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(i) 
ABSTRACT
 
The paper discusses the problems encounteied in moving into 
the industrial econamy, defined as an econcrq in which the industrial 
labor force exceeds the agricultural labor force. The difficulties of 
the transition are ascribed to the nature of the monsoon economy of Asia 
whose special characteristics are described. The paper analyzes the 
transition for Japan, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea and the 
differences in the pattern of the transition of Taiwan and the Republic 
of Korea. This is followed by a discussion of how and where the* 
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia stand with respect to the 
stages of the transition. Brief discussions on how Hong Kong and 
Singapore were able to move fran the service econany to the industrial 
econcy, contrasting their experience with that of the giants of Asia, 
China and India, carplete the paper. 
The paper emphasizes that under monsoon conditions the need to 
develop agriculture sufficiently before shifting to an industrial 
strategy for a speedy and successful cupletion of the transition. The 
difficulties encountered, during the transition with heavy processing 
industries are identified. The relationship of a successful transition
 
to full employ nt, lower income inequalities and the demographic 
transition is briefly traced. 
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IN-MONSOON ASIATHE TRANSITION ) AN nDUSTRIAL BCONOMY 
UIRODUCTION 
exceptionally difficultTransition to an industrial economy is 
of the peculiar stricture offor the monsoon countries of Asia because 
this paper, a generalmonsoon paddy agriculture. In the first half of 
framework is presented in which we attempt to describe and analyze why 
examine how Taiwan and the Republicthis is so. In the second part, we 
industrial society during theof Korea were able to move into the 
third part is concerned with thepostwar decades ending in 1980. The 
inability up to the present of the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia 
near success of West Malaysia into become industrial societies and the 
end of the 1970s. The fourth part dealsachieving that status at the 
failed to industrialize whereasbriefly with why India and China have 
though from being service ratherHong Kong and Singapore have succeeded 

than predominantly agricultural societies.
 
The paper assumes the following definitions: the econamy is 
divided into three sectors; an industrial econamy or society is one in 
labor force is enployed in mining,which the greatest part of the 
construction, manufacturing, public utilities, transport, cammunication 
one in which the largest part isand storage; an agricultural society is 
engaged in farming, forestry, fishing ard livestock; and a service 
econmy is one in which the largest part is engaged neither in industry 
nor agriculture but in modern business, personal and public services. 
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Such definitions nay seem arbitrary but they are conceptually usefl and 
For when the labor force in industryparticularly so in the first case. 
begins to exceed that of agriculture, it is just about then that income 
secondary educationinequality begins to fall and enrollment in 
to. theaccelerates; in other words as the demographic transition 
requirement of the definition is made, there is a corresponding 
factor productivity (asacceleration in the growth of inare and 
explained below). Let us now outline the changing patterns that emerge 
as a monsoon economy evolves into an industrial society. 
I. THE MONSOON ECONOMY OF ASIA 
Certain problems of South and East Asia are closely connected 
with the monsoon climate which gave rise, several thousand of years ago, 
to a form of agriculture quite different from that based on the 
This section deals with the naturecultivation of wheat as in the West. 

of the monsoon climate, its relation to paddy/rice agriculture with its
 
pronounced seasonality and labor intensity and the relation of that 
agriculture to the non-agricultural sector, so clarifying the 
and pattern of growth of monsoon Asiadifferences between the structure 
and non-monsoon lands. Without such an understanding the dynamics of 
growth in postwar Asian countries, particularly the transition from an 
agricultural to an industrial society, cannot be understood. Certainly 
theoriesthat trarsition cannot be adequately explained by the Western 
of growth found in the Classical, Neoclassical, Marxian systems and in 
the Iewis/RanisiFei theories of dualisn and unlimited labor supply. l1 
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econmy ofClassical/Marxiandiffers from the For the Monsoon econmy 

the 19th century and frcm the Neoclassical 
world of the 20th century.
 
choice but to evolve, over manySouth Asians had noEast and 
the otherthat of 
a form of agriculture different from centuries, 

as no cereal crop other than rice was
 
agricultural systems of the world, . 2/Asi a of monsoonand the humidityof rainfallto the patternsuited 

the very nature
was adopted,asAnd once paddy rice the basic food crop 

of the past centuries in
 and institutiflsthe science, technologyof 
dictated that paddy-rice 
Asia and the world at large up to World 
War I, 
unlikea labor-based technologygr"ing should be labor-intensive with 
from about the 18th century say, Europe whichthe wheat agriculture of, 
became increasingly labor-saving. Accordingly, monsoon Asia ended up 
by 
and with 
with the highest population densities the end of World War II 
than one-half of the world's population of which the majority lived more 
in China and India. 
so many people, labor supply should It would appear that with 
of Asia; that this was for the industrializationno probleiashave po ed 
In a nutshell the explanation is 
not so calls for detailed explanation. 
winds bringsthe monsoon
the pronounced seasonality of as follows: 
of the year but very little in the 
other. 
in one-halfheavy rains 
the most labor-using type of thousands of years,Asians developed, over 
ial water-floodedwas grown in s the world has known. Riceagriculture 
of people ploughing,large nmbersrains came withplots when the 
rigid schedule imposed by the transplanting, and harvesting under a 
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timing of the monsoon rains. But when the rain stopped, the densely 
populated farms were left with a large labor force with little to do as 
the farms dried up. Although such labor was available for industrial 
purposes during the slack months most of it had to get back to farm work 
when the rains came so that the rice needed to sustain so rmny people 
throughout the year could be produced. Hence, year-round 
industrialization using extensive mechanized equipment and a supervising 
staff, was greatly impeded by the scarcity of labor during the rainy 
months. The poverty of the densely packed Asian countries was thus 
partly due to the scarcity of remunerative work opportunities during the 
dry season for the enormous labor force, and the small size of the paddy 
farms which required a lot of labor during the rainy season, and 
therefore high population densities relative to farm land. This type of 
agriculture, unlike that of the West, developed a small and 
labor-intensive industrial and service sector structure with 
institutions differing fron those of the West. The following discussion 
anplifies the foregoing smary statement. 
A. The Monsoon Asian Econany Differentiated from Western Economy 
Because it is the world's largest land mass with a "vast 
cmplex of mountains and plateaus", centered near Tibet and bounded by 
the Himalayas, Pamirs, Sinhiang and the southeastern mountains of China, 
two sudden and pronounced reversals of wind pattern occur each year; 
during the winter months, cold, dry air blows out of the land mass 
towards the south, and during the sumrer months, moistura-laden winds 
from the surrounding seas flow into the continent, bringing heavy 
rains.­
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The rainfall must be heavy enough during at least 
four months 
to collect for rice seedlgs to germinateof the year for enough water 
and then, after transplanting, to grow to maturity. Where the rainfall 
is too heavy, as in parts of Sumatra (and also parts of Africa and Latin 
paddy rice growing is .not feasible. The monsoon winds 
do not 
America), 
now heavily populatedof Asia but do affect what areaffect all parts 
include nearly all of Southeast monsoon countries of Asia pregions. The 

Japan, Korea, Burma, Nepal,
Asia and the densely settled parts of China, 
exclude Hokkaido, Manchuria, and India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh; they 

in the north, Western China, Afghanistan, nost 
of
 
the Mongolias 
islands of Indonesia, and Mindanao in the Pakistan, the southeastern 
Philippines.-
Chart I shows the rainfall patterns of the main regions 
of the 
even 
The large mode for monsoon Asia contrasts sharply with 
the 
world. 
Latin Anerica, and Africa.North America,rainfall patterns of Europe, 
of the paddieslimits the use The pronounced seasonality of the monsoons 
during theunless irrigation brings water to about half the year only, 
look for off-farm work The majority of Asian peasants mustdry seasons. 
(and*also after the busy nonths of planting and during the dry mronths 
do not require ruchrice crops growing in waterbefore harvesting, as 
such 
care, especially weeding, ccmpared with crops grown in 
dry fields, 
as wheat).. Traditionally they took up handicraft production in addition 
the import of cheaperand hunting, tiagh withto forestry, fishing 
lost their urban markets,fran abroad, peasantsmachine-made products 
In We-teen 
and production of handicrafts was confined to village needs. 
Source; Royal Meteorologfcal offce .1. K. 
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countries, the sparsely settled, low-density, rural areas, together with 
the relative evenness of rainfall throughout the year, permitted fanrers 
to complement their agricultural production with livestock-raising as 
there was sufficient land to grow crops in addition to wheat or other 
cereals to feed livestock during the winter. As will be note& below the 
rise of capitalistic agriculture, especially in England fron the 18th 
century, greatly hastened the separation of agriculture fron handicraft 
production, and making it more heavily dependent on animal husbandry. 
Such a separation has never occurred in monsoon Asia, even up to the 
present, except in plantation crops, such as rubber, requiring labor 
all-year round. Most of the available work was marginal, intermittent, 
irregular, of short duration, and of low intensity, so that remuneration 
per day was low. I have estimated, on the basis of data from various 
surveys, that on average the agricultural labor force is unemployed for 
about a quarter to a third of the year.- / 
The other problem in the development of nonsoon agriculture 
was the great labor requirent per hectare during the rainy seasons., 
Labor requirement per hectare of paddy-rice growing varied fran country 
to country depending mainly on the extent to which work animals (and in 
East Asia, machines) were used but also on the prevalence of irrigation 
and transplantation. In the pre-war decades about 50 man-days were 
required in the Philippines, 80 in Thailand and Bombay, 100 in West 
Bengal, and 150 in Madras, China and Japan. The lower figures for 
Southeast Asia (except Java) reflect the more extensive use of work 
animals and the limited extent of irrigation and transplantation, though 
.8
 
for the wheat culture even these figures were considerably higher than 
of the 19th century when ,no machines wereof the U.S. at the beginning 
(before widespreadused / For the United States in 1900 
for corn weremechanization), 5 man-days for wheat and 10 days 
needed.6/ 
The major reasons for the heavy labor requirement of 
to wheat and other cereals were, first, the needpaddy-rice as coapared 
the tine-consuming of harvesting with 
(in order to get high yields) to prepare seelling beds and 
transplantation instead of broadcasting or drilling as in wheat, second 
methods a small knife or later, 
a scythe as used inwith the short-stalk variety, a sickle instead of 
Western wheat cultivation in the 19th century, and third, the rigid work 
schedule inqosed by rainy seasons, requiring concentrated labor. 
come,Typically in Asian paddy fields, when the early rains 
the seedling beds are plowed and harrowed several times. By hoeing, 
made into fine, softplowing, or tranpling,. the soil of the seed bed is 
mud before sowing. In most countries, the seeds are soaked in water and 
then broadcast after the water is drained. The water is replaced in the 
paddy after the seeds have germinated, and after about a month, the 
young rice plants are pulled out, tied in bundles, topped, and taken to 
the paddies to be planted in the main fields.- / 
Daring harvesting, reaping with knives and sickles requires 
The use of the large scythe employed inmany workers, mainly wcmen. 
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or moist paddy soil.wheat harvesting is not feasible due to the 	wet 
the grournd after reaping.moisture can spoil the grain if it falls to 
with the long-stalk indica rice used extensively in SoutheastMoreover, 
a carinn problem,Asia before the spread of IRRI varieties, lodging is 
must be cut singly withleading to uneven maturing so that the heads 
small knives -- all this to avoid heavy losses due to shattering, 
lodging and uneven maturing. Unlike other grains, -the mature rice grain 
readily shatters. 
Extreme labor-intensity, together with the rigid schedule 
iosed by the rainy seasons,8/ underlie the great population 
Asia. In Appendix Table 2, agricultural densitiesdensities of monsoon 
the highestare shon for the various regions of the world. Asia had 
(1.3 persons per hectare copared to 0.4 for the world as a whole). But 
even these figures understate the population density of monsoon Asia, 
since Asia in the table includes non-imnsoon Asia (the Middle East, 
Pakistan, western and northern China, half of India, and so on). If 
Asia'srough adjustments ard made to exclude these areas, monsoon 
instead of 1.3.density rises to about 5 to 10 persons per hectare 
data on average. area of holdingsAppendix Tables 2 and 3 also present 
which is 2 hectares for Asia and 17 hectares for the world. Again if 
the non-monsoon regions are excluded the 2 hectares may fall to less 
than 1 leetare. 
Thus, the extreme labor-intensity and population densities of 
the paddy rice agricultural areas of monsoon Asia have meant that farms 
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And because of small are tiny carpared with other parts of the world. 
for the growing of feed for livestockfarm size and land scarcity, land 
was so severely limited that animal husbandry could not-be developed as 
during the slack season, as in the West. a source of additional income 
In sum, a highly specialized type of agriculture very 
rest of the world evolved in the course ofdifferent from those of the 
seasonsthousands of years. Labor was abundant during the slack dry but 
the busy, rainy months. Agriculture had to be combined scarce during 
with handicraft and other nonfarm occupations, and unlike in the West, 
never evolved into a completely specialized industry (except on 
of animal husbandry complemented farmingplantations)*. Fishery instead 
as fish were caught in the paddies, lakes, and coastal waters. Above 
size of and long seasons limited theall, the small farms the dry 
them in poverty throughout the periodearning power of Asians, 	 keeping 
the half ofrevolutions in latterof the agricultural and 	 industrial 
West moved far ahead of monsoon Asia. (Seethis millenium when the 
foctnote 15 for citation.) In the next section, we discuss the inpact 
of this type of agriculture (the overwhelmingly dominant sector of the 
sector, which also developedon the nonagriculturaltraditional economy) 
small units of labor-intensive production. 
Services andB. The Small Size and Labor-Intensity of Industry, 
Homes
 
on nonagriculture may be 	described asAgriculture's influence 
since most of the industries could only be follows. On the supply side, 
when labor was easilyoperated at full capacity 	during the slack seasons 
large buildings, and aavailable, 	 the use of expensive machines, 
per:anent staff of supervisors was 	costly and uneconomic. 
Moreover, the 
slack seasons made labor-intensivecheapness 	 of labor during the 
in or near the home and farm feasible and economic. Land foroperations 
was expensive because of the great populationworkshops and stores 
the river basins, where most ofdensities of the lowlands in and around 
population was concentrated. 
in the West larger. farms made forOn the demand side, while 
longer distances between one family and another, in the densely settled 
low-lands of monsoon Asia, villages were large clusters of farm families 
In the West,
which could sustain small but many workshops and stores. 
towns to market theirindividual farmers had to travel to nearby 
produce, purchase inputs and consumption goods. Transportation was not 
be andhorses could raised a problem since, with plenty 	 of land, 
means of travel. In monsoon Asia, withmaintained cheaply as 	the major 
the rich could afford horses and carriages forland scarcity, only 
and the oxen and buffaloes could not be used for transport into trunc, 
age. In the cities,transportation. Asia never had a horse and buggy 
part of the city to another promotedthe difficulties of moving from one 

workers

neighborhood stores and workshops to w.hich the ordinary or 
could walk. The cities -f traditional Asia were clusters of consumers 
many towns with numerous market centers in each town. Thus, before the 
coming of bicycles, st-eet cars, and buses, the scarcity of grazing land 
precluded the extensive use of animal-drawn transport (ar in the West), 
of small neighborhood storeswhich therefore made the numerous 	 centers 
-- A - (Wripnli7 or-able 41.­1.t-nvu 
12 
To the small units of industry and ccm erce may be added the 
small haes ("rabbit hutches" according to the OECD), closely bunched in 
monsoon Asia. Dense settlement inthe villages, towns and cities of 
to the cost of land, houses andsmall dwelling units is partly due 
transport, but also to the smaller physiques of Asians in contrast to 
Asians may be more than just genetics. InWesterners. The size of 
educational
Japan with better nutrition in the postwar decades, 

authorities are finding that the standard uniforms worn students inby 
each grade of primary and secondary schools are too small for the 
students caming in later years into each grade, as Japanese families 
begin to eat more Western type of foods. 
be noted that in those parts of Asia just outside or at
It my 

the edge of the monsoon territory, wheat/meat diets are prevalent and 
than those in the rice-eating sections ofpeople are taller and larger 
Manchuria and northern China, northwesternthese countries, (e.g., 
India, West Pakistan) .2/ The nutrient value for physical growth of 
diet is said to be inferior to tnat or achildren in rice/fish/bean 
wheat/meat/milk diet. moreover, the lack of year-round enployment in 
the rmnsoon area may have contributed to low food-intake of growing 
children during the months before the harvest of rice which over a long
 
the failure of children in monsoon Asiaperiod may have been a factor in 
the "land of to grow bigger. (For example, Korea was referred to as 
that the millennia of evolutionaryspring hunger".) And it is likely 
selection may not have favored the larger-sized physique which requires 
too large a caloric intake for the retabollic functions of the'body 
during the slack, dry season when work activity and food supplies were 
13
 
low, and that during the busy seasons, height was a disadvantage in 
transplanting, weeding and harvesting, which requi much bending 
down. I ' Thus as in farming, the monsoons by keeping units of 
production in norfarming small and labor-intensive contributed to the 
poverty of Asians. But in one respect, the influence of the -monsoon 
economy was not negative. 
C. 	 The Impact of Monsoon Agriculture on Work Culture and Social 
Stability 
The heavy demand for workers during the busy seasons had a 
favorable impact on diligence and propensity to work, particularly on 
housewives and young :orkers who had to help out with transplanting and 
harvesting when labor was in short supply. Thus, it became the accepted 
practice for most housewives and children to take part in working in the 
fields with adult males in Asia, u-ilike in most Western countries. The 
scarcity of crop land and the exacting and complex requirements of 
monsoon agriculture for high yields from small farms by thorough 
plowing, rigid schedules and close tining, seedling growing and 
transplanting, multiple- and inter-cropping, intensive reaping and 
threshing, good water control, irrigation and drainage all contributed 
to a high quality work skills and ethics, and to thriftiness as it was 
necessary to save for the lean months ahead and because of the general 
scarcity of raw materials. 
Even mre important was the impact of monsoon agriculture on 
attitudes toward cooperation, consensus, and harmonious relations in 
14
 
associated with Western capitalisticcontrast to the individualism 
agriculture. Because of the great demand for labor and the rigid 
timdng during the busy months, villages -re ccnzpelled to schedule and 
idealsdepend on their kinfolks and neighbors for group work; therefore 
living harmoniously evolved, strengthenedand traditions of working and 
in the East Asian countries by the systematic teaching of Confucian 
need to work in groups of a dozen or so ethics. In my view, the 
and harvesting and to develop more families during plowing, planting 
than group effort in dealing with the distribution of water and 
the 
The basicunderlies Asian groupism.maintenance of irrigation works, 
reason for group farming may be stated as follows. 
agriculture.seasons, unlike in Western 
The family unit was too small to undertake the anount and 
diversity of tasks required during the short periods of the peak 
The various tasks involved in 
(pulling and heading of seedlings,land preparation and transplantation 
carrying and distributing them to the transplanters, guiding and feeding 
special skills, different degrees ofthe workers, and so on) require 
strength and muscle-power and experience, which can best be net by 
sexes of different
specialization and division of labor between the 
can be carried out by the strongest males, while ages. Land-preparation 
can be done by elderlyand feeding the transplanterscoordinating 
be pulling and distributingcouples. The youngest workers can the 
doing most of the transplanting.seedlings with the younger adults 
an element of flexibility canMreover, with group planting and plowing, 

be introduced into the schedule by staggering the days of preparation of
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seedling beds and therefore transplanting to the individual plots of the 
of harvesting timeparticipating families, so making the staggering 
possible within the rigid schedules imposed by .the monsoons. And the 
enthusiasn generated by group work (often accacrpanied by singing and 
reduces the tediousness and arduouaness cf long hours ofsocializing) 
12/ 
thereby raising efficiency.­work, 
tn addition, there were other operations calling for group 
work; for example, the cooperation rl.uired to, maintain, coordinate, 
distribute and expand irrigation infrastructure. Irrigation activities 
and quaternarywere necessary within the village (with tertiary 
(with secondary irrigation) andirrigation Wrks), between the villages 

between districts and provinces (with primary irrigation).
 
It may be useful at this point to distinguish between 
of primary andpolitical and social stability.1 3 / The network 
secondary irrigation works between provinces, districts and villages may 
to political stability and unity while thebe said to be related more 
tertiary and quaternary may be more related to social stability within 
It is the need to cooperate and work together on irrigationvillages. 

works near and within villages together with the need to work in groups
 
of families during the heavy labor requirements during the
 
plowing/planting and harvesting seasons within each village that seem to
 
underlie the historic stability of Asian village society, (as
 
deronstrated by the ability of ancient civilizations such as India and
 
China to last so long). Of the two, I believe that it is the latter
 
rather than the former which contributes more to social stability within
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(farms upstream vs. the village. Irrigation prcblems within villages 
in lower and higher terraces) or or farmsthose downstreams between 
to create more conflicts and disagreementsbetween villages are likely 
which although normally resolved one way or another, leave a residue of 
or sections of villages.bad feelings and hostility between villages 
in neighboring villages are (Thus, relations between Asian peasants 
generally far from being cordial.) In contrast, the tradition of 
working together at planting and harvesting has given rise to concepts 
such as gotong rojong (in Java), bayanihan (in hilippines), and "eating 
all of which inply group 1;rorkfrom the same pot of rice" (in East Asia) 
within the village. 
Mreover, where transplantation is widely practiced, as in 
and Java, the villages are much more cohesive and tightlyEast Asia 
in of Thailand, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia and structured than parts 
India where deep-water rice-growing (due to the over-flow of the major 
areas 
rivers) precludes transplantation of seedlings. In these 
pre low, as broadcasting or drilling does not population densities 
require much labor. The anthropologist, John F. ERbree, found that Thai 
villages were loosely structured and villagers more independent than in 
anthropologists investigated theJapan, but it turned out after other 
south ofEmbree hypothesis that he was discussing villages to the 
Bangkok where not paddy rice but deep-water rice was grwn, and that in 
was carried out villagesparts of Thailand where transplantationmost 
in upland rice-growing where were cohesive and structured. Similarly 
for paddies, the absence of transplantationthe rainfall is insufficient 
in dry-land farming may make for less groupism. 
17
 
In ray view, these values of Asian groupisn may turn out to be 
in the age of 20th century industrial' technology whichvaluable assets 
increasingly requires good cooperation between workers and management 
more appropriate
rather than individualistic, confrontational attitudes, 
to 19th century technology. Groupism inplies that within the 
group, members help each other in one another's work as the group has to 
compete with other groups. It also implies that decisions are ade not 
fashion as in the modern corporation but with highin authoritarian a 
of the group and throughdegree of participation by the main meirbers 
consensus which in turn calls for compromise. At all times every effort 
nust be made to maintain cordial, harmonious relations within the group 
to be organized and to function effectively.if the latthr is 
D. 	 A Framework for Analyzing the Dynamics of Monsoon Asian 
Economies 
With the foregoing background, we can now proceed to outline 
the, analysis of the transition to the industrial our approach to 
The time frame for the study must be longer than thesociety. 
Marshallian long-run (roughly the lifetime of a factory). It may be 
defined as the period long enough for substantial changes in 
technologies and institutir- to take place in the economy as a whole; 
a very clearcut definition for operational purposes,though this is not 
it may be said that the postwar era, from the mid-1940s to the late 
1970s, saw vast changes in technologies and institutions in most of the 
and that the slowdown in the pace ofixportant countries of the world, 
18
 
world grath and change in the early 	years of the 1980s may mark 
the end 
of the postwar era. 
The analysis must start with the overwhelming inwrtant. 
as noted above, was primarily responsible foragricultural sector which, 
the Asian econoy franvarious characteristics differentiating monsoon 
the Western econcmy. Pronounced seasonality caused labor to be abundant p 
in another, so retarding extensivein one part of the year but scarce 
Great labor-intensities and populationmechanized industrialization. 
tied dan large amounts of manpower in tiny farms, yieldingdensities 
meager returns per worker. Elsewhere I have described how seasonality 
the introduction into Asia of nearly 	all and labor intensities precluded 
in the West, which raisedthe innovations of the agricultural 	revolution 
for the industrial revolution, which output per worker and paved the way 
all the innovations of 
ushered in modern econcmic growth.1 5 / Nearly 
were land-using and labor-savingthe Western Agricultural revolution 
clover, grasses, turnip, seed drilling,(animal feed crops such, as 
crop rotation, inproved fallowing,scythe/craddle reapihg, 
for teams of horses, capitalistic farming, and so on),multiple-plows 
the case of drainage) or, if and were either non-applicable (as in 
hectare yields to fall drastically andapplicable, would cause per 

unemployment to rise substantially.
 
on the trend of profits asThe Classical ecocmists focussed 
in which not only nonagriculturethey had in mind a capitalistic econamy 
largely operated by capitalistic entrepreneursbut also agriculture was 
enploying many workers and using substantial amounts of material and 
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equipment. In these farms and factories, capital accumulation in the 
force, and purchasing the currentform of finances for paying the work 
inputs and equipment was necessary. In the small peasant farms of 
monsoon agriculture, the accumlation of capital of such magnitude is 
capital isnot a prerequisite for operation, so that the volume of of 
limited importance in the dynamics of monsoon agriculture. It is the 
annual return to the peasant and his family that is of major consequence 
in the groth of national prluct and its distribution - whether in 
influencing the dynamics of savings and consmption, or causing 
structural and demographic changes. In these small, family farms where 
the whole family participates in productive activities during the peak 
seasons, as described above, it is not the individual return to the head 
of the family farms that matters but the collective return of the family 
is notmembers. (This is why the annual return to the family nebers 
separable individually to each member and cannot be apportioned 
accurately into rent, interest, proprietor's profit and wages.) 
(1) Full Erployment 
related problems ofThe first task mrist be to solve the 
unemployment, underemployment, and low inccaes in the rural areas of a 
so, annual return or income per farmmonsoon economy. In order to do 
grwing faster than the labor supply and such growthfamily should be 
nust be sustained until full emplyment is reached. In nonsoon Asia, 
unlike in the West or Latin America, since the overwhelming bulk of farm 
production canes from the small peasantry, the sustained growth of farm 
family incomes can take place only if the incomes of the small peasants 
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are raised. To raise the growth rate of annual farm family 
hectare can be increased but, moreproductivity, average yields per 
inportant, multiple-cropping and off-farm employment (during the dry 
And these affect the smaller peasantsseasons) must also be increased. 
much more because surplus labor per family is more plentiful than in 
raised by the estblishrrent oflarger farms. -When the growth rate is 
long-lasting .. infrastnuture such as irrigation/drainage, rural 
roads, and rural industries, and institutionalelectrification, 
inprovenents such as Farnmrs' associations, better tenurial conditions, 
xiral banks, stations and so an,agricultural extensions, experimntal 
the full employment achieved meay be said to be long-run or secular, and 
itu_. of farm families are not transitionalthe corresponding higher 
but permanent. The majar abstacle ni sed by the monsoon - the low 
incaes due to undeziployae.,t in the slack season is then 
1 1 aiE-ached, theoverccne. As full eniyrirrt i.n the "ural areas is 
sustained groth of rura'. l,ct'es ir lxes the growth -of darand -for the 
output of industry and -viewhich c-tr ibute to the expansion of 
employment.in the urban a3..,i 
(2) 'Rise in Daeit'ic Market 
Not only the land-. Aning peasatrd's -inm=es rise but also 
those of share tenants and 1a."Iiess wrkers, Jzmg .before fuWi eployent 
is attained. This is because -as .id wn3 irltipkcqing rise, the 
absolute ammxt received by -he tenants in thEr cntrated shars 
duringincreases .and the wages of landless workes rise largely .Because 

of uorlms in
the busy seasos there tends - -,e a sf 9z -m onsn 
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paddy agriculture as already 	 indicated./ Similarly, as more 
(such as rural, mechanized work due toproductive off-farm work develops 
arural electrification), the rise in marginal product will entail rise 
18 /
in the earnings of landless workers as well as of other workers.-. 
The strong values of harmony, cooperation, and good relations among 
kinsfolk and neighbors in Asia dictate that equal pay for hired as well 
as family and exchange labor is necessary if motivated work effort is to 
19 /
be realized. 
With higher and groing annual incomes of rural families, the 
home market of the vast majority of the population rises to higher 
levels, and the markets for domestically produced industrial products 
expand substantially, especially for labor-intensive products such as 
clothing, houseware, farm tools and equipment, etc. As noted above, the 
peasants were too poor to buy machine-made products, and produced their 
own clothing, farm inputs, etc. during their off-farm months by 
traditional but low productivity methods (such as hand spinning and 
hand-loans) but now, with rural industrialization, the peasants can find 
tojobs in better-paying activities, the incae fran which is used 
by traditionalsubstitute for things they produced for themselves 
methods. Hence, the increase in the domestic market is even greater 
than the increase in incczes. 
(3) Full Employmxent, Mechanization 	 and Industrialization 
Once full employment is approached as farm family annual 
the use ofearnings continue to rise faster than the labor supply, 
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modern tools and small sinple machines in monsoon paddy agriculture 
begins to take place, as real wages of hired workers in the peak seasons 
in the large rural sectorbegin to accelerate. The rise 	in real wages 
sector to rise also and mechanization offorces real wages in the urban 
industry begins to accelerate. As noted above, the domstic-market 
expands at first, and exports for the foreign market later begin to 
accelerate, as local entrepreneurs and workers gain experience in 
manufacturing (together with the strong work ethics of Asian workers and 
managers, and mechanization) raise the efficiency and the international 
Industrial employment begins tocarpetitiveness of local manufactures. 
labor in the urban sectors induceaccelerate and soon shortages 	 of 
20 /migration of young workers from 	the rural areas. 
With the loss of young workers to the urban areas, the 
mechanization of monsoon paddy growing is hastened, and small, 
hand-operated, diesel-powered, mechanical tractors, transplanters, 
reapers, and threshers begin to take the place of the young men and 
wamen leaving for indutries. 
And the furthea development of the process of increased 
annual incomes of rural and urban families converts full employment into 
labor shortages, as the pool of workers fram agriculture, from the 
over-staff services, and housewives fran households, begin to disappear. 
Industrialization moves increasingly to the small towns near 
heavily populated rural areas to take advantage of more flexible labor 
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wages offered induce more and more agriculturalmarkets, as higher 

workers to take on full-year employment in nearby towns.
 
and salaries all-around motivateIn turn, higher wages 
interplay
manpower to improve productiWity, and t--re is an intricate 
between increases in produut.ivity, wage-, and mechanization, unlike in 
the static conventional theories of wage determination. As long as 
the process of transition toindustries established are labor-intensive, 
an industrial society is fairly smooth and rapid. 
Structural Changes and the Transition to Industrial(4) 
Society 
The migration of workers from agriculture with accelerating 
mechanization comprises an absolute decline (not just a relative 
decline) in the labor force engaged in agriculture -- which never 
occurred in monsoon paddy agriculture before. This, together with the 
same of the over-staffed service sectorsshift of redundant wor]ers from 
to industries, signals the transformation of an agricultural society 
the shift fran a rural andinto an industrial society (including 
traditional to an urban and modern society). 
Reinforcing these structural changes on the Puqply side are 
the impact fran the demand side. Incom elasticities in tie. demand for 
and root crops), fall as workfood, especially caloric foods (cereal 
shift fran the use of foodwith machines instead of tools inplies a 
are same of the forces underlyingcalories to mechanical energy. (These 
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the fall in the Engel coefficient.) Thus, production structures change 
not only fran agriculture to industry but also, within the former, the 
production of protein food, fish, livestock and poultry, fruits and 
vegetables, and within the latter nonfood manufacturing become 
relatively more inportant. 
Occupationally, the substitution of machines for men 
increasingly leads to unskilled workers in agriculture and industry (and 
scmewhat later the service industries) being replaced by semi- and 
skilled workers. And as wages rise, industrial structure shifts from 
the production of lower to higher quality and grades of product, while 
labor-intefisive handicrafts and cottage industries tend to be eliminated 
unless their processes are mechanized. 
(5) Income Distribution 
The cumulative impact of tJa foregoing changes are more 
favorable to families in the lower than higher inccme groups, thereby 
improving the distribution of family incomes. Income variances between 
the major sectors decline as yields and crops per hectare, off-farm 
employment :and mechanization raise average peasant incames closer to 
nonfarm incomes. Variance within agriculture fall as crops per hectare 
and off-farm employment tend to raise incomes of smaller peasants who 
have more surplus labor per hectare than the peasant with larger 
fralms. / Land and other agrarian reforms, besides their direct 
distributive impact, favorably influence snall peasants' productivity 
Uhoucgh better work motivation and better distribution of government 
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information, etc.,services such as credit, water, extension, education, 
power on .,,all peasants, especially if institutionsby conferring more 

such as farners' organizatios., are established effectively.
 
In the nonagricultural sector, variances within industry are 
reduced by the mechanization of hand-work. The demand for skilled and 
rises faster than that for unskilled wrkers whowhite-collar workers 
are increasingly shifted to jobs such as machine operators with higher 
pay. Full employment and rising wages bring housewives and younger 
workers into the factories, raisinr, earnings per family among the 
working classes. Workers in menial services (such as domestic work) and 
marginal occupations (in the unorganized sector) are able to get better 
paying jobs in factories, stores and shops. The reduction of cottage 
industries and small, informal sector activities reduces the number of 
small, underemployed proprietors. In labor-intensive industrialization, 
the spread of capital over large numbers of firms tenrls to lower wage 
and profit differentials between industries. 
Accordingly, one can expect the secular decline in incae 
the time of the entry of the nation intoinequalities to begin around 
full employment,industrial society, which coincides with long-run 

mechanization, and the absolute decline of the farm labor force. 2 2 /
 
(6) Personayn 
Unlike in the West where most of the savings are frar the 
-
3highest incrme decile, 2 in monsoon Asia, higher incomes for the 
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to save to buy mechanized and other equipment forpeasants enable them 
busy seasons of planting/plowing and reaping/threshing as laborthe 
becomes scarce. For the urban proprietor, higher incomes enable savings 
to buy more and better machines and equiprent, better to meet the 
challenge of his competitors, to expand his operations in the groqig 
and to cope with rising wages and tight labor markets.markets, 
For rural and urban workers as for proprietors, sustained 
growt-h in the use of mechanized and other technologies and higher family 
incames enable increasing amounts to be saved for the education of their 
going beyond primary grades to secondary and even tertiarychildren, 

levels. As production technologies become more ccnplex and the demand
 
for unskilled work relative to skilled and technical work falls, farming
 
and working-class parents begin to realize the need for longer years of
 
eveneducation for their children, who have to cope with more complex 
technologies in the future. 
As job opportunities open up for housewives, households begin
 
to save to purchase appliances and other consumer durables in order to 
spent on, house work, after which families save toreduce the tine 
purchase homes and for insurance against old age.
 
As noted above, urbanization and the use of mechanical power
 
hence the intake of caloric foodsreduce the use of muscle power and 
among laboring families. (Note that this implies that the energy costs 
are paid for by enterprises rather than the households,)of working 
With thrift-onscious Asians, this probably tends to lower the 
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propensity to consume and increases savings, particularly in a Confucian 
society. Siilar impact on food consumption may have been the reduced 
consumption of calorie intake for basal metabolisii due to full 
enployment, relative to personal income. (See footnote 10) 
In a Confucian culture, the urge to work hard and long, and to 
earn enough in order to save for business, for more education of the 
young, for hame and old age is probably stronger than in many other 
cultures, perhaps even stronger than in the Western Protestant ethic 
(whose inpact may be mainly on the entrepreneurs). A labor-intensive 
strategy emphasizing the development of small farms and other small 
businesses provides extensive opportunities to realize the ideals found 
in Confucian teaching. 
(7) Family Consumption 
Even though the propensity to oonsume is falling as noted, the 
growth rate of consumption (dc/c) may be rising. The fall of the former 
and tie rise of the latter are not inconsistent as long as family income 
is rising as fast as family consumption, given the saving (with the 
changes in the two propensities cancelling out). It is the groth rate 
of consumption and not the propensity which is relevant to the growth of 
the domestic market.24/ 
28 
(8) The Relation of the Industrial Transition to the
 
Demgraphic Transition 
of this is found in another paper,A full discussion 
in Postwar East and Southeast Asia", (mimeo)-Februry"Fertility Trends 
1983, School of Economics, and too long to be even summarized here. The
 
previous section noted that lower incare groups save part of their 
income to send their children to schools beyond primary level, thereby 
and raising the cost offoregoing incomes fram teenagers working, 

rearing children. The value of children as sources of income and as
 
insurance for parents as they grow old declines as higher incmes permit 
parents to buy land and hames, health insurance, and get into pension 
schemes. Thus, the industrial society, by raising the cost of children 
and lowering their value by requiring rore education, higher incames, 
together with other forces (higher opportunity costs of female labor and 
of urban living, and so on), tend to reduce fertility. The higher 
incomes generated by industrial society have better uses than increasing
 
the number of children who can be substituted for by mechanized 
whose for can reduced by purchasingtechnologies and value old age be 
assets and insurance.
 
The foregoing is a general framework, relevant for the region 
as a whole. When applied to specific countries, as in the following 
sections, we need to bring in special factors, especially historical and
 
These unique
natural endowmts, which differ fran country to country. 

forces are inportant, as will be seen, in the*understanding of the
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growth of particular countries (such as Confucianism in East Asia, 
plantations in Southeast Asia, the type of colonialism or its absence, 
and so on). (For the inportance of these exogenous factors, see my 
the US cited in note 4/papers on Japan and on 
II. TAIPW AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA MOVE INTO THE INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 
Though we focus on differences in the grwth pattern, the 
similarities are many and plentifully describet- in literature. A quick 
rundown may be useful before we begin. The annual growth rate of GmP 
per capita at constant prices is identical for both, 5.7 per cent, 
1950-1980.. This impressive record over three decades (second only to 
Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong), was accamanied by rapid shifts away 
fran agriculture; substantial falls in incae disparities fran prewar 
decades, in birth and death rates, and in unenploynent; and sharp rises 
in total factor productivity, in educational enmollments, literacy, life 
expectancies, and so on -- all signs pointing to the widespread 
distribution of the benefits of growth (as in Japan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore), unlike in Mexico, Brazil and other NICs. It should be noted 
that the aggregate record of growth in Taiwan, Republic of Korea, Japan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore is quite unprecedented in the annals of modern 
econanic growth whether capitalistic or socialistic. 
Institutionally and historically, both countries have had long 
traditions of Confucian culture with strong work ethics. Both were 
colonies of Japaw in the prewar decades, oppressed and exploited but 
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taught the rudiments of modern agriculture, the construction of modern 
physical infrastructure, -4nd the operation of institutions such as 
cooperatives and extensions. Both started the postwar decades with 
extensive land reform, US government assistance (largely offsetting the 
huge military expenditures) and influx of migrants, many of whqm were 
experienced entrepreneurs and technicians. Both have been ruled by 
authoritarian, central governments, and both have benefitted much from 
their proximity to Japan (and the US). Both, above all, are monsoon 
economies like Japan - of a type with meager natural resources, but 
with ethnic and social homogeneity, unlike Southeast Asia. 
But differences in historical and natural endaments should be 
noted. Because of subtropical climate, Taiwan was better suited for 
agricultural development than Korea with long severe winters. Being 
closer to Manchuria, Japan found Korea to be a suitable staging ground 
for the invasion of North China, and hence established many more 
industries than in Taiwan. Mobt important, the invasion from the north 
devastated much of the Republic of Korea in the early 1950s, requiring a 
long period of reconstruction which delayed the industrialization and 
modernization process. And there are important historical differences 
if one goes back into the 19th and earlier centuries.- 5 
The transition into industrial society of Taiwan and the 
Republic of Korea was preceded by that of Japan in the late 1950s; 
frequent references will be made to the Japanese experience insofar as 
it sheds light on the topic. The unusual speed of Japanese transition 
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was due in part to its extensive industrial experience in the pre-World 
War decades. Nevertheless, its agricultural labor force in the censuses 
of 1920, 1930, and 1940 showed no clear-cut trends and the absolute 
decline started from the 1950 census of population. The ambiguity of 
the trend is analogous to those of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea in 
the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. (These and other data on Japan 
P 
referred to without citations are fran my paper "Reinterpreting Japan's 
Postwar Gnmth", Econanic Development and Cultural Chanwg, October 1982, 
pp. 1-43, and for Taiwan and the Republic of Korea fran the Appendix 
Tables A, B, C, unless otherwise noted.) 
In Table 1 are shown data on total factor productivity (TFp) 
of Japan, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. The sharp acceleration in 
the growth of TFP from the prewar decades to the postwar (0.8 per cent 
to 4.7 per cent per year for Taiwan, 0.7 to 2.2 per cent for the 
Republic of Korea, and 1.6 to 3.5 per cent for Japan) is rarely seen in 
the secular growth of nations," not even in the experience of the Western 
industrialized countries. John Kendrick presents table showing thata 
the average for the postwar decade, 1960-1979, for the nine leading 
industrialized countries is 2.9 per ceut with Japan the highest and the 
UK the- lowest. 2 It is to be noted that TEP growth of the Republic 
of Korea is lower than that of Taiwan by about one-half. The major 
sources for the differences in TFP growth are: first, the nuch higher 
growth of agricultural output in Taiwan (3.6 per cent than in the 
Republic of Korea (2.4 per cent) and, secondly, in the growth of capital 
32 
Annual Growth of Product, ZnVt and Proructivi in Japan Taiwan andTable 1: Avr Hopmlic of Korea r e and Post war Years 
GRWH RCE CP 
Total Prfto_ rout apal 2tai Factor 
per per per 
Input labo Capital labor ProductivityPrct Labor Capital (6) (7) (9)(1) 421 (3) (4) 15) 
Whole 
1.61.9 2.7 0.1 2.61908-38 3.5 0.8 3.4 
9.8 3.9 6.0 -2.4 8.4 3.5. 1953-80 7.4 1.4 
Taiwan 
1911-20 to 
5.3 3.0 2.3 -1.5 3.9 0.91931-38 3.8 1.5 4.4 1.7 4.3 	 4.71952-80 9.r* 3.1 7.4 6.0 
Public of Korea 
7.9 2.9 -4.4 7.3 0.71920-38 3.5 0.6 	 2.8 4.0 -1.9 5.9 2.21953-80 7.0 3.0 8.9 4.9 
Japan 
0.5 -0.1 1.3 	 0.61901-37 1.1 -0.1 1.2 1.2 
-5.5 11.4 2.51955-80 1.9 -4.0 7.4 	 -0.6 5.9 
Taiwan 1.4 4.2 -2.6 6.8 	 2.21952-80 3.6 -0.6 6.2 
Jaublic of Kora 
0.4 -0.1 1.0 	 0.91920-39 1.4 0.5 1.5 0.9 
7.9 2.1 -5.5 7.6 -0.21953-80 2.4 0.3 	 2.6 
Japan 	 -. . . 
3.4 2.5 -0.9 3.5 	 1.11908-38 4.5 2.0 5.5 
5.0 -0.0 6.9 	 4.01955-10 9.0 2.9 9.8 6.1 
Taiwan 
(Sec- Sector)
 6.7 	 6.5 4.7U.8 7.3 0.2 

crftiary sector)
 
1952-80 12.0 5.3 
9.3 4.7 6.3 5.2 4.6 3.0 1.6 4.11952-80 
Pepblic of Korea 1.61920-38 5.9 4.3 2.46.7 3.3 0.2 3.11953-80 9.1 5.8 8.9 
Notes and Sourcess 
jaw r the whole ecnw prewaiZ data ware caiculAted fram K. aikawna r oaovsky is Grew -E enison'seapat ]- nt andand for postar period, E.F. Denison H 
Capital were used to =npt cuiventx- fatrprmtvity. Ftr i estimtes on agriculture and 
no-agriclture secto, Chkawa and Flosovsky ibid. was used for prewar period and Okawa and M. for postwar data. All postwarse E c DvejoJ was used to COMit 	 a lShindhara Patterns of J 	 an product, capital and labor frm Annual Reportndata ware n oficalestumts 
Acmounts 1982 (for the 1970's). 
-Taiwan Prewar data an GN from iizoguchi as cited in Kuzneta, Inlto, and product per labor from S. Kuznepts in 
Walter Galenzon (ad.) E!'adc Growdth and Structural ;Mnq in Taiwan, (p. 22). Capital stock was 
quoteid nru Mle .A-Z of Sarmuel P.S. (Io Ecnoicestimted by using Mizog uhils'investuent, data data 0573WDevlcpentof Taiwan 160-1970 (p. 296) and using R. goldmith's formula. Postwar 
rom ShirlY N~. =Ko 7he Emncmc Structure 	 of Taiwan 1952-1969. 1969-80 product and ca lt 
loyent data were official astimae taken fra 	 Statistical Yeartbc of KE 1981. Net capital stock 
- 1975 as bimbnark and extrapolated utilizing realstimates war deri'ed by using fied capital stockn 

fie capital formtion data in Nati l Income of IXC
1981. 
apublic of Korea Prvr estimates were thosn of the wh e Komea, and were based an T. Nizoguch "GDP and GNE 
Estimates of Japammse D .%de",Hitotubahi Discussion Paper No. 35, March 1981. Sung twan Ban's 
and H.N. Southoorth Agricultural Croth in Ja-n.estimates obtatined from YujLro Hayuzii. V.W. Ftattkn 	 tn 
wre used for pruevr Souith Korean aogriculture 11920-39). F and the PhilippinesKoM""awa 	 in Korea 1978 (for growth of product), * 1 Yearboo~k ofMsaawr calculated frzc NaU- Xnme 99 ofLabor Statistics ad UN Statist=cal YearOR for Asia and Pacific (for growth of laborT7,p. 
an mlmm rwh I U ,_Qu&KI, 1979 (for groth of -netWon1ack Ho e Df--win The Bank of Korea .tthl. Ecicfixed capital ,tock. &U data w ,pdate 	 to. 90 . U sgStatit.cs No. 3, 1981. Zbr ard capit w givn aes of .7 and .3 respectively in cal uating 
t I3rU t (a Hong did in his estiates). Because of the disastrus harvest in 1990, the &pulibc of 
FAa agriculture hod negative WP; if we eliminate that year, growth rate of real product would be 2.6 
per cent ad P would be around 0 per cant for the utalt postwr period. 
.33
 
input the Republic of Korea (8.9 per cent) than in Taiwan (7.4 per 
cent), these two factors being responsible for nearly all of the 
differences in TFP growth of the two countries. This paper, therefore, 
focusses on these two aspects - i.e., the slow growth in agricultural 
output and the rapid growth in heavy industrialization of the Republic 
of Korea relative to Taiwan. (The excess of TFP growth of Japan (3.5 
per cent) over the Republic of Korea (2.2 per cent) can be attributed 
almost entirely to the faster growth of total input in the Republic of 
Korea (4.8 per cent) over Japan (3.9 per cent). 
These differences between Taiwan and the Republic of Korea are 
substantial, considering the similarities in the prewar decades. 
Taiwan's growth of GNP was 3.8 per cent per year (1911/1920 to 
1931/1938) and that of the Republic of Korea 3.5 per cent (1920 to 1938) 
while total input for the former was 3.0 per cent and for the latter 2.8 
per cent, leaving TEP groth only slightly higher in Taiwan (0.8 per 
cent) than in the Republic of Korea (0.7 per cent).27/ 
Of course, part of the explanation for the poorer performance 
.of the economy of the Republic of Korea in the postwar decades lies in 
its slower start owing to the devastations of the Korea War in the early 
1950s and the reconstruction aftermath. Nevertheless, TFP growth in the 
1960s and 1970s was lower for the Republic of Korea (2.6 per cent) than 
for Taiwan (4.1 per cent) despite higher growth of GNP per capita. It 
will be argued below that it was the different strategy pursued by the 
Republic of Korea that mainly contributed to the differential growth. 
And there is a vital lesson to be learned in the Korean experience which 
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other countries in monsoon Asia interested in industrialization should 
know about. 
A. Agricultural Developffent 
As is well known, both countries started out with high 
unemployment in the 1950s, Taiwan in part because of the influx of 
Mainland Chinese as the Ccmaist armies conquered China and the 
Republic of Korea because of the inflow of northern Koreans during the 
Korean War and imnigrants in the imrediate years after World War II 
(about 2.8 million).28-/ By the late 1960s in Taiwan and the
 
mid-1970s in the Republic of Korea full enploym-ent was attained. How, 
then, was this done? Farm family incaes recovered quickly after the 
war, as agricultural production rose at a rate of 10 per cent per year 
from 1945 to 1952;. Once prewar levels had been reached, farm family
 
incoes rose at a rate of 3 per cent per year from the earlier to the 
latter years in the 1950s in real terms, then to 5.4 per cent in the 
1960s (1961 to 1969) .and 7.0 per cent in 1970-1976. These rates of
 
growth far exceeded the growth of the labor force of 3 per cent in the 
three postwar decades (1.7 per cent in the 1950s, 3.6 per cent in the 
1960s and 1970s). (These figures conpare with Japan's 4.9 per cent in 
the 1950s and 6.8 per cent in the 1960s and 1970s, higher than Taiwan's
 
farm family income growth, which enabled Japan to reach full employment
" )29/ 
about a decade earlier. 
The Republic of Korea's real farm family inccaes grew in the 
latter 1950s to make up for the very low levels reached in the Korean 
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war and its immediate aftermath, but fell in the first half of 1960s by 
2.8 per cent each year. Then, in the latter half of the 1960s, there 
was a sharp acceleration to 10.8 per cent and in the 1970s a decline to 
5.8 per cent. Over-all for the period 1960 to 1979, the rate was 4.9 
per cent higher than the grath .ofthe labor force of 3.3 per cent. But 
because of the poor start throughout the 1940s and 1950s and the first 
half of the 1960s, the Republic of Korea did not reach full employmentP 
0/
until the latter 1970s, about half a decade later than Taiwan.-
Depending on the rapidity of industrial growth, the amount of 
in the groth rate of farm family inccres over that of the laborexcess 
force supply, and the extent of labor surplus at the beginning of the 
postwar period, full employment is reached sooner or later as farm land, 
yields per hectare, number of crops per hectare and income fran off-farm 
employment increase. In all three countries, new land brought into 
cultivation was negligible and yields rose rapidly with the use of new 
varieties, expanded irrigation and fertilizer ue, diversification to 
higher-value crops and, above all, improved institutions. Irrigation 
permitted nore crops to be grown in each country, the multiple-cropping 
ratio reaching a peak of 1.59 in Japan in the mid-1950s, and 1.90 in 
Taiwan in the mid-1960s. In the Republic of Korea, the over all ratio 
to a peak of 1.58 in the mid-1960s and declined thereafter.
31/ 
rose 
Most important in raising farm family incomes, once increases 
in yields and cropping intensities slow down, is off-farm employment. 
Here too, the performance of the Republic of Korea was not as good as 
those of the other countries. In Japan and Taiwan once full employment 
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rising, and 	 off-farm incomes was approached, cropping ratios stopped 
began to accelerate, amounting to one-half of total farm family incomes, 
but to lessin Japan by thac Z.1-i9bOs in Taiwan by the end of the 1970s, 
of Korea. 2 / Thus, both Taiwan andthan 30 per cent in the Republic 
of Korea started the late 1940s with two-thirds -of. thethe Republic 
in this share was faster inlabor force 	 in agriculture; the decline 
in the Republic of Korea. In 1980, one-fifth of the laborTaiwan than 
force was engaged in agriculture in Taiwan capared with one-third in 
the Republic of Korea. [In 1960, the figures were, Taiwan 56 per cent; 
of Korea 66 per cent; in 1970, 37 per cent as againstand the Republic 
51 per cent. The Republic of Korea was nearly a decade behind Taiwan 
behind Japan (33 per cent in agriculture,and the latter a decade 
force in1960)]. The absolute number (not the share) of the labor 
agriculture began to fall inJapan from the early 1950s, in Taiwan from 
the early 1970s, and in the Republic of Korea only from the late 
1970s.23/ The problems encountered by the Republic of Korea as a 
result of so great a labor force inagriculture will be discussed below. 
The rapid growth of farm family incomes in all three countries
 
was achieved through physical infrastructure construction and the
 
so that the 	high levels of incameestablishnent of various institutions, 
said to comprise a new long-long
and employnent reached may be 

equilibrium 	level, not a transitional one. The network of rural roads 
from the prewar period was extended to covei" nearly all villages besides 
which there was construction of additiora railways, highways and 
areas were nearly cmpletely electritied iO Japanbyharbors; the rural 
the early 1960s, inTaiwaA by the early 1970s and the Republic of Korea 
by the late 	1970s - an infrastructure important for both the 
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and for ruralmechanization of agriculture (e.g., irrigation pumps) 
for remunerative off-farm employment.34/ Mostindustrialization 
strategic for higher yields and cropping intensity was. the extensive 
construction of irrigation infrastructure, which in Japan covered 66 per 
cent of farm households in 1975, 50 per cent in Taiwan, and 45 per cent 
in the Republic of Korea.
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As imortant as physical infrastructure was institutional 
development. Drastic land reform was carried out in the early postwar 
decades for all thret countries under the prodding of the US. The 
greatest successes were adiieved in Japan, then in Taiwan, and lastly in 
The main reason for the differential impact wasthe Republic. of Korea. 
due to the extent to which rural institutions were iproved to provide 
inputs, hitherto supplied by the landlords, and to inprove work 
incentives and motivations. Elsewhere I have attempted to show how well 
and rural -institutions was monolithically controlledagricultural 
rural institutions in Japan were developed to prolnote the growth of 
production.- In Korea, unlike in Japan, the structure of 
at the 
top by the Central Government with little leeway for grassroot 
for the variousparticipation and initiatives. This is not only true 
local governnent agencies but also for the cooperatives and other rural 
institutions. While in the short-run such tight controls may make for 
efficiencies in initiating and inplementing policies, in the long run 
(which counts most for -secular growth), policies established in Seoul 
are unlikely to be suitable for the varying conditions and needs at the 
farm level; the capabilities of peasants to make changes and 
improvements were therefore poorly developed. Nor was the authoritarian. 
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to the optimal allocation 
control of farners likely to lead 
of 
to have been insufficient for funds uhich appeargovernment development 
agriculture all through the 1950s, 1960s and even into 
the 	 early 
1970s1960s and the late poor crop years of th-e late 1970s.3-7 / The 
a reflection of authoritarian institutions which 
left the 
nay in part be 
quickly with adversities, unlike and unable to copepeasantry lethargic 

or Taiwan.
the peasants of Japan 
in Taiwan, below the authoritarianism of the 
central political 
at all local levels were fairlyand operationsthe structureapparatus, 
not as much as in Japan but much more than and participatory,demtv)cratic 
especially the case with agriculturalThis wasthe Republic of Korea. 
Thefarmers' associations.such as the all-iTportantinstitutions 
and guided agricultural
of JCRR (which spearheadedformer head 
development just as MITI did with Japanese industrialization) noted 
that 
and that "farmers rid 
are "now of ormers and by farners" cooperatives 
regardingtradition of decision-mkingot landlord-centeredthemselves 
.38/enterprsare becming more 
production and marketing" and 
tier of the Taiwan politicalNevertheless, because the upper 
central govr.n0Pntcontrolled,
was' as not IL-mLBrtiallyapparatus 
of Korea ±tban of like -tose iof the Republicmreinstitutions behaved 

(via lan -taxest
 
Japan. Te govenxnm&- taxed the fanmrs timdlYl 
of ferti-izered-ehlyJmduties and cameffity taxes), t 
h-Jxr tmaes rf agrmiltimal(nonopolized by -the gobeii'g), a 

mmts on-pic Jlards. 3
 md~chage exobitaremachiinery, 
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The funds forthconing fran the Central Government for rural 
extension services, agriculturalroads, major irrigation works, 
ind so on were probably as liited as in theeducation and research, 
Central Government investment expenditure (includingRepublic of Korea. 
was only 5-.7 perbank loans) in agriculture during 1976-1981 in Taiwan 
cent ccapared with the Republic of Korea's 11 per cent for the same 
the larger share of the labor force inperiod. Even if we allow for 
(34 per cent to 20 per cent) in 1980, the TaiwanKorean agrirulture 
is smaller that of theagricultural investment share someaAt than 
Republic of Korea. The percent of households covered by irrigation in 
1975 just 5 per cent higher than in the Republic of KoreaTaiwan in was 
the efforts local governmentsand much of. this was probably due to of 
which were also responsible for theand farmers' associations, 

constructin, of various marketing facilities, fertilizer-mixing, health,
 
so on, as well as mostindustry, feed processing, pesticide plants, and 
of the costs of agricultural credit, extension, education, and research 
made for saying that the betterservices. A good case can be 
over that, of the Republic of Koreaperformance of Taiwan's agriculture 
much to the central government but to the local was due not so 
and help of thegovernments and farmers' association (with the guidance 
to remark at a conference inunbureaucratic JCRR). Taiwan, (I ventured 
Taipei in the mid-1970s) made impressive agricultural progress because 
there was no ministry of aq-tculture. 
greaterDespite the foregoing, Taiwan's farmers made 
Republic of Korea.contributions to overall growth than those of the 
First of all, fram the earlier period, Taiwan's agriculture contributed 
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substantial amounts to total investment through net capital outflows 
while these were small in the Republic of Korea (part _of these flows 
comprised a higher personal savings rate).--/ (This meant that to the 
extent of the lesser contributions by agriculture, the Republic of Korea. 
had to depend on foreign borrowings to finance industrialization - a 
topic discussed below.) Secondly, the rapid growth of production (and 
its diversification) from 1945 enabled Taiwan not only to save foreiyn 
exchange from declining food imports and eventual food self-sufficiency 
/but to make production the main source of exports.- (This meant 
that there was no need for frenzied promotion of industrial output 
exportation with various kinds of subsidies and State assistance as in 
the Republic of Korea, thereby putting pressures not only on the balance 
of payments but also on the national budget.) Also effective in 
reducing the need for increasing industrial exports was the larger size 
of the domestic market (per household) for industrial products in 
average farm family incomes wereTaiwan. Both in 1966 and 1975 (in US$) 
little more than double the average in the Republic of Korea, with the 
Engel coefficient abodt 5 percentage points lower in Taiwan. The 
average farm family in Taiwan purchase 15 per cent more clothing in 1966 
and 1975 than in the Republic of Korea, (taking clothing purchase as a 
42/ 
proxy for the demand for industrial products by farmers).- It was 
not so nuch the yields and diversity of crops which made for these 
differences in farm incomes but the multiple-cropping ratio and incomes 
from off-farm employment, both vital in nonsoon-type of agriculture, as 
discussed above. 
41
 
Finally and most irportant, the inadequate developTent of 
agriculture bottled up a larger share of the labor force in the farm 
sector of the Republic of Korea (34 per cent in 1980 cpmpared with 20 
per cent in Taiwan as noted above). Mechanization of operations in the 
busy months of the year spread more slowly in the Republic of _Korea;. in 
Taiwan by 1975 there were 50 power tillers per 1,000 farm households and 
160 rice threshers but in the Republic of Korea 36 tillers and 53 
threshers. The need to squeeze more workers out of agriculture to stop 
the acceleration of industrial wage rates during the latter 1970s forced 
the authorities in the Republic of Korea to supply more power tillers 
and threshers - more than to catch up with Taiwan by 1981 - but they 
failed to supply machines for the most labor-intensive phases of monsoon 
paddy cultivation, namely, transplantation and reaping (as noted in 
Part I above). (To reduce its agricultural labor force fram 33 per cent 
in 1970 to 12 per cent in 1980, Japanese peasants had to go beyond the 
purchase of power tillers and threshers and buy power transplanters and 
reapers which were found in every third farm household by 1981. In 
Taiwan there was only one power transplanter to 33 families.) 43 / Note 
must be taken that in Taiwan through the farmers' associations joint and 
cooperative use of machines appears to be much more extensive than in 
the Republic of Korea or in Japan where the more affluent farm families 
assisted by subsidies insisted on individual ownership.A But it was 
the all-around backwardness of the agriculture of the Republic of Korea 
relative to Taiwaneae agriculture, particularly in the institutional 
aspects, that :minly accounted for the slow rate of reduction in its 
labor force. Excessive preoccupation with industrialization throughout 
most of the 1960s and 1970s and not enough attention to agriculture 
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resulted in a slow-down in migration from the rural areas in the first 
half of the 1970s over the second half of the 1960s. 
45/ 
B. Industrial Developaent 
It has been said that the Republic of Korea had to turn 
quickly to rapid industrialization because by 1970, "Korea was one of 
the most advanced farming nations (Table 4) ... and nearly a match for 
Japan's heavily subsidized rice farmers. One of the irain reasons for 
this high land productivity, of course, was that the Republic of Korea 
had very little land and a considerable supply of farm workers. In 
terms of acreage per person in the farm sector, in fact, the Republic of 
Korea's arable land endrm-ent was prcbably the smallest in the world, if 
one excludes city-states like Singapore (see Table 5)". The hasty and 
massive shift to heavy industrialization in the latter 1970s had been 
supported when necessary because of the limits of further groth in 
labor-intensive exports. 4 6  Hindsight permits a different perspective 
on both aspects. 
Tables 4 and 5 referred to above are somewhat misleading. 
Table 5 shows the Republic of Korea with the lowest area of arable land 
per head of agricultural population - lower than that of Japan. This 
is because the data for Japan pertains to 1968/1970 when the massive 
rural-urban migration was all but completed. For the purpose of the 
argument, the data for the early or mid-1950s should be used for Jaan 
and when this is done the density is about the sane. In che Table, 
density measured as arable land per capita in Korea is also low, next to 
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that of Japan but if Taiwan is included in the table, its per capita 
density is seen to be somewhat lower than that of the Republic of Korea 
for 1968/1970. (.064). In brief, arable land (per. capita or per 
agricultural population) was about the same in the Republic of Korea as 
47/
in Japan or Taiwan (with which camparison is most relevant).--. 
Table 4 shows the Republic of Korea's rice yields per hectare 
in 1970 to be 4,550 kilogram/hectare of harvested acreage, about 20 per 
cent lower than Japan's 5,640 and about 10 per cent higher than Taiwan's 
4,160. The harvested area includes rice land used twice (or thrice) 
during the year for paddy-growing; this is a very canmon practice in 
Taiwan though not in the Republic of Korea. (This is why despite the 
higher yields in the Republic of Korea, Taiwan's rice production per 
agricultural worker is substantially higher than that of the Republic of 
Korea.) When two crops of rice are grown on one piece of land, 
short-duration (early maturing) varieties must be used in order to 
harvest the first crop of rice and quickly plant the second crop; this 
necessarily entails a trade-off with yields since the early maturing 
varieties are not the highest-yielding. 
As to Japanese rice yields, one mst keep in mind that by the 
1970s production was largely carried out by what may be designated as 
marginal labor (females, and older men) as other men found jcbs 
off-farm. The low yields in Southeast Asia on the other hand are in 
large part the result of a much larger share of rice production caning 
fran rain-fed, poorly irrigated, and flooded rice farms. 
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further agriculturalThat '-here was enough roan for 
that by the end of thedevelopment in Korea is indicated by the fact 
by 50 per cent fran the 19701970s agricultural production increased 
so much into heavy industries, greaterlevel. If, instead of putting 
amounts had been invested in agriculture and its institutions iriproved 
in Japan from the 1950s), the 50 per cent increase(as was the case 
and increased output ofcould have been accomplished in half a decade, 
made unnecessary a large partgrains, vegetables and fruits would have 
excess
of the $5 billion of imported food (comprising one-third of the 
It may be plausible to argue, asof imports over exports in the 1970s). 

same did, that Korea's strategy of developing industrial exports can
 
a strategy of more balanced development as long assubstitute for 
1960s and 1970s. But such aexports are boaming as they were in the 
1980s. 48 / 
boan is not likely to be repeated in the rest 
of the 
of Korea's type of strategy must take into accountMoreover, the costs 
the various problems which came to the surface towards the end of the 
1970s. (These are discussed toward the end of Part II.) 
industrial output was pushed 
In contrast to the growth of Taiwan, one of the most 
unfortunate consequences "of the haste with which the export of 
in the Republic of Korea was the 
few centers, thereby preventingconcentration of industrialization in a 
the growth of off-fam income and the employment of arm families. (It 
the tiny farms and pronouncedlyhas been argued in Part I that in 
seasonal nature of monsoon agriculture, beyond a certain level of yields 
the growth of farm family incomes tends to slow downand multiple-crops, 
relative to urban incanes, if off-farm incomes of farm families do not 
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increase rapidly as they did in Japan and Taiwan.) Kim and Sloboda have 
shown that migration in the Republic of Korea has taken place in a 
"narrowly circumscribed area", attributing this to the fact that the 
"rural industrialization that has occurred has been concentrated in the 
rural hinterlands of the metropolitan cities", and that off-farm 
incomes up to 1975 have not increased much, remaining at about one-fifth 
of farm incomes, or less than one-half those of Taiwan. G. Ranis and S. 
Ho have shown that Taiwan's industrialization has been extensively 
regionalized, as a result of its labor-intensity, a good road network, 
rural electrification, and so on. A more balanced regional growth 
pattern would not have left Korea as, to use Vincent Brandt's term, a 
country of "rural isolation". Brandt found the degree of isolation 
closely correlated with variations in regional farm per capita 
in .49/ 
The shift to heavy industrialization from the early 1970s in 
Korea was unprecedented for a small country, exceeded in speed and size 
only by China in the early 1950s and India in the -latter 1950s. 50/
 
(Elsewhere I have discussed the problems of heavy industries.) 5- / We 
briefly note here that leaders of the Republic of Korea have now arrived 
at a consensus that the building of so much capacity in the 
petrochemical, shipbuilding, heavy machinery (mainly transforners and 
generators), automobile and pulp/paper industries, etc. was a major 
mistake. "tese industries now face the problem of extensive 
under-utilization which may not be wiped out even with world recovery in 
the coning years. 2 / Even in the iron/steel industry which is at 
present operating at full capacity, the subsidies required amnt to 20 
-- 
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to 30 per cent of the value of output, and as the years 	elapse, with the 
plants becoming technologically cbsolete (as the neighboring Japanese 
to beiron/steel technologies change), the subsidies for export may have 
enlarged.
 
that heavy industries in the 20thIt is hazardous to assume 
the infant industry argument. Their technologycentury are subject to 
is very much more complex and dynamic than in the 19th 	century when the 
of Research andinfant industry concept emerged. The huge amount 
(R & D) expenditure and the large number of sophisticated RDevelopment 
& D scientists needed are beyond the capacity of all but the large and 
more advanced industrialized countries. Moreover, they are highly risky 
industries entailing large investments not only in plant and equipment 
but also in supporting and facilitating infrastructure (roads, harbors, 
storage, piers, ships, rails, land development and so on). The risks 
are not only due to technological changes but also to changes in fuel 
(natural gas in petrochemicals, refineries, 
costs (since the heavy processing industries blast and electric 
furnaces, ceennt, aluminum and other smelters - are highly 
energy-intensive), and changes in raw material prices and supplies 
oil in metallic ores in 
pulp in paper, etc.). Design and quality changessmelting, are 
important in heavy achinery industries which require a large group of 
good subcontracting firms to be internationally ccmpetitive, as the 
Korean electric generator/transformer manufacturers have found to their 
to build up high quality,chagrin. And it takes decades (not years) 
sophisticated subcontractors. 
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These costly industries are not easily junked nor can they be 
sold readily. (Taiwan and Japan have been trying to sell, their aluminum 
smelters and Taiwan and Korea would like to sell their petrochemical 
plants, with no takers in sight.) They must, therefore, be utilized in 
one way or another if annual losses are to be minimized. Some part of 
the output must be sold to domestic, lower-stream industries, lowering 
their competitiveness through cost/quality "cascading" and the rest must 
P 
be dumped abroad with large subsidies. Or as currently discussed in 
Korea, same of the excess capacities in petrochemicals may be used for 
munition manufacturing, in ship building for constructing destroyers, 
and in heavy machinery for any tanks - part of these to be sold 
abroad. It is difficult for an economist to say much on military and 
defense requiremnt, except to note that when development expenditures 
become diverted to military purposes, the trade-off with growth is 
likely to be unfavorable, as in the case of India and China. 
Fortunately, the leaders of the Republic of Korea have 
reversed their strategies and are now in favor of supporting 
agriculture, raising the quality of light industries and moving forward 
in the engineering industries such as electronics, small and medium 
machinery, parts and components, and lower-stream fabrication in retals 
and petrochemicals where the bulk of employment and value aded is 
usually found in 20th century manufacturing (not in the risky primary, 
basic heavy industries). Heie are the industries where Republic of. 
Korea's manpower with strong work ethics (among the strongest in the 
world, perhaps stronger than in Taiwan) has a chance to display its 
prowss to 
48
 
same vigor and courage asproduce for the export market. And with the 
in the past both the people and the government have set out to overcome 
the mistakes of the late 1970s. 
C. Inplications of Differing Growth Strategies 
Before the onset of the world recession in 1979, both 
countries succeeded in moving into the industrial society as the 
industrial labor force exceeded the agricultural labor force. This 
industrial transition was accompanied by a demographic transition in 
which birth and death rates fell substantially, and income disparities 
were lowered from prewar decades. Personal consumption grew rapidly and 
at the sane time the propensity to save rose. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that in all these aspects, Taiwan 
seems to have done better than Korea as the comparative data compiled in 
the appendix tables tend to show. (The Gini in Korea had been rising in 
the 1970s and recently there has been an upturn in the agricultural 
labor force which is likely to be transitionai.) And if we return to 
the data cited at the beginning of Part II, namely, the substantially 
slow growth of efficiency as measured by the overall total factor 
productivity in the Republic of Korea as against Taiwan, it can be 
concluded that the higher growth of capital input was due to heavy 
ialization and that insfficient de elopment of agriculture was 
responsible for the slow growth of farm output. 
In one respect, further inspection is called for in the 
evaluation of the different strategies pursued by the .two nations. It 
l 
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was noted above that the failure to release enough workers fran fanning 
produced labor shortages in the industrial sector during the latter 
1970s. In the period 1976 to 1979, labor productivity grew at 11.4 per 
a rise of 19.6 per centcent annually but real wages exceeded it with 
(32.9 per cent rise in nominal wages with consumer prices rising et 14.5 
per cent). After 1976 the unemployment rate in the Republic of Korea 
fell 	below the 4 per cent level. In Taiwan, labor productivity rose 
as against 9.6faster than real wages in the smne period (11.1 per cent 
per cent). A devaluation was carried out in 1980, in an effort to 
correct the outpacing of the-wages of the Republic of Korea over those 
of Taiwan the levels of which were 20 per cent above Republic of Korea 
but fell 20 per cent below by 1979. 
53 / 
levels in 19.76 
For the 	three decades of the postwar period, Taiwan's consumer 
annual rate of 9.8 per cent as against the Republic ofprices rose at an 
Korea's 22.5 per cent, with the index of foreign exchange rates rising 
at 4.7 per cent as against the Republic of Korea's 19.6 per cent 
(Appendix Table). The greater long-run instability of the wages and 
prices of the Republic of Korea originates in a number of factors but 
one of the major sources must have been the slow development of the 
agricultural sector relative to the industrial sector. 
The surplus in current account of the central goverrm~nt in 
Taiwan was 5.4 per cent of-GNP as compared to 0.4 per cent in the 
Republic of Korea in the three postwar decades. This was because of the 
higher levels of subsidies needed to foster industrial exports in the 
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Republic of Korea, the outome of higher contributions by Taiwan's 
peasantry, the various forms of assistance extended to heavy industries 
by Republic of Korea governmsnt enterprises (public utilities, 
transport, banks, etc.), and also the generally higher income levels in 
Taiwan. 
Taiwan's surplus on current transactions in the external 
sector of the system of national accounts averaged -0.3 per cent of GNP
 
during the three decades compared with the Republic of Korea's -3.4 per
 
cent. It has been noted above that Taiwan's agriculture rde major 
contributions to the excess of exports over imxpcrts, besides supplying 
larger markets for industrial exports. The need to find markets abroad
 
to caqxensate for the thinness of the domestic market drove Republic of 
Korea industry to borrow heavily (in part due to low savings) to 
purchase equipment and current inputs (with consequent low value added 
in export goods).54/ Accordingly, the Republic of Korea found itself 
at the end of the period with an external public debt outstanding (and 
disbursed) twice as large as that of Taiwan '28.8 per cent of GNP as 
against 13.1 per cent) and with debt servicing of 15.0 per cent of 
exports (as against Taiwan's 4.5 per cent), and with a costly collection 
of heavy industries whose future was uncertain. 
One may onclude that, though a part of the poor performance 
can be attributed to start-up delays caused by the Korean War in the 
early 1950s, momst of it nust be attributed to the different strategies 
pursued by the two countries. Already -the Korean War, the 
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Republic of Korea leaders were neglecting agriculture and this continued 
into the' latter 1950s and 1960s, in contrast to Taiwan. In the 
industrial field, the Republic of Korea could have pursued a policy -­
it inreturned the early 1980s -- of gradualto which fortunately 
with emphasis on the lower-streamincrease in capital-intensity 
and the more labor-intensive engineeringprocessing industries 
the basic and primaryindustries, instead of junping so quicklyv into 
o Korea had neither the capitalheavy industries for which the Republic 
resources nor the technological experience. 
The caqmarison of the Taiwan and the Republic of Korea growth 
the need for "fine tuning" in sector developmentstrategies underscores 
rigid crop schedules and tight labor requirementsin mnsoon Asia where 
in paddy-growing do not permit much flexibility. This, in turn raises 
the question of whether authoritarian methods of deciding 
are either instrategies and agricultural/industrial policies suitable, 
were made in the Republic ofEast Asia or elsewhere. Major mistakes 
aKorea in large part because strategies and policies were selected by 
small group of businessmen and academics, and the military leaders. 
Taiwan's central government was also authoritarian but in econonic 
seem to have been made on a much broader basis.matters decisions 
Nehru was aPolitical democracy is not at issue here. India under 
no greater consultation withdatocracy but in econcmic matters there was 
workers and small businesses when Nehrurepresentatives of peasants, 

decided in the latter 1950s on a heavy industrialization strategy than
 
when Mao made the same decision in China during the early 1950s.
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Japanese postwar experience (in contrast to prewar) points to 
the success of broadly based consultation and participation in the 
selection of groth strategy and policies (similarly with Taiwan's 
success in agricultural development). The choice of growth strategies 
and policies is likely to becae' much more complex as an, tzoncmy eins 
to move rapidly away from agriculture and into industry, amd the 
long-term issues of agriculttral diversification and industry/ 
technological choice beccm crucial. It seems to me that it is high 
time Taiwan, as well as Korea, began to widen the base of participation 
and consultation in policy determination, as Japan did in the postwar 
decades. 5 5 / Particularly to be deplored is the excessive role of the 
military in grwth policies in Korea, (as well as in countries like 
Indonesia and prewar Japan). It appears that military considerations 
played a major role in Nehru's decision in India's Second Plan. The 
mistakes made by the Republic of Korea in the 1970s, no matter hcw much 
justification there might have been fran a military point of view, have 
produced opposition and unrest among the populace and disruption of 
national consensus -- hardly the best way of building up the defense of 
a country. Aid in areas such as industrial relations, good quality work 
besides diligence is required in the engineering and assembly 
;ldustries, on which Taiwan and the Republic of Korea are beginnig to 
concentrate, and this cannot be cbtained by authoritarian and purely 
materialistic methods. Better ways of motivating manpcwer at all levels 
.must be found in higher technology shops and factories. Japan succeeded 
in reducing the disutility of work (for which. wages are paid) by making 
the work an attractive activity. The rrre the worker is motivated to 
53
 
work for itself rather than for wages, the less the dependence on 
means. 56/material 
III. Industrial Transition in Southeast Asia, the 1980s 
After seeing how East Asia moved into the industrial society, 
we can turn to Southeast Asia (excepting Singapore which is treated in 
the next section). We now ask: what have been the sources of, and the 
Westcircumstances for, the acceleration in economic growth in Thailand, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia in the 1970s, and do they imply
 
that these countries will move into the industrial society in the near 
future? In particular, how close are these countries to being 
industrial economies in which the labor force engaged in industry is 
beginning to exceed the agricultural labor force? The present writer 
visited all these countries for the first time in the early 1960s. At 
that time, the socio-political environment was so shaky in all these 
countries (including Singapore) that one wondered how they were ever to
 
get going. Development economists at that time were interested in the 
rapidly growing econcaies of Japan, China and India and were hardly 
aware of Southeast Asian countries (except for the Philippines). At 
that time, few would have thought that the situation would soon be 
reversed and that the 1960s and 1970s would witness South Asia and China 
being' replaced by Southeast Asia as the focus of interest in the 
develop nt debate.-
The Appendix tables present the basic growth data for 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia (to be referred to as 
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as part ofthe ASEAN Four, excluding Singapore which may be regarded 
East Asia from the cultural point of view). For the three decadep 
groth of GDP per capita was(1950-1980), the unweighted sinple average 
about 3.2 per cent, lower than East Asia's 6.0 per cent (including 
Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) 
but better than the growth of the industrialized countries in the past 
century of about 2.0 per cent, and far better than that of South Asia's 
1.5 per cent (including India, Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka and Nepal, 
leaving out Pakistan as a predominantly wheat-eating country and largely 
outside the zone of monsoon Asia). 58/ Most important, there has been 
an acceleration of growth in all the four from the 1950s into the 1960s 
(except the Philippines) and from the 1960s into the 1970s at a time 
when there was decel'zration in most countries of East and South Asia, 
especially from the 1960s into the 1970s -- a feat which led many to 
hope that the ASEAN Four would duplicate the East Asian Four (Taiwan, 
the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) by moving swiftly into 
the industrial economy in the 1980s. That it may take a longer time 
than hoped for is indicated by the following considerations. 
The East Asian Four were fortunate that the industrialized. 
countries ir the postwar decades were growing at rates substantially 
higher than the historic 2 per cent trend rate and also with their 
domestic markets wide open. And the two giants of Asia, China and 
India, preoccupied with the difficult task of heavy industrialization, 
sacrificed the efficiency of their light and labor-intensive industries 
and were unable to put up much of a competitive L-ht. Elsewhere I have 
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argued that these favorable conditions are not likely to be repeated in 
Four will have to contend withthe 1980s. 5 9 / Increasingly, the ASEAN 
the formidable efficiency of the East Asian Four in higher valued 
exports and with China's groing ccapetitive power in lower-value 
exports. 
force engaged in agriculture is farInternally, the labor 
and it will take some timre, even undergreater than in industry 
an
noderately favorable external conditions, before it begins to exhibit 
absolute decline, with the exception of Malaysia which is most likely to 
as may be seen frcmhe the ffirst to move into the industrial economy, 
the data below. The figurs may overstate the size of the agricultural 
workers in the processinglabor force in Malaysia as many of the 
factories of the rubber and palm oil estates my be better classified in 
But just how many, it is difficult to say. Thethe industrial sector. 
low figure for the Philippines may reflect mechanization in the 
the larger farms. The high share in Thai agricultureplantations and on 
farming;is due to the broader efinition of the female labor force in 
this is shown by the share of income originating in agriculture which is 
cent for Thailand, 23 per cent for the Philippines, 24 per cent25 per 
for Malaysia, 26 per cent for Indonesia, 16 per cent for the Repuolic of 
Korea, and 20 per cent for Taiwan.
 
Food consumption levels in the late 1970s show that the 
Four has sate way to go beforenon-plantation agriculture of the ASEAN 
reaching the levels of the Republic of Korea (at about the time when the 
latter moved into the industrial econcmy) - perhaps one decade behind 
for Malaysia and nearly two decades for the rest. 
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Employnent by Major Sectors, 1980 
Agriculture Industry Services Total 
No. 
(1000) 
% No. 
(100) 
% No. 
(1000) 
% No. 
a 766-6 
% 
-
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Rep. of Korea 
Taiwan 
2067.0 
6889.4 
16566.7 
28040.5 
4658.0 
1277.0 
40.6* 
51.6 
74.4 
55.5 
34.0 
19.5 
1403.9 
2779.0 
2188.1 
7855.6 
3974.7 
3161.0 
27.5 
20.8 
9.8 
15.6 
29.0 
48.3 
2638.5 
3694.3 
3503.5 
14582.6 
5071.2 
2110.0 
31.9 
27.6 
15.7 
28.9 
37.0 
32.2 
5105.0 
13362.7 
22258.3 
50478.7 
13706.0 
6548.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Source: 	 For Malaysia fram the Fourth Malaysian Plan 1981-1985, Table 
4-6, Kuala Lumpur; 1981; for Philippines fram 1980 Population 
Census (unpublished worksheet); for Thailand fran Advance 
Report of 1980 Census; for Indonesia fram Results of the 
Sub-sample of the 1960 Population Census; Republic of Korea 
frm - IBRD World Developmnt Report 1982; for Taiwan fran 
Statistical Yearbook of ROC 1982. 
Note : 	 *Share of employment in A Sector in Malaysia is much higher in 
IBRD World Development Report 1982 (50 per cent than our data 
here.
 
Intake per capita, Paddy Electricity Per Capita 
per day of: Yields supply: KWH dollar GDP 
1977-1979 Calorie Protein kg/ha per capita 1980 
Malaysia 2560 47 2600 595 1620
 
Philippines 2210 41 2100 272 690
 
Thailand 2180 40 2000 280 670
 
Indonesia 2200 42 3300 28 430
 
Rep. of Korea 2840 69 6000 859 1520
 
Rep. of Korea 
(1961/63) 2100 42 2200
 
Source: 	 paddy yields fran FAD Production Yearbook 1978 to 1980; 
electricity data fran E1ect .'1bw r in Asia and the Pacific, 1979 
and 1980, data for Malaysia for Peninsular Malaysia and for 1979, 
dollar figures fran IBRD World Report. 
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above table,Thai food consumption may be understated in the 
per capita incomes due to the overvaluation of and also the Philippines' 
if these are corrected Thai development levels are about the the peso; 

sare as those of the Philippines in 1980. In any case, by 1982 with the
 
3.4 cent in 1981 
compared with that of Malaysiathe Republic of Korea 
Philippines per capita GDP growinq on average at per 
and 1982, compared with Thailand's 5.8 per cent, the latter's level 
surpassed that of the Philippines ($750 to $740). The lower income of 
is due partly to 
Despite these and other limitations ofthe severity of the depression. 
far behind the ASEAN countriesthe data, the table above shows haw are, 
which had entered the industrialccopared with the Republic of Korea 
in the previous sections. Socialsociety in the late 1970s as shown 
birth and death rates in theindicators confirm the foregoing. Crude 
above those of the Republic of Korea andASEAN Four are significantly 
although Malaysia canes close to the Republic oflife expectancy below, 

Korea in all three. (See Appendix Tables) Moreoever, the incame
 
high, with no sign of downwardin all four countries areinequalities 
are . far fran the copletion of the demographictrend. 6 0  They 
And underenploymenttransition, with total fertility rates still high. 
with the possible exception of Peninsularis by no means wiped out 
closest to the industrial economy andMalaysia. Evidently, Malaysia is 
and the Philippines just aboutIndonesia the furthest with Thailand 
looked at the record of growth we nowmid-way between the two. Having 
of the ASEAN Four,turn to the ca'parative analysis of the growth 
then proceeding to industrialstarting with agricultural development, 
development, and finally to institutional development. 
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A. Agricultural Developmnt 
The impressive performance of the ASEAN Four in the 1960s and 
1970s was mainly due to the 	rapid growth of agriculture which registered 
per cent in the 1960s and 1970s -- nearlygrowth rates of about 4.6 
double the rate of South Asia and slightly less than the rate for-Taiwan 
and the Republic of Korea in their best agricultural decades, the 1950s
 
and 1960s, but higher than 	the industrial 1970s. The best performances
 
were in Malaysia and Thailand, with a record 5.3 per cent for the 1960s
 
These are extremely high growth rates for agriculture by any
and 1970s. 

and are partly the outcome 	 of the inability of Burma's _addystandard 
fields and Indonesia's nationalized plantations to regain their prewar 
output and export levels, (similar to the poor showing of Babay and 
mostShanghai textile manufacturers who were unable to buy the modern 
it for East Asia's Four tomachines from the West, making possible 

was
expand their textile industries.) But largely it the result of the 
program launched by the Malaysiansuccesstul agricultural development 
the and early and throughoutGovernment in late 1950s 1960s sustained 
the 1970s. In Thailand, it. was less the government and more the 
respond to newself-reliant peasants who were able to quickly 
brought by efficient privateopportunities, information about which was 
The superb response of Thai and Malaysian agriculture was madetraders. 
possible by the plentifulness of new lands, unlike in Java, and the 
absence of a porful landed oligarchy, unlike in the Philippines.-
In the Philippines and Indonesia, agricultural develprent programs were 
weak and ineffective inthe 	1950s and 1960s and not until the 1970s were
 
these programs strengthened and expanded, including moderately 
successful agrarian reform efforts in the Philippines. 
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It is thus to be expected that real farm family incomes in 
Peninsular Malaysia would grow rapidly, 5.8 per cent a year in the 1960s 
and real rural family incomes in the 1970s by 6.6 per cent, rates which 
were double the growth of the labor force (2.9 per cent).62 By the 
latter 1970s with the rapid rise in rural family inccmes, the expansion 
of industrial exports, and the migration of Malay peasants to Singapore, 
full employment was approached in most parts of Malaysia, requiring an 
influx of workers from nearby Sumatra to take the low-paying jcbs on the 
estates. With wage rates rising, rice-farming became mechanized but 
there were no available mechanized technologies to substitute for laboc 
in the most labor-intensive operations in rubter-grcwing (tapping) and 
in palm oil harvesting. Since in Malaysia, rubber, palm oil and coconut 
take up about four tines the area under rice, the inability to mechanize 
these operations (as in the Republic of Korea's rice farms before the 
latter 1970s) has become the major stumbling block to the further rise 
of real farm incomes and the snvoth shift of the labor force to 
industry. New technologies take time to be invented and even more time 
to become viable and efficiently produced, altogether perhaps about a 
decade (as was the case of the Hawaiian sugarcane harvester in the 
postwar cades) 63/
 
The sources of the rapid rise in rural incares in the 1970s 
were increases in yields, extension of crop area through resettement, 
diversification into higher-valued crops, mechanization of paddies, and 
so on; but particularly important in monsoon farming were 
multiple-crpping and off-farm eiployent which helped to reduce 
underenployment during the slack seasons. Data supplied by the 
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14 
Statistics Department of 	Malaysia indicate that off-farm 
inctres were 
The 
per cent of farm incomes in 1973 increasing 
to 28 per cent in 1979. 
rise in family incmes enabled rice-grWing peasants 
(supplemented by 
liberal credits) to purchase equipment 	 and machines to substitute for 
in the 1970s as young workers labor whose wages were rising rapidly 

of the 1970s was
 the and cities. Malaysia by the 	endmoved to towns 
society along with the Republic 	of to step into the industrializedready 

Korea except for the fact noted above that its vast rubber and palm oil
 
lave the technology to mechanize the most
 plantations and farms did not 
harvesting of oiltapping of rubber andlabor-intensive operations, 
This nmeant 
palms. (There are no plantations in the Republic of Korea.) 
replace the Indianthat labor from Indonesia had to be brought in to 
workers moving out to the urban sectors. 
effective in bringingWhereas in Malaysia, the Govemrnt was 
farm family inccues, the role of governmentabout sustained increases in 
in GNP capita was also 
was minimal in Thailand, where rapid rise per 
the high grath rate of product per worker in largely propelled by 
per cent for Malaysia,3.5 per cent as cxirared with 	3.7agriculture, 
and 2.2 per cent for Indonesia. But 2.8 	per cent for the Philippines, 
slowly than in Malaysia, 3.1 per cent as farm family incomes rose more 
the 1960s and 1970s, (particularly in the 1970s, against 4.2 per cent in 
per cent) .64/ These figures do not1.8 	 per cent as against 2.7 
data for which is available only fran the 1978 include off-farm inccme, 
are no industrial estatesIn .hailand whvre thereAgricultural Census. 
in and around Bangkok, the 1978is cncentratedand industrialization 
Agricultural Census reports off-farm incore to be only 9.5 
per cent (p. 
exceed tli4 
97). Although these rates of grarwth of farm family bncm 
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growth of the labor force of 2.5 per cent, 1960 to 1980, and 
unemployment has been reported to be very low, there is still much 
undereiployment during the dry months of the year. The Population 
Census for 1980 taken in the dry month of April reported only 2.2 per 
cent looking for work but 18.5 per cent of the labor force waiting, for 
the agricultural season to begin. 
The large size of the seasonally underemployed labor force is 
in part due to the high propensity of Thai women to work (75 per cent) 
especially in farming, for plowing as well as for planting and 
harvesting. (This is one reason for the higher growth of output in Thai 
agriculture over that of the Philippines and Indonesia with about only 
40 per cent female participation rates.) It is also due to the 
insufficient .ncrease in irrigated area and mltiple cropping which in 
the 1970s rose by only 3.3 per cent a year carpared with the 
-Philippines' 4.8 per cent and Malaysia's 4.5 per cent. 6 But it is 
mainly due to the low level of off-farm incres cripared with Malaysia 
and the Philippines. 
In the Appendix table, note that net output originating per 
hectare for most major crops grew very slowly in Thailand, this being 
particularly so for rice and cassava. The major zeason for the slow 
growth of yields was the rapid expansion of output through land clearing 
by peasants especially in the Northeast region where growing conditions 
for rice and cassava were not as good. (The area planted to arable and 
in the postwar period.)permanent crops nearly doubled in Thailand 6 / 
Extensive expansion of output through cultivation of new lands generally 
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implies an increase in seasonal underemploymrent in monsoon agriculture, 
at least in the short-run when irrigation facilities for second crops 
and transport and rural electrification for off-farm jobs are not 
available. Hence, farming families nving out to the new lands cannot 
earn high annual incomes. This is the disadvantage of Thailand's 
expansion in the postwar decades (capared with Malaysia's); it was 
carried out mainly on the strength of peasant initiatives with very 
little help frn the public authorities; in Malaysia the Government, 
through various types of rural development program (resettlement, 
multiple cropping, rural electrification, construction of industrial 
estates) , assisted farming families to increase their incames through 
mre work throughout the year, besides helping to increase yields per 
hectare by providing new varieties of seed, credit, mechanization, etc., 
and establishing larger farms through resettlement. Accordingly, though 
Thailand ended the period with the highest growth rate of per capita 
GDP, it did not succeed as well as Malaysia in wiping out seasonally 
underemployed labor, and in raising fanning family incores to levels 
where mechanized equiluent could be purchased. Thus, Thailand has sare 
way to go in rural development before it can move into the industrial 
society. 
The slow growth of agricultural product per worker underlies 
the slow growth of the GDP per worker in the Philippines. In part this 
was the result of the preoccupation of the government with policies (and 
financing) related to the development of industrialization; noreover 
deteriorating agrarian relations caused by bitter disputes between 
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landlords and tenants affected work motivation. The peasantry in the 
in difficult conditionsPhilippines emerged fran the prewar decades 
compared with their counterparts in the other countries of East and 
Southeast Asia, and had to contend with a landed oligarchy in ccntrol of 
the government. %ThePhilippines has a long history of peasant uprising 
the only country among its neighbors toand in the postwar decade, was 
have a full scale peasant rebellion, in the form of the Huk movement.) 
The situation called for land reform (as in Japan, Taiwan and the 
Republic of Korea) but it was not until the early 1970s (under martial 
law) that land reform for the rice and corr farms could be launched, and 
followed up with rural developrent programs; these eased the tensions in 
the rural sector and the Philippines became self-sufficient in rice by 
the late 1970s. But tensions remained in the plantation sectors, 
especially in sugar and coconut, where yields were stagnant throughout 
67/
the three decades.- (Also in the banana and other plantations in 
Mindanao where land was taken over frmn peasants without capensation.) 
Available data on agricultural family incomes show that they 
rose 0.2 per cent each year between tbe family incme and expenditure 
surveys of 1961 and 1971. For the 1970s, we have no appropriate data 
except to take as a proxy the growth of product per worker in 
agriculture which in the Appendix tables is 1.5 per cent. While the 
data for the 1960s include off-farm incames, the proxy for the 1970s 
does not. Since the growth in industrial and service product in the 
1970s was lcest in the Philippines (about 7 per cent ccpared with 9 
per cent for Thailand and Malaysia and 10 per cent for Indonesia), it is 
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incames increased significantly. Thus, the not likelj that off-farm 
substantially .lower than theincrease in real farming family incaes was 
growth rate of the labor force (about 3.5 per cent) and both 
unenpicyment and underemploynefnt were substantial by the end of the 
1970s. 
The low grwth of farm incores may be traced not only to -the 
grwth of theslow groth of off-farm incaTes but also to the slow 
multiple cropping ratio, 1.24 in 1948, 1.46 in 1961, and 1.40 in 1971. 
why, in a tropical country like the PhilippinesThere is no reason 
(unlike Japan and the Republic of 	Korea), this ratio should not rise to
 
in the mid-1960s provided that sufficient funds2.0 as it did in Taiwan 
68/
 
are provided for irrigation and other infrastructure.­
real income or net product originating from each ofAlso when 
the national accornts for 1967-1980) isthe major crops (data from 
growth rates for coconut anddivided by the harvested area, the 
respectively), much sugarcane are low (0.3 per cent 	and 1.4 . er cent 
other ciops (4.7 per cent), rice (3.5lower than banana (8.7 per cent), 
The 1.w growth may be indicative 	of
 per cent) and corn (3.3 per centi. 

o mers who failed to introduce 	 new poor managenent by the big land 
plantations, and thevarieties, unlike the owners of the banana 
coconut growers. In the noncropMalaysian nuber, palm oil, and 
9 
sector of agriculture, fishery, forestry and livestock, there are signs 
the large
of low productivity growth, especially in fishing where 
fishing groups have been increasingly taking over the traditional 
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fishing grounds fra the small fishermen in coastal, river, and lake 
slow growth of farm family incomes of 1 to 2 per centfishing. 70 / The 
labor force which has accelerated from 3 peris far below that of the 

cent in the 1960s to over 4 per cent in the 1970s.
 
have been stagnant orIndonesia's agriculture appears to 
growing slowly during the Sukarno period - the 1950s and most of the 
In the 1970s, it began to grow as a result of extensive efforts1960s. 
later than the others,by the Suharto Government. Having started much 
and with extreme shortages of land in densely packed Java, Indonesia has 
a long way to go in agricultural developmit before it can approach the 
industrial society. In the meantime, its policy of putting large sums 
in big, capital-intensive projects in the industrial sector has not 
mlbers landlesscreated sufficient jobs to absorb the groing of 
simple changes the technology ofworkers in the rural areas where in 
cultivation, such as the replacement of the knife by the sickle in rice
 
harvesting, are cutting down the manhours required. With labor force 
growth accelerating from 1.5 per cent in the 1960s to 2.8 per cent in 
the 1970s and even higher in the 1980s, a growth rate of agricultural 
cent 1970s -implies increasedproduct per worker of 2.4 per in the 
off-farm incres, increasedunenp!oyment, and witlout sufficient 
unremployment, particularly for the growing class of landless workers. 
here are recent reports that voluntary transmigration from Java to the 
funding for infrastructureother islands has begun to take place but if 
on a large scale is not made available, the transfer to the other 
on a scale sufficient to absorb theislands is not likely to take place 

growing rural labor force.
 
B. Industrial Development 
As 	may be seen fran the appendix tables, Thailand led in the 
10 per cent growth for 1950 to 1980,growth of industrial product with a 
followed by Philippines 7.3 per cent, then Malaysia with 6.8 per cent. 
the 1950s. are included). These figures, spenningand then Indonesia (if 
in an approximate way the rapid growththree decades, take into account 
and the slowdown in the laterof the initial :rport substitution decade 
and Indonesia the slwdecades for the Philippines, and for Malaysia 
But note that Thai growthgrowth in the pre-inport substitution phase. 
ay be mainly
rates are consistently high for the three decades. This 
the colonial era,due to the fact that, unlike the 	other three where in 
construction, public utilities, transport 
the establishment of modern buildings, roads, harbors, and public 
utilities had begun, uncolonized Thailand had to start almst fran 
scratch where most of these industrial facilities were concerned. Thus, 
the high overall industrial groth was due to rapid growth of 
and and communication 
the first and second decades and 	then inport-substitutionfacilities in 
later years. The industrial facilitiesin manufacturing in the 
above are necessary befoie iqport-substitution inmentioned 
acontrast, the Philippines inheritingmanufacturing can begin. In 
was able to large stock of such facilities 	from the colonial period, 
in the later years of the 1940s, andplunge into inport-substitution 
also of Malaysia. Accordingly, the growth ratesthis may have been tcue 
industrial facilities in Thailand during the 1950s and 1960sfor these 
were nearly double those in the Philippines.-
/ The high growth rates 
for the 1970s are the result of the first decade of in Indonesia 
inport-substitution. 
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The foregoing suggests that the high growth of industrial 
product in tl, 1970s in these countries, except for the Philippines, 
mainly reflected the "easy phase" of import substitution; this phase is 
likely to care to a stop soon at various times in the 1980s. In. 
aanticipation of this all the c6untries have taken steps to move j.nto 
more capital-intensive phase of inport-substitutici, following the 
exanple of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. This may b? premature and 
difficulties are encountered as such risky industries are beyond the 
technological levels of these countries. As noted in Part II, the 
already found this to be the case and likewiseRepublic of Korea has 
Taiwan - both now shifting back to more labor-intensive but higher 
technology industry strategy. One problem with the Philippines' poor 
industrial performance in the past two decades is that despite two 
decades of experience the up-stream, capital-intensive industries (such 
as steel product,, chemicals, paper/pulp, and so on) have failed to 
improve their efficiency and have obstructed the growth of the 
labor-intensive industries through "costs and quality cascading", making 
export expansion difficult (e.g., the high costs and low quality of 
paper and ink for printing have prevented the development of printing 
and publishing, an industry in which the Philippines excels in manpower; 
the high costs and poor quality of cans for canning have caused 
difficulties for the food manufacturing industries in exporti ;; the 
poor quality of textiles, leather and dyes for the garment and shoe 
industry have haupered export expansion). 
Both Taiwan and the Republic of Korea underestimated the 
technological requirements of the heavier industries, reasoning that if 
68
 
likewise. 
the Japanese could successfully establish thei, they 
could do 
in thethe long experience of JapanaccountThis failed t, take into 
industries 
prewar half century with the technologically simpler 
heavier 
with the nore complex technology of the of prewar vintage and, later, 
postwar heavy industries leading to success, because 
of a unique .system 
industrialin industrial policy,for industrialization,of institutions 

been able
country has to 
relations, and managment, which Vno 

India
next section that even emulate.72/ We shall see in the 
and
 
and market resources than
 greater manpower, capitalChina with much 
not been able to develop a system Taiwan and the Republic of Korea have 
do not handicap theindustries whichof capital-intensive 

despite three decades 
labor-intensive "-dustries fran exporting, 
of 
into industrializedtheir entry theexperience, thereby obstructing 
economy.
 
aspect is the rise in manufacturing productOne encouraging 
cent a year forand 1970s of about 5.4 perper worker in the 1960s 
1.7 per cent for the Philippines.Thailand and Malaysia; ccnpared with 
industries are 
These figures nay indicate that the iport-substitution 
beccning ore efficient, despite distortions introduced 
by protective 
resources to dubious capital-intensiveneasures. Instea- of shifting 
should begin to dismnantle the structure of these coutriesindustries, 
and prcrte increasedbefore it becoues cunter-productiveprotection 
bytheir further development, e.g.,in ways conducive toefficiencies 
on a few lines. There is no doubt that specialization and concentration 
the prolongation of a structure of protection has dealt Philippine 
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a blow from which it will take. some time to recover;industrialization 
note the low rates of product per worker not only in manufacturing but 
in the other sectors of industry which are not directly protected. 
(Appendix tables) But this calls for long range 3-.dustrial planning 
within an over-all industrial policy which takes into account not -only 
foreign exchange savings but the role of industrialization in the 
over-all growth of the economy, including the need to regionalize 
industrialization in order to create jcb opportunities for farm families 
as they exhaust the potentialities for improving earnings from farming 
- scrething which is crucial for monsoon Asia in the transition from an 
agricultural to an industrial economy, as we found in the case of the 
Republic of Korea. (For further discussion, see below.) 
In this regard, Malaysian manufacturing is in the best 
position to expand in the 1980s as compared to the others. In the 
1950s and 1960s it extended and modernized its physical infrastructure 
from British days so that 'amongst the ASEAN Four it has the best 
infrastructure for industrialization with an extensive network of good 
-roads, nearly complete rural electrification, and a score of industrial 
estates, besides efficient public utilities and ccrriication 
facilities. After a strong effort at capital-intensive 
industrialization in the 1960s (including the first integrated 
iron/steel ccxplex at Penang in ASEAN), it has been pushing 
labor-intensive industries in the 1970s. The prosp'.cts are weakest for 
the Philippines saddled as it is with a lot of inafficient industries 
from the late 1940s. A recent study shows that between 1956 and 1974 
the grwth of product per workjr in most of the capital-intcsive 
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basic metals) orhas 	 been slow (paper/pulp, chemicals,industries 
steel, electrical machinery, transportnegative (non-metallic mineral, 
been doingindustries haveof labor-intensiveequipent); sare the 
poorly with negative growth of productivity (textiles, apparel, leather 
/ may be sarewhat better 
and wood products). 7- - Indonesia's prospects 
on 
if the resource-based capital-intensive projects caning stream 
earn foreign 
p(petrochemicals, liquefied gas, aluminum, etc.) enough 

of light industries.
the developTentexchange to assist with 

and Malaysia, misinterpreting the
 Indonesia, Philippines,Unfortunately, 

the 1970s and ignorant

experience of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea in 
the 
prcblems of heavy industrialization in India and 
China in 
of the 
of heavyto advocate the establishment1950s and 1960s, have begun 
the main argument of 1980s. This goes contrary toindustries in the 
that Japan in the 1950s, Taiwan in the 1960s and the this paper which is 
the 1970s moved into the industrial society without Republic of Korea in 
that the latter were cbstacles to the the 	 heavy industries, and 
Taiwan and particularly in the i.epLblic of Korea. transition in 
DevelorentC. 	 nstitutional 
one looks back over the postwar decades it is puzzling 
to 
When 
doing so well. 
find Malaysia and Thailand, (and the East Asian Four) 
so strongly and 
one w=ld have expected the Philippines which 	 started 
1940s (except Japan) to 
ahead of every country in Asia in the latter 
(Instead Thailand, with top by the beginning of the 1980s. came out on 
incce of the Philippines in the 1950s, was per capitaabout half the 
the other countries were struggling with catch Whileable to up.) 
etc. (the
prcblems of independence, rebellion, ethnicity, 	religion, 
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the Philippinescivil war continues in Burma after nearly four decades), 
plunged ahead with extensive industrialization in the 1950s endowed with 
the largest educated manpower, modernized institutions, and "special 
leading economic power. To understand thisrelations" with the world's 
perhaps not unusual in the economic history- of theunexpected outcome --
growth of nations as may be seen by the rise and decline of Spain in the 
16th century, of the Dutch subsequently, of the British in the 19th and 
of the US in the 20th - we need to step back into the prewar past the 
was beingcircumstances of whdch had a great influence when independence 
case of Taiwan andachieved by many nations after the war. As in the 
Korea, behind the similarities crucial differences existed during those 
formative decades. 
The Philippines was not only occupied by the West longest but 
also by a medieval colonial power which was influenced very little by 
and the Renaissance, thethe modernizing influences of the Reformation 
liberalism, egalitarianism and humanitarianism, and mercantile and 
that developed in countries like the Netherlandsindustrial capitalism, 

and England in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. More interested
 
would be better than in productive activities, andperhaps 'dolce vita' 

without the benefit of experience in nercantile of industrial
 
entrepreneurship, the Spaniards left the establishment of modern
 
enterprises in trade and production largely to others unlike the Dutch
 
in Indonesia or the British in Malaysia. Thus, when the upsurge in the
 
demand for tropical produce occurred in Europe in the 19th century, it
 
was not the Spaniards who took the lead in establishing plantations,
 
estates, and trading ccmpanies. This was left to the Filipino mestizo
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in 
elite which grew into a rich and powerful landed oligarchy, unlike 
Dutch and British" organized the Indonesia and Malaysia where the 
When World War II ended, the Philippines had a full-blownplantations. 
indigenous elite with power rooted in large land holdings ready to 
push 
the destinies of the nation. out the colonialists and take over 
emerged in Indonesia andNo such indigenous oligarchies 
the Dutch and the nationalization of the Malaysia. The expulsion of 

and different interests in different regions
estates left a power vacuum 
ending in 1966 
contended for power under Sukarno for nearly two decades, 
the two main contenders ofin an unprecedented bloodbath of one of 
in the two decades of confusion there was not nuch that power. Thus, 
to develop the economy. Unlike Indonesia, Malaya (latercould be done 

an
part of Malaysia) gained independence in evolutionary and 
of the 1950s and earlyThe communist challengeconstitutional manner. 
of the then Federation of Malayacontained by the Government1960s was 
under British control). After independence estates were (before 1957 
situation in Burma 
not nationalized. This contrasts sharply with the 
war and nationalized the 
which gained independence shortly after the 
(like the British in Burma) expelled and their estates. The Dutch were 
because of the extremely exploitiveestates nationalized mainly 
of the estates, especially the forcedcharacter of the organization 
unlike in Malaysia where thelabor demanded of the Indonesian peasants, 
at the height of their industrial power in EDrope were able to British 
Left to develop the planta­pay for the establishment of the estates. 
73
 
tions, British managers succeeded in making them one of the most 
efficient enterprises in postwar Asia even more efficient than prewar 
decades. This contrasts with the degeneration of the nationalized 
Indonesia estates. 
Contributing to the power of the indigenous oligarchy was the 
Spanish policy of permitting the alienation of peasant land, much of 
p 
which eventually found its way into elite hands, unlike the British and 
Dutch who not only forbade the sale of peasant land but also prevented 
the aristocracy from exploiting the peasantry. In this, the Dutch 
rulers were under heavy pressure from the hcme country undergoing the 
pressure of liberal and humanitarian thinking in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, while Spain remained largely feudalistic. Thus, in the 
Philippines, the oligarchy became powerful both by taking over the land 
of the colonial rulers and by assuming power over the peasants many of 
whom became tenants and laborers on their estates. In Indonesia and 
Malaysia, the peasant ccmmnity remained largely intact and largely free 
from the unreasonable demands of the upper classes. This may partly 
account for the higher productivity of rice farms in these countries. 
In contrast to these three countries, the Thais were not 
ocpied by the Western poars, even though British advisers exerted 
strong influence in the court and bureaucracy (and eventually forced the 
Thais to open up their domestic market completely to Western industrial 
exports). This meant that land in Thailand was not preempted by 
plantation owners; but the tardiness of the cmnercialization of 
74
 
such as roads was turn meant that physical infrastructureagriculture in 
Thailand started out at the beginning of slow to be established. Thus, 
era with the most traditional infrastructure and institutions 
among
the 
the ASEAN Four. 
Unlike the Philippines and Indonesia where the pressure of 
the 
force accelerated the growth of expanding plantations for larger work 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and unlike Malaysiapopulation 
where there was no flooded-rice culture, Thailand was sparsely 
settled 
with areas of flooded-rice fields where without plantations and large 
labor-demanding transplantation could not be 	practiced. 
tenure agrarianWithout foreign intervention, Thai land and 
evolve in their own ways. In the institutions were permitted to 
the monarchy and the nobility in the latter half of conflicts between 
corvee labor demanded of the peasantry bythe 19th century, slave and 
in theits land was gradually abolishedthe nobility to cultivate 
closing decades of the century. This in turn weakened the 
power of the 
the use oflabor, could not lay claim tonobility who, without such 
large tracts of land. (This land reverted to the nation in the King's 
other countries
name.) Accordingly, when the demand for rice in the 
Indonesia and the Philippines (as more and more rice land rose such as 

the peasants

was converted into plantations for cmrercial crops), were 
and the free to respond. Rice production and exports expanded, 
corvee peasants, unerumbered by the requirements 	 of bondage and 
and 
cleared the forests andmotivated by higher rice prices and profits, 
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jungles, especially after the turn of the century. The expansion of 
rice production in the 1950s and 1960s was a continuation of this trend. 
Thailand started the postwar era without a strong landed oligarchy, but 
with a self-reliant peasantry free to expand its holdings into new 
territories; however, its infrastructure and institutions were.outmoded. 
The situation was therefore unlike that of the Philippines where most of 
the uncultivated land had been alienated by families and public 
institutions. 74/ 
With their countries under the complete and unified control of 
their own elites, the Philippines and Thailand were able to start their 
march into *modern developrent far ahead of th others, the former 
through industrialization and the latter through export agriculture. 
Despite frequent military coups, the strength of the Thai nnarchy based 
on its success in emancipating the peasantry fran the nobility served as 
the rallying point for national unity and social cohesion (similar to 
the role of thB Meiji Emperor .in the freeing of the Japanese peasantry 
from feudal obligations, especially in land tenure). The powerful 
Philippine elite with the cooperation of the US was able to achieve 
national independence quickly and peacefully in 1946. Impressive growth 
rates of G)P per capita of 3.6 per cent in the Philippines and 2.8 per 
cent in Thailand for the 1950s resulted, compared with 1 to 2 per cent 
for Indonesia and Malaysia (and also Singapore). Spearheading the 
growth in the Philippines uere the American traders and industrialists 
and the Filipino entrepreneurs with decades of experience in agriculture 
and comierce (together with the accu,-lated wealth from land and 
trading), unlike the Thai, Malay, and Javanese elites. 
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Philippine economic growth, however, slowed down in the 1960s 
and the 1970s as overall productivity grew much less than those of its 
neighbors (1.7 per cent per year as against 4.1 per cent for Malaysia, 
4.2 per cent for Thailand and even higher for the East Asian Four; see 
data on growth of G)P per worker in Appendix). The industrial base laid 
down in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s instead of conferring 
infant industry advantages was proving to be a drag on the overall F 
growth of the Philippines. Industrial productivity per worker in the 
1950s was growing more slowly than that in neighborin,; countries (0.8 
per cent as against 2.0 per cent for Thailand and even more for the East 
Asian Four, see Appendix). Under these circumstances, it was not to be 
expected that Philippine industry could forego protection and subsidies 
and begin exporting, as did industry in Taiwan and Korea in the early 
1960s. There might have been more than just the debilitating effects of 
the structure of protection on efficiency in the failure of Philippine 
industry to be able to strike out into the international markets in the 
1960s.
 
We hypothesiv .- that the US import-substituting industries, 
which in large numbers rushed into the Philippines in the 1950s and 
early 1960s (in appliances, pharmaceutical, and other consumer 
products), had no intention of exporting and when protection was 
extended into the 1960s, the motivations to inprove efficiency was 
substantially blunted. Why then did the Philippine oligarchy, who 
controlled not only the enterprises but also the legislative body, 
insist on continuing the structure of protection into the 1960s? The 
77
 
data cited above on industrial productivity per worker in the 1950s 
permit one to speculate that perhaps the failure of efficiency to 
improve (as much as the neighbors of the Philippines) made it hazardous 
for Philippine industry to liberalize, especially in areas such as 
be in the entrepreneurialtextiles. And the reason for this may 
philosophy or style in the Philippines. 
Economists often think of entrepreneurial behavior, as shown 
in the neoclassical theory of the firm and industry, to be more or less 
universal, holding true for countries across the board, whether 
developed or not. But this theory, strictly speaking, applies largely 
to the Western developed countries and even among the developed 
countries there can be differences depending on the historical 
circumstances and background. lohn Maurice Clark, a leading student of 
carpetitive theory, used to insist in his lectures at Columbia 
University that we actually do not know why the theory works out so we.ll 
in US industry, and that the institution' s mores and historical 
background need to be, studied. Japanese firms put more emphasis on 
long-run profits, foregoing short-run profits in order to expand market 
shares and to spend more for in-service training of new employees who 
are generally employed as they come out of schools and universities. 
This is possible in Japan because of the values of Japanese workers, who 
are willing to ccmit themselves to permanent employnent with a given
-% 
firm, compared to the m re individualistic workers in the West who cpt 
for nability. Thus,, Japanese entrepreneurs do not act as in the theory 
of the fir, i.e., attempt to hire the most efficient workers but to 
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hire the younger workers and train them (paying. seniority wages), and 
employing then until retirement. 
In the Philippines entrepreneurs put more weight on personal 
instead of efficiency consideiations in hiring, firing, and. promoting 
employees than in the Wect or in the neighboring countries of Asia. 
Compared with the Japanese, they arp nch more interested i. windfall, 
75/
which are drained cut of the enterprise.­short-term profits 
Entrepreneurship in the Philippines may have been influenced in large 
part by the centuries of association with Spanish administrators and 
Hispanic values where self-interest and pleasure were much more 
important than in the capitalistic West where the impact of the 
Protestant Reformation was strong or the Confucian East Asia, where 
enphasis on diligence, hard work, frugality, and groupism was far 
greater. If so, the low growth of efficiency in the 1950s (and also in 
the 1960s) must be attributed to poor ( .trepareneurship which during the 
1950s could not bring the efficiency of manufacturing up. to the levels 
of Taiwan, Korea and -Hong Kong and therefore could not liberai.ze and 
coipete in the worli markets. And even before the adoption of 
comprehensive import-substitution measures, the Bell Commission 
reportin.g to President Truman in 1948 cocluded that "the basic economic 
problem in the Philippines is inefficient production and very low 
inccmes". In agriculture, it pointed to the lw returns oi tenant 
farmers and low wages for agricultural workers which failed to motivate 
cultivators to higher productivity. In industry, "fran statistical data 
and Y ~rcdirect inquiry ... no noteworthy change seems to have taken 
6 / 
or in industrial efficiency.place in industrial production 
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In short, the differences in historical circumstances and 
experience in the ASEAN Four produced different sets of institutions and 
values which in turn meant that the response to opportunitiessocial 
opening up in the postwar decades were different. The higher. growth 
rates for Malaysia and Thailand in three decades ( . -stwar gr wethvre 
in ,art the outcome of historical differences, as was the case noted 
above for Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. These are the historical 
legacies and incubuses whic h have affected the development of 
institutions which, more than technologies, are the product .1 many 
decades and centuries of the past. It is maily through institutions 
(defined broadly as ways of doing and thinking) that the past affects 
present-daY economic growth. For example, the efficient functioning of 
government in Singapore and Malaysia is he result of many decades of 
experience under the UK which before World War I had developed the best 
bureaucracy for economic growth. This, however, does not explain the 
better performance of the Singapore Government over that of 4-ilaysia. 
Perhaps for this we must refer to the stronger influence of Confucian 
teaching on the authorities and civil servants of Singapore, as against 
Islam in Malaya. -
A key element in neo-Confucian ideals emphasized the role of 
the government in the operation of society. When troubles in society 
occur, the Confucian believed that "only the wise and learned" ruling 
benevolently and humianely and with integrity and self-discipline can 
solve them. The high place accorded to government led to nation-wide 
competitive examinations of candidates with long years of training in 
the Classics in the search for the best - centuries before the British 
began civil service examinations. Part of the explanations for the 
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far better performance of governmrents in the East Asian Four as a whole 
political culture of Confucianism which over the ASEAN Four is the 
and demandaffects not only the rulers but also the ruled who expect 
8 / 
rlers to act with integrity and discipline. 
Although the efficiency and effectiveness of most governments 
in the ASEAN Four have improved in the postwar decades, much has still 
This is true not only in the formation of adequateto be acccrplished. 
and their effective implementation but also in theindustrial policies 
routine functions of public institutions which involve the generation of 
external econcmies so irportant for private enterprises (gas and 
electric pmer, water supplies, roads, transport and ccrnnication, 
education, training). Qontributingregulation, law and order, justice, 
to the slowdown in Philippine growth in the latter portions of the 
postwar era may be the failure of the government to improve as a 
generator of externalities. 
IN THE MINT AND GIANT COUNTRIES OF ASIAIV. THE INDUSTRIAL TRANSITION 
we may briefly note the postwar experienceBy way of contrast, 
of the city-states, Hong Kong and Singapore and the giants, India and 
some insight and a better perspectiveChina, the purpose being to obtain 
saehere in betweenin viewing the growth of the ASEAN Four, which cure 
countries. The city-states have a sallthe giants and the mini 
agricultural sector and a small domestic market while the giants are 
saddled with a huge agricultural sector and a large damestic market. 
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These are basic differences compared with the ASEAN Four and they are 
inportant in Lhe dynamics of their postwar growth. Because of the 
shortage of crop land and other natural resources it is imperative for 
Singapore and Hong Kong to import most of their food and other basic 
necessities (including water).. This carpels them to export -:to .earn 
foreign exchange to purchase at least food and other prLmary 
necessities. To improve their livng standards and keep on growing, 
exports must expand and for this the labor force must became 
increasingly efficient. In contrast, the giants of Asia have nearl, all 
the varied basic needs within their borders. The need to export is not 
ompelling, and strategies to develop scale-econanic heavy industries 
ani the corresponding lower-stream capital-intensive industries to cater 
to the demand of the vast darestic market beccme more attractive than to 
develop industries that can earn foreign exchange. For foreign exchange 
is not important for the giants which together contain nearly two 
billion people carpared with city-states with little more than 2 and 4 
million. As a Chinese emperor told a foreign monarch, there is no need 
to trade as "we produce everything we need". 
Before the 1950s, Singapore and Hong Kong were trading 
centers, subsisting mainly on the food purchased fran the proceeds of 
the entrepot trade. But with the emancipation fram foreign control of 
China and the independence of Indonesia, the era of the entrepot trade 
was over, as trading with the villages and towns along the coasts of 
China and Indonesia became difficult or impossible. Without enough land 
for agriculture and markets for trading, there was no alternative but to 
shift to industrialization, no easy matter for two cities without a 
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for Hong Kong,large industrial entrepreneurial class. FortunaLelY 
with capital and technicians, especially highlyindustrialists 
experienced Shanghainese textile manufacturers arrived fron 
China 
fleeing frcm the communist armies in the late 1940s, many of them 	were 
from 
ready to set up factories as the textile machines they had ordered 
the West prior to their departure from China had arrived 
in Hong 
ino=.a. -substitution9 / 	 after a brief interlude withKong.- Singapore 

enough jobs for its rapidly
was too slow a way to createfound this 

growing workforce and flung open its doors to foreign enterprises. 
Both
 
countries had no need for a costly inport-substitution period 
to develop 
in order to initiate indigenous entrepreneurship 	and industrial capital 
They were also fortunate in having a their industrialization. 
predamLnantly Chinese labor force with Confucian traditions of 
diligence 
Thus, these city-states had all and frugality in consunption.in wor.K 
economy but without the disadvzntages of the advantages of a monsoon 
slow-growing, highly demanding traditional agriculture with pronounced 
seasonalities, rigid schedules, and great densities. 
on industrial efficiencies, 	 the mrostNevertheless, the demands 
were severe. To export manufactures,for city-states,critical factor 
and materials forfood and other necessities for workersthe inported 

and tariffs could not be levied. 
processing had to be kept cheap, 
With 
free trade, industries in city-states were on their own and 
had to be 
advanced by governrentsurvive. kvqpr development wasefficient to 
and training;policies to prmarte housing, health facilities, education, 
drive to increase external econamies bythere was also an incessant 

inproving the varied services of government-utilities, transport/
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so on. The role of government was alsocanmnication, construction and 
strategic in the formulation of appropriate industrial policies and 
their effective irrplementation. 
finished manufactured goods kept prices coapared 
With increasing efficiency in services, touri.n (an -export 
sector) expanded, tourist purchases rising as the free inport of 
low with those of 
flow of funds and finance opened upneighboring countries. The free 
opportunities for the two states to develop as financial centers. Thus 
both Singapore and Hong Kong, with small agricultural sectors, had to 
to improve their service sector not only to generate externalstrive 
a modern export sector.econanies for manufacturing but also to develop 
Not being constrained by the ne-A to finance the development of paddy 
their funds into nanpower andagriculture tCey could instead put 

infrastructure development for industrial and service efficiencies.
 
In the Appendix Tables, the rise in GDP per capita for both 
rates lower incountries is the same, about 6 per cent, with Singapore 
the first half of the period but higher in the second half than those of 
Hong Kong, which it has been noted, was able to start nuch earlier. The 
service product per worker rose substantially for both countries in the 
1960s even though fran the beginning of the period it was already high. 
of the labor force in the service andThere was an absolute decline 
agricultural sectors as the labor force in industry surpassed the total 
in services for Hong Kong in the 1960s and for Singapore in the late 
1970s, thus completing the passage into the industrial society (though 
fran a traditional service, not an agricultural society). As 
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(and also inproductivity and wages rose in industry and services 
agriculture), the low paying tiny stores, shops, stalls, hawkers, and 
others in the informal sect,,r began to disappear; mechanization spread 
not only to industry but also to the services, increasingly replacing 
unskilled workers. With full employment, housewives found jobs.easier 
to get and their participation rates rose., 
These and other forces contributed to falling trends in family 
income inequalities. 0 / Nevertheless, the level of over-all income 
inequalities remained higher than in East Asian countries with rural 
sectors because of the much greater variance of income within the 
service sector in contrast to the agricultural sector in monsoon Asian 
economies. The great population densities and small size of farms do 
not permit large variations in size of farms in monsoon paddy 
agriculture in contrast to wheat farming holdings in the West. In the 
service sector, proprietors and managers do not employ large numbers of 
blue collar workers as in industry or in service units in the West, so 
that the number of blpe collar workers per proprietor .-r manager or 
skilled worker) is small. Thus the income distribution pyramid is a 
long, sharp, narm; one compared to a flat one in agriculture or 
industry. 
Birth rates fell as the. demand for more skilled and educated 
labor rose relative to unskilled workers. Parents found it necessary to 
send their children to school longer to help them get jobs in the 
future; thus secondary education accelerated. Full emplyrment opened up 
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greater opportunities for housewives to enter the labor market and 
participation rates rose, increasing the opportunity costs of raising 
children. The incae to buy health and life insurance-, opportunities of 
buying aparlmants in public housing projects, and the spread of schemes 
for pension and retirennt allowance, meant that there was less need for 
children to provide for the future of parents as they got old. In all 
this the changes were similar to those in Japan, Taiwan and the Republic 
of Korea, when they moved into the industrial society. But note that 
Singapore's total fertility rate is substantially lower than Hong 
Kong's, 1.8 per cent agains- 2.2 per cent in 1980 (nmuch lower than those 
of Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and Malaysia and as low as that of 
Japan). Part of the explanation may be that more than any country in 
Asia the Singapore Government has provided the types of social welfare 
assistance which provide security and insurance for aging parents 
(housing and pensions): even though it has spent less than Sri Lanka's 
welfare program.81/ 
One other lesson from the success of the city-states' 
transition may be noted. Their industrialization, propelled initially 
by outside entrepreneurs with capital and technicians is gradually being 
taken over by locals as their institutions of higher learning and 
technical schools turn out the managers, technicians and skilled workers 
and as they gain experience in the operation of the enterpr'.ses of 
outsiders. Moreover, the growth of Singapore (where so many of the 
world' s leading multinationals havin9 established themselves) 
demonstrates that national goverrmenes, hoxmver small, need not sucimib 
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to foreign control if the state's authorities are strongly dedicated to 
national (instead of personal) interests. It take.s a strongly 
to eliminate overnight the car assembly industryindependent government 
of some of the world's largest multinationals, as Singapore did 
recently. In all this, the city-states took advantage of, and put to 
developing monsoon paddy agriculture contrary 
good use, a highly diligent labor force and a dedicated class of 
entrepreneurs, managers, professionals, and politicians; these 
advantages of monsoon Asia were not offset by the high costs of 
- to the experience of 
tl. giants of Asia who ended the postwar decades with about 70 per cent 
of the labor force in agriculture with a long way to go before they 
could move into the industrial society. 
In their haste to leap 	into industrialization, enormous waste 
in the form of large amounts of unusedwas incurred in India and China, 
capacity in costly heavy industries and in the production of poor 
or high cost industrial products for downstream industries. Itquality 
is now acknawledged that the "heavy industrial strategy was a grave 
labor-intensivemistake, and in recent years, efforts to shift to a more 
industrialization and greater enphasis on agriculture have made for 
iproved growth performance. But the costs sunk into heavy industries 
the span of two or three decadesand the damage to light industries over 
are not easily wiped out. The tragedy is that a heavy industry strategy 
cannot be lightly or easily abandoned. 
the data show that China'sIn the Appendix Tables, most of 
was far better than that of India with national product perperformance 
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the level of income in Chinacapita three times greater. Nevertheless 
is $290, not very much higher than India's $240 in 1980. With such 
a 
large discrepancy ingrowth rates, one would expect a larger 
discrepancy 
There may be various reasonsin levels of per capita income in 1980. 

which is a narrowerChina's concept is net material productfor this. 
Since
 
total than GDP, excluding a large portion of the service sector. 

smaller size 
the excluded portion may have a-own more slowly than the 
included 
.portion, there may be an upward bias. This 
accounts in part for the 
of the S sector On terms both of employment and value 
added).
 
by the growth inThe growth of efficiency in China measured 
the growth in product peronly one-half that ofproduct per worker is 
is that, as in all communist countries, China has capita. The reason 
force. 
promoted the higher participation of housewives in the labor 
for the two 
Thus, although the population growth rate is about the same 
India), China'sChina, 2.1 per cent forcountries (2.0 per cent for 
in the labor foroe is 2.7 per cent compared with India's 1.6 per
growth 
cent.
 
China's food consuiption is There is another explanation. 
much larger than India's, 2,400 calories per day per capita as capared
 
extreme

with 2,000 in 1980.- This is mainly the result of the 

egalitarian and full eployment aims pursued by China, keeping the Gini 
very low (.33) and idleness virtually nil. With income ratio 
the lowest incure groups in China can cat raich moreineaualities so low, 
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than in India. The higher level of social welfare in China is shown by 
energy levels,the substantially higher life expectancy, consumption 
adult literacy, much lower fertility rate (2.9 as against. 4o9). 
Finally, recent discussions in the Chinese press have revealed 
the prevalence of gross inefficiencies in commune agriculture, 
it was
especially in motivating families tomaximize productive efforts; 
only after 1980 that the camune system was abolished, Note that the 
ormore slowly in agriculture than in industryproduct per worker grows 
services. Rice yields per hectare increased slower than in India (2.1 
and 2.5). 
in both ChinaThe slow groth of overall product per worker 
and India (much slower than East Asia and Southeast Asia) was one of the 
major reasons for tle large work force needed in agriculture. China did 
better than India largely because of the drastic land reform undertaken 
after 1948. Tenants and small -peasants were motivated to produce more; 
But changes sinceproduct per worker 3os4 to 2.6 per cent in the 1950s. 
then (such as • the- ccmmne system), went too far... and became 
cotmter-productive, and the growth of productivity fell in the. 1960s and 
for most of the 1970s. 8 3 / India's land and agrarian changes were too 
restricted and inadequate to have nuch inact. 
Te slow growth of agriculture in the giants was mainly the 
strategy policies of giving top priority tooutcome of the development 
heavy industrialization adopted by Mao in the early 1950s and by behru 
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in the mid-1950s, leaving insufficient resources for light industries, 
agriculture and infrastructure (besides institutions of Cmmnism in 
China and caste in India). China began to invest about 48 per cent of
 
the total capital construction fund fran the First Plan (1953-1957) 
leaving only 8 per cent for. agriculture and 6 per cent .for light 
industry, increasing it to about 58 per cent in 1958-1975. India 
decreased its outlays on agriculture in the development plans frm 11 
per cent in the First Plan (1951-1955) to*6 per cent in the Second Plan
 
while increasing the amount for industry fran 5 per cent to 23 per cent, 
with heavy industry receiving 16 per cent of the total. These shares 
for heavy industry were decreased in China from the 1976-1980 Plan from 
58 per cent.to 48 per cent, and in India during the 1974-1979 Plan from 
15 per cent to 12 per cent84/
 
The meager amounts allocated to agriculture made itimpossible
 
to develop such physical infrastructure as irrigation, roads, and 
electricity supply for agricultural development in the different parts 
of the two vast countries. In China, irrigation was only highly 
developed in certain parts of the country so that uneven development of
 
agriculture contributed substantially to inocue in, ,ality - "between 
variances" even though highly egalitarian methods of remmeration made 
for amazingly low "within sector" variances. For the regions without 
irrigation and rural industry, multiple-crqpping and off-fam .ncomes 
were negligible and yields low.
 
Light and labor-intensive industries shunted aside recaived 
meager help fran the goverament. Forced to buy obsolete and inefficient 
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machines fran the heavy engineering sectors, and expensive or 
poor-quality materials fran the heavy processing sectors 
(petrochemicals, steel, copper, pulp/paper, chemicals, and so on), they 
were unable to produce efficiently, and further constrained by the slow 
growth of the vast dcrr-stic markets as peasant incomes were viztually 
stagnant much of the time. 
Above all, these industries were unable to expand their 
exports rapidly. Econamists in India tend to shrug this off with the 
remark that India's home market is so vast, that there is no need to 
export. Although this is true, I believe that such a view overlooks the 
point that the function of exports is not only to serve as an extension 
of (or a complement to) the domestic market but as a source of the 
foreign exchange earnings needed to purchase goods not available 
internaly, especially machines and equipment and prxcessed materials. 
Exports, as a share of GNP, need not be large since, unlike the 
city-states, they need not import large amounts of fod and other 
necessities. But to buy machinery, equipment and manufactured products 
fran abroad, as the country becomes more industrialized and the 
agriculture more modern, exports 4o need to grow as rapidly as those of 
any country. 
At the end of World War II, there were highly efficient 
industries in both countries at a time when there were. no such 
industries in East and Southeast stia, except in Japan, e.g. the textile 
industry of Bombay and Shanghai, but they were not able to progress with 
locally mde machines and/or materials. Unable tz export labor­
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intensive industrial products (nor services nor agricultural products), 
both countries had to expand their production into every conceivable 
form of equipmt and material, whether they had the capabilities or the 
primary materials or not. At the outset, this was welcomed as a 
necessary step on the road to self-reliance in technology and self­
sufficiency in industry, the cherished goals of the heavy 
industrialization strategy. Specialization was for smaller countries, 
a modern version of the Chinese emperor's boast.it was argued --
But the enormous range and caplexities of modern industrial 
make ittechnologies, especially in the second 	half of the 20th century, 
irpossible for any one country to be able to produce all the varied 
equipment and materials needed by modern industries properly. This is 
true even for the larger and richer industrialized countries; even the 
US does not have such vast resources (capital, raw materials, and 
as to be able to be efficient in the production oftec-ical manpower) 
even half of its industrial output, particularly in machinery. The R & 
needed to keep inproving machines require all industrializedD resources 
countries to specialize, to sell each other new technologies, to 
exchange information and keep in close contact. If this is true of the 
of the smalllarge industrialized countries, it 	 is doubly true 
Sweden, Belgium, Netherlands, andindustrialized countries (Switzerland, 

so on) without the wide range of industries in the large countries.
 
Such countries "were able to enter the industrial society through
 
specialization in a few industries. For countries like China and India, 
without any experience in modern industry except textiles, it was a 
grave mistake to plunge into the most complex and costly set of 
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industries, hoping to short-cut their way into industrialization through 
self-reliance in technology. Planners may argue that India has the 
third largest scientific manpower in the world, but most of that 
manper consists of teachers in .-- 11eges and secondary schools and is not 
scientific manpower as such; in reality it is the highly specialized and 
experienced technicians on the factory floor ond in research 
laboratories who improve the techn9logies of e"isting machinery. The 
dream of self-reliance and self-sufficiency has now been given up but it 
is difficult to shift quickly to specialization and concentration, since 
the broad range of the obsolescent heavy industrial plant cannot be 
abandoned but must be refurbished at great cost while it takes time to 
restructure the light industries to improve their exporting 
capabilities'. With labor productivity growing slowly in agriculture the 
labor force continued to rise absolutely and to decline 3lowly, relative 
to the other sectors, and with industrial productivity slowing down in 
the 1970s, the pace of industrial expansion fell in both countries. The 
moveent into the industrial society began to stagnate. 
In my talks in Delhi and Beijing (1982), I encountered the 
argument that despite everything India and China have established a set 
of highly sophisticated industries which only Japan possesses in Asia. 
Undoubtedly this is an achievement that should not be neglected in 
assessing the industrialization of the giants. Nevertheless, it can be 
added that as long as Lxlia is so far fran the industrial society, its 
average living standards will be low with large sections of the populace 
in dire poverty, large disparities in income distribution, high birth 
and death rates, low levels of literacy, educational attainment and life 
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expectancy, and so on. And how valuable are these sophisticated 
industries (except to the small handful who wrk in them and receive 
high incores) if they cannot be made efficient, producing 'goods which 
help the othe-- industries to grow healthily? 
Under China's socialism, sam of the undesirable aspects of a 
pre-industrial econory such as poverty, inequality, and insecurity, 
unerployment, and so on prevailing in India are not Eeen. (It was one 
of the most heartening things to see in Beijing streets the populace 
riding in bicycles, wearing shoes, neat uniforms with hats, looking well 
fed and healthy; it was most distressing to see in the Delhi streets 
Indians cooking, sleeping and practically living on the sidewalks, in 
rags and without shoes.) One can readily grant that this is a 
substantial achievement of a socialist econoay. On the other hand 
average living standards are low, far below those of Indonesia (the 
lowest in ASE1N) and the question arises: has low income inequality and 
econonic security been achieved at too high a price, i.e., in trade-off 
with growth, a process ,of levelling downward to low incares? If growth 
were faster, under a strategy of less egalitarianism and less employment 
security and greater emphasis on agricultural and light-industry 
development durirr the past decades, the lowest income groups in China 
today might be earning nuch more than they are, while the Gini of inccme 
distribution (.33 per cent) would be no higher (as the "between 
variances" will lower, offsetting the higher "within variances"). 
believe that these questions are pertinent to the discussion going on 
among China's econcinsts as they debate the wisdom of excessive 
I 
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of Socialist countries.egalitarianism and job security in the growth 
The lesson from the postwar experience of the giants of Asia is that the
 
sheer size of a country cannot get around the imperatives of a monsoon 
economy nor can they be easily pushed aside under a socialist economy.
 
SITRY AND CONCLUDING RKS 
The passage into the industrial society is a major milestone 
-in the growth of monsoon econc mies, as it frees them from the 
constraints imposed on agriculture by the monsoons, and opens up 
opportunities to take full advantage of the strong work ethics of the 
labor force for industrialization. Approximately around the point when 
the labor force in industry rises to equal and then exceed the declining 
agricultural labor force, the distribution of household incomes begins 
to improve, the completion of the demographic transition is approached, 
and efficiency starts to accelerate with factor productivity rising, 
with favorable inpact on the propensity to save and the growth rate of 
consumption, as the experience of Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of 
Korea (and in saewhAt different manner, Hong Kong and Singapore) 
demonstrates.
 
To ;-each this Asian "golden age", hoever, monsoon econamies 
must go through a difficult period of adjusting to the pronounced 
seasonality, the great labor dtnand during the peak months, and the 
rigid schedules of, monsoon paddy agriculture. If this is successfully 
carried out, (through construction of roads, transport, 
irrigation/drainrie, and rural electrification, and improvements in 
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zural institutions pertaining to agrarian relations, associations, 
extension services, credit distribution, research and rural industry), 
farm family incores begin to accelerate and soon exceed the growth of 
the labor supply. When the excess is sustained, full employment is 
eventually approached and wages begin to rise. With rising farm 
incames, domestic demand for industrial and service output in the urban 
areas increases and this expands the demand for labor and young workers 
fran the rural areas who leave for jobs in the cities. Peasants find it 
necessary to mechanize farm operations in the peak season, and rising 
wages also induce industries to mechanize; in both instances the 
technology of small electric/gas machines and equipment are readily 
available from abroad. Total factor productivity begins to accelerate 
and growinj industrial e-2ficiencies enable entrepreneurs to expand 
exports. The shift of workers from agriculture to industry accelerates. 
The distribution of income tends to fall as incomes of small 
peasants rise faster than the larger ones with fuller use of surplus 
labor in multiple-cropping and off-farm incames, and as the poorest 
peasants move out "to the cities for more remunerative work. 
Mechanization and the greater use of labor in the slack season raise 
incaes in the agricultural sector as a whole. In the cities, 
increasing mechanization and efficiency enable workers to imrprove their 
productivity and earnings with full employment, mre housewives in lcwer 
incamre groups are able to obtain jobs and expand family incomes. The 
same forces increase the costs of raising children who now miust obtain 
additional education to qualify for more carplex cccupations when they 
grow up, and as children stay in school durinxg their teens, instead of 
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going to work, the incomes forgone rise. Increasing family incomes 
(in the form ofenable parents to purchase security in their old age 
pensions), ilwering theinvestments in housing, health insurance and 
value of children. 
Japan was the first to go through these processes in the 
1950s. It was relatively easy and swift with its long experience in 
prewear half century.agricultural and industrial development in the 
followed Japan into the industrialTaiwan, starting early in the 1950s, 

society about a decade or so later. Starting nuch later, the Republic
 
of Korea tried to leap into industrialization before 	its agriculture had
 
overome thd monsoon constraints. It stumbled into the industrial 
host of problems created by itssociety in the late 1970s but with a 
undue haste, especially in the premature establishment of a costly 
valiant efforts toccmplex of heavy industries. Despite vigorous and 
on
undo the damage by accelerated agricultural mechanization and emphasis 
high technology but labor intensive industries, the 	investment in heavy 
of Korea ended theindustries cannot be written off and the Republic 

1970s with a huge foreign debt.
 
Among the ASEAN Four, only Malaysia is close to the 	industrial 
econmy. Two decades of rural development plus the expansion of its 
to approach full employmentefficient plantations have enabled Malaysia 
in the rural areas. With industrialization growing as the dauestic 
market expands and as labor-intensive exports accelerate Malaysia should 
all the if mechaniza­be able to enter the industrial society - sooner 
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can betion of labor-intensive rubber tapping and palm oil harvesting 
this will be delayed if Malaysia g6es ahead withachieved. But entry 
Thailand is the next possibility but manythe heavy industry projects. 
out very strongly inbehind Malaysia. The Philippines, startingyears 
the 1950s slowed down in the later decades, and was the only country in 
in theASEAN to experience stagnation in the growth of per capita GDP, 
in efficiencyThere are serious problems of slow progressearly 1980s. 

the most inportant, the public
includingin many sectors of the economy 

sector.
 
life and death matter, theDependent on efficiency as a 
have striven for and ac~b-eved city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong 
all segments of the economy, including the high levels of efficiency in 
lik:e 
public sector. In contrast, Asia' s giants, India and China 
have, 
and (to a certain extent) the1970sthe Republic of Korea in the 
opted for a capital-intensivePhilippines from the 1950s, 
down the growth of labor-intensivewhich has slowedindustrialization 
theseare nowd belatedly turning to industries and agriculture. They 
no monsoon economy with its greatsectors without whose development, 
ever move into theand population densities canlabor-intensities 
where
unlike in the sparsely settled Westindustrial society, 
leave a 
capital-intensive growth in agriculture and industry will 
not 

large segment of the labor force idle.
 
the Middle(It may be added that countries in Latin Arrerica, 

East, and elsewhere have little difficulty entering the industrial
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society. Argentina and Uruguay wade it before 1950, Venezuela, Chile 
and Cuba in the 1970s. Also Libya, Israel, Iran, Portugal, South 
Africa, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia. But the transition 
in these countries outside of monsoon Asia does not necessarily signify 
a fall in incme inequalities, demographic transition, and high growth 
of per capita GDP.) 
The question arises: how soon will the countries discussed 
above other than Malaysia make it into the industrial econcmies? As far 
as India and China are concerned, the share of the labor force in 
agriculture is so large that it is unlikely they can do so before the 
end of this century, as it will take at least a couple of decades to 
raise farm family incomes high enough to neet the requirements of an 
industrial econcury. At rates of growth of the industrial labor force in 
the 1960s and the 1970s, it is unlikely that Thailand, the Philippines 
and Indonesia can complete the transition by the end of the 1980s and 
probably not even in the early. 1990s. But this assumes that present 
policies continue unchanged into the rest of this century. With policy 
changes, the deceleration :i the growth of the agricultural labor force
 
and the acceleration in the growth of the industrial labor force can 
quickly bring all three into the industrial society, as was the case in 
Japan in the 1950s, Taiwan in the 1960s and Republic of Korea and 
Malaysia in the 1970s. What, then, are the policies suggested by the 
experience of these four countries (as uxell as those of Singapore and 
Hong Kong) ? 
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First of all, we believe that the development of agriculture 
must continue at an undiminished pace for all countries of ASEAN. It is 
not sufficient just to look at data on imports (and exports) of 
agricultural products and conclude that saturation in demand for this or 
that food is being approached. In such cases, plans for diversification 
of agricultural production should be drawn up, since the East Asian 
experience shows that with rising incomes shifts toward higher valued 
foods (such as fruits, vegetables, meats, and poultry) are certain to 
take place. Moreover, even in seemingly saturated foods such as rice, 
the growth of family incomes is likely to increase substantially the 
consumption of foods in the lower income groups with fuller employment 
and shifts to higher elasticity foods (see -). As noted in the table 
above on caloric and protein consumption, the intake levels of the ASEAN 
Four are about a decade behind that of the Republic of Korea. Finally, 
farming family incomes in all the ASEAN Four are about one-half or less 
of non-farming family incomes. This gap needs to be cut down 
substantially if the damestic market is to expand further and incame 
distribution is to improve. For Japan, Taiwan and the Republic of 
Korea, farming family incomes can be increased by a transformation of 
small-scale mechanized farming, and eventual liquidation of part-time 
farming imposed by the ncnsoons. 
Malaysia has sae ways to go in rice self-sufficiency through 
further increases in yields, multiple-cropping, and inproved 
irrigation/drainage systems. Moreover, with rising incomes, 
diversification into poultry, vegetables and fruits may become 
necessary in order to cut down their imports. Above all, the mechaniza­
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tion of rubber tapping and Palm oil harvesting is essential if the labor 
force in the comercial crops is to be shifted to industries and the 
productivity of those remaining is to rise. Most worrisome is 
Malaysia's sharp turn to industrial capital-intensity recently. It may 
in thebe repeating the same mistake 	 that the Republic of Korea made 
latter 1970s.
 
It is in Thailand that government assistance in the 
intensification of fanning is urgently needed to raise annual farm 
This calls for greater spending on irrigation facilities,incomes. 
credit for therural electrification, road construction, and increased 
1980s, besides improements in rural institutions. Thai peasants have 
performed well in the past decades but infrastructure construction is 
beyond their means. 
The Philippines and Indonesia are facing the problem of 
improving productivity in their important estate sector at a time when 
world markets are shripking with the slowdown in the growth of incomes 
This appears to be mainly a problem ofin industrialized countries. 
poor management, and not much can be done by government, except perhaps 
encouraging re-planting of trees, a, Malaysia did inin matters such as 
rubber and coconut. Both countries, while intensifying et.krts to raise 
physicalefficiency in the small rice 	 farms through more and better 
the outer islands for Indonesia), need toinfrastructure, (especially in 

pay closer attention to the improvement of rural institutions,
 
especially farmers' associations, and in the develop ent of light and
 
labor intensive industries.
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For all of the ASEAN Four, the costs of these policies will be 
considerable, and the lessons of the giants and of the Pepublic of Korea 
(and even Taiwan) are that they should take priority over the 
establishment of capital-intensive industries. None of the ASEAN Four 
has industrial/technological experience ccaparable to that of India and 
China, nor even of Korea and Taiwan; moreover, the scattered ca ital­
intensive industries now operating in the Four have not been doing well 
even though these are jointly operated with multinationals. If the 
objective is to save foreign exchange (via second-stage inport­
substitutions), why not establish them cooperatively as regional 
projects, spreading the costs of their establishment and reducing the 
risks of unused capacities? These industries are difficult to operate 
smoothly in small markets with insufficient numbers of experienced 
managers, engineers, technicians, and skilled workers and inadequate 
supporting infrastructure (roads, harbors, storage, power and water 
supplies, etc.). 
The priority need for the ASEAN Four aspiring to move into the 
industrial economy for the 1930's is for decentralized and regionalized 
small industries which can provide employment for the rural labor force 
available durinq all but the busiest weeks of planting and harvesting. 
This can become the major factor in the rise of farm family inccmes, as 
shown by the cases of Japan and Taiwan, and becnting increasingly 
evident in Malaysia and the Republic of Korea. For the larger, more 
capital-intensive industries, as well as for even the labor-intensive 
industries, long-range plans for specialization in particular lines of 
industries should be made. Without such planning, it is difficult to 
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plan for the allocation of scarce resources for construction of plant, 
equipment, infrastructure and training facilities. And both the ASEAN 
Four and the East Asian Four simply do not have the skilled manpower to 
get into many industries. These brief remarks lead to the issue: how do 
countries go about the formation and implerrentation of industrial 
policies? 
One reason for the postwar successes of the Japanese economy 
is the unique industrial policy which evolved in the postwar decades, 
with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) assuming 
the coordinating role and scores of committees and councils, involving 
the participation of large number of experts and interested individuals, 
spending a great deal of time studying the industries to be selected for 
concentration in the long-term future. Instead of laws and regulations 
most of the decisions and policies arrived at by consensus are 
inplemented through coordination and persuasion by MITI. (The 
assumption is that a larger group of experts make less mistakes and a 
larger group of interested institutions facilitate the implementation of 
policies agreed upon.) We are not raising here the issue of whether the 
Japanese system is suitable for other countries in Asia. Rather the 
issue is: how. did countries such as India, China, and Korea cmre to the 
decisions which committed the people of these countries to such 
enormmts, unrecoverable expenditures? What little we can find on this 
issue points to a small group with limited time and knowledge (and with 
consultations here and there) making the decisions. Similarly in recent 
years anmmcements by ministers of industries and heads of govemments 
in the ASEAN Four do not seem to be the cutcme of long and careful 
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deliberations (which require extensive visits and investigation of 
industries abroad) by a large group of qualified experts in and out of 
governments. They appear to be ad hoc announcements and declarations 
that this or that industry is to be supported. For Asian countries to 
succeed in industrialization, a much better method for the selQction. and 
implementation of over-all, long-range industrial policy is nMeded, if 
costly mistakes are to be avoided and if implementation is to be 
efficient and effective. 
8 5 / 
Industrial policy, unlike trade policy, should not just focus 
on the short-term needs of the balance of payments, but on the 
long-range development of industrialization in which econcmic and 
technological elements are at the core but not the only considerations. 
For many other interests are involved: labor in employment creation, the 
peasant in cheap and good quality inputs for farming and off-farm 
employment and likewise the consumers who must buy the final products of 
industry. Only by taking into account the needs of these groups can an 
to maximize the long-term graoth of industriesindustrial policy serve 
(and minimize the balance of payments and government deficits in the 
future). The adoption of good industrial policies and their effective 
implementation, however, can only go hand in hand with improvements in 
the functioning of the government as a whole. 8 6 / 
Apedix Table 1 
RAINFLL PAT7EF FOR MJOR ro m or 7HE wow 
Average Monthly nfall (i.nches) 
Yearly 
Belin,, Cities In Average January February March April Hay Jme July qxrjst September cter Novi,ber Deeiber 
Ionsm Asia 82.0 2.5 1.9 2.3 3.1 7.0 12.5 13.8 12.1 10.5 7.8 5.2 3.2 
Afric (Smith of 52.9 2.9 2.6 3.5 3.5 4.1 4.4 6.6 7.7 5.9 5.0 3.4 3.3 
Sahara) 
3.4 * 2.9 3.6 3.3 3.3 2.6 2.8 3.1 2.9 3.5 3.3 3.8Africa* 38.5 

3.6Latin mrica 43.2 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.5 
Nth i 36.8 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.4 2.6 2.5 
Dmps 24.6 2.0 1.8 . 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.2 
X­
* 	 Africa excluding (1) Freetown, Sierra Iwne; (2) Doan, Cameroon and (3) Bathrst, Gwbia. These are (except for Cameron) mall coatries in 
West Africa bdre torntial mzmer rains make for rain forests and not paddy agriculture. 
General notes mid orcess Data from various publications of Royal Heteorological Office, United Kingdom and are simple uwielghted average of cities 
in 	 each region. Honioon Asia's rainfall pattern is the average of (1) Sandakan, North Borneo; (2) Aoy, 0hia (3) Nagasaki, Japan, (4) Tokyo, 
Japan: (5) Shanghai, China: (6) Cochin, Indial (7) Akyab, Bumal (8) Ragon, Bmua: (9) Quang-Tri, Vietnam e10)Aparri, Philippines, 
(1) i ajeeling, India (12) Bangalore, India (13) Mandalay, Burm: (14) Saigan, Vietnam (15) Allahabad, India: (16) Lashlo, Burnal aid 
(17) Hanoi, Vietnam. Africa (south of Sara's) rainfall pattern is the average of (1) Banxrbu, Republic of Congo; (2) Nouvelle-Anvers,
 
Belgian ongo; (3) Freetwn, Sierra Ieot (4) Port Nolloth, South Africal (5) Kizberley, South Africa; (6) Port Elizabeth, South Africa;
 
(7) Goree, French West Africa: (R) kmbasa, F~nya; (9) ITbadan, Nigeria; (10) Wary, Sudan: (U) Nova Lisbo, Angola; (12) Beira, kozaabique: 
(13) Kasmrpa, Northern Roesia; (14) Doula, Camaroon (15) Bathurst, Genbia; and (16) Walvis Bay, SoutJi.st Africa. latin Amrica's rainfall
 
pattern is the average of (1) Medellin, bolombial (2) Santos, Brazil; (3) Manaus, Brazil; (4) Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; (5) Coquitbo, Chile;
 
(6) Puerto Montt, Chlei. (7) Santiago, Chile; (8) Buenos Aires, Argenti a: (9) Mar del Plata, Argentina; (10) Tucurmn, Argentina; (111 Lim, Perus 
(12) Cababoc, Venezuela; (13) Gmayaquil, Ecuador; and (14) Asuncion, Paraguay. North America's rainfall pattern is the average of (1) Miami*
 
Florida: (2) Goodlad, Kansas: (3) San Diego, California; (4) Phoenix, .rizona: (5) Cairo, Illinois; (6) New York, N.Y.; (7) Washington, D.C.1
 
(8) San Antonlo, Texas, (9) Mon1tgary, Alabama; (10) Sitka, Alaska; (11) St. Paul, Minnesota; (12) Albany, New York; (13) Dubuque, lam; and 
(14) Duluth, rdnnesota. Eunjpe's rainfall pattern is the average of (1) Astrakhan, USSR; (2) Turin, Italy; (3) Trieste, Italy; (4) Paris, France; 
(5) Dublin, Ireland; (6) ftykjavik, Iceland; (7) frankfurt am Main, West Germany: (8) Edinburgh, Scotland; (9) Athens, Greece; (10) La Coruna,
 
Spain: (11) Ganada, ain; (12) Lisbon, Portugal: (13) Bucharest, oamnia. (14) Odessa, USSR; (15) Oslo, Norway; (16) Moscow, USSR;
 
(17) Stockholm, q-vden; (18) Tr mso, Norway: (19) Archangel, USSR; and (20) Vardo, Norway. Java aid Malaysia have been omitted fron the table.
 
Ttzir mosoon rains oe in the last and the first quarters of the year, just the opposite of other parts of Asia.
 
Appendix Table 2 
IN VARIOUS 	 PARTS OF THE WORLDAGRICULTuRAL DENSITIs AND AVERAGE SIZE OF FARMS 
ricultural 	Population Agricultural Population Total Agricul- Area of Average of 
tural ols Holdings HoldingsArable LandBegion/Continent Aricultural Land (Million Holdings) Million (Hectares Per(Persons per Hectare) (Persons per Hectare) Hectares) Holdings) 
138.5 2,387.6 17.2
1.4
0.4
World 

3.1 	 92.3 201.2 2.21.3Mnsoon Asia 
7.3 	 227.8 31.0 Africa 	 0.3 1.4 
North and
 7.0 	 710.0 102.0
0.2
0.1
Central America 

544.2 80.01.0 	 6.8Latin America 	 0.1 
0.4 	 24.7 221.3 9.0
 Europe 	 0.2 

0.4 	 483.1 1,316.1
0.1
0.01
Oceania 

Source: 	 FAO Production Yearbook (1972), based on 1960 and 1970 agricultural censuses of each country. 
Arable land as defined by FAD refers to land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are countedNotes: land under market and kitchen gardens (includingonly once), cemporary meadows for mowing or pasture, 
crops refers
cultivation under glass), and land temporary fallow or lying idle. Land under permanent 
the land 	for long periods and need not be replanted afterto land cultivated with crops' which occupy 
each harvest, such as cocoa, coffee and rubber, it includes land under shrubs, fruit trees, nut trees 
land under trees grown for wood or timber. Permanent meadows and pasturesand vines, but excluded 
or more) 	 for herbaceous forage crops, either cultivated orrefers to land used permanently (five years 
growing wild (wild prairie or grazing land). 
Agricultural Land = Arable land + Land under permanent crops + Permanent meadcws and pastures 
wholly or partly forAricultural holding as defined by FAO refers to all land which is used 
one person - the holder - alone or with the assistance ofagricultural production and is operated by 
without regard to title, size or location (livestock kept for agricultural purpose withoutothers, 

agricultural land is also considered as constituting a holding.
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A ndix Table 3 
TO RICE AND
CORRELATION BEIWE- MONSOON RAINS, AREA PLANM 
ASIAN CXNTRIESPOPULATION DENSIIY IN REGIONS OF SEL' 
Area plantedPopulation Density Average 
per Arable Land Rainfall to rice as % 
(persons per hectare) per year of total 
(inches) cultivated land 
JAPAN 
43.7 24%()
4.9(1)
Hokkaido 

71.8 65%(1)
25.4(i)
Japan, excluding Hokkaido 

INDIA
 
29.4 16% (4)
1.9 (3)
Northwest India(2) 

Rest of India 3.9(3) 64.0 55%(4)
 
INDONESIA
 
4.7(5) 108.9 (6) 37% (7)
 Sumatra 

89.5 77% (7)
13.4 (5)
Java-Madura 

PHILIPPINES
 
54% (8)(10)
98.2
9.9 (8)
Luzon 

89.4(9) 29% (8)
6.0 (8)
Mindanao 

PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH
 
13.7 17% (12)

.3.1(ii)
Pakistan 

98% (12)
100.0
7.7(11)
Bangladesh 

(1) 1979; (2)Northwest India is composed of Uttar Pradesh East, Uttar Pradesh
 
West, Punjab, Hinmchal Pradesh, Janmu Kashmir, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh West,
 
Gujarat, and Saurashtra and Kutch; (3)1961; (4)1959-60, area planted to rice
 
as % of area planted to total cereal; (5)1973, population density per total
 (6) rain
agricultural land (which consists of farm agriculture and estate); 

forest; (7) 1973; (8) 1971; (9) rainfall pattern for Mindanao is evenly 
distributed throughout the year unlike that of mnsoon Luzon area; (10) 
Philippines, excluding Mindanao; (11) 1970; (12) 1976, area planted to rice as % 
of area planted to all cereals. 
Sources: Japan - Japan Statistical Yearbook 1981; India - Statistical 
Abstract of the Indian Union 1961; Indonesia - Agriculture Census 1973 and 
- NFDA PhilippineStatistical Yearbook of Indonesia 1979; Philippines 
Yearbook 1978, and Census of Agriculture 1971; Pakistan and Bangladesh -
Area Handbook for Pakistan, Area Handbook for Bangladesh, and FAD 
Production Yearbook 1976.
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AppendLx Table 4 
pER1ERAE OF TOTAL HIPLOym IN FIRMS 
NGGING LESS THAN 10 PERSONS 
UNITED UN= SATESTAIWAN 
(1961) Manufacturing 46(1947) Manufacturing 16* (1961) Canrerce 95(1954) Manufacturing 8** (1961) Transport 
-
58 
(1961) Services 93 JAPAN 

PHILIPPINES(1964) Manufacturing 28 
(1964) Manufacturing 5C (1961) Manufacturing 76 
(1961) Construction 93SINGAPORE (1961) Commerce 94 
(1961) Transport and 64(1966) Manufacturing 45 Camunication 
(1961) Private 95
 SOUrH KOREA 
 Services
 
(1966) Manufacturing 43 
THAILAND 
(1970) Manufacturing 70
 
* as %of employment in finns engaging less than 50 persons
 
** as %of employment in firms engaging less than 20 persons
 
Force "Explosion" and the Labor-intensiveSee Oshima, H.T. ';LaborSources and notes: 
Asian Growth in Eonaic Develoment and Cultural Change, Vol. 19 No. Sector in 
1971 for the various econonic and industrial censuses and surveys fracm 2, January 
taken. United States data from Statistical Abstract of the which data are derived by subtracting from sectorUnited States 1979. Percentages were 
employment figures taken fran the labor-force sample surveys the number enployed 
as reported in the economic orfirms with more than ten persons engagedin 
The residual was assumed to be approximately the size of industrial censuses. 
employees. The percentage is the sector comprising finns with fewer than ten moreis a tendency for iany finns with ten orupwardly biased because therb, 
onitted in the economic or industrial censuses, which are employees to be 
based on lists of addresses. On the other hand,establishment censuses lcyees tend to be included in establishmentpart-time enployees and part-year e 
censuses. 
_ _ _ 
A. 	 Statistics of O prative Croth Rates in Taiwan and the public of 1re. 
Growth Pate in Constant Price, ,Ge.-tetric Rates per Year 1950 to 
__ _ 
_I_ _C 	 C OF KOMEA 
Whole Whole 
1950s 1560s 1970s Period 19505 1960s 19709 Period 
Overall Growth Rates in 
7.6 9.b 8.9 8.7 5.1 8.6 9.5 7.71. GP Mruet prices 
5.7 3.1 6.0 8.0 S.7
2. GDP per capita 	 4.0 6.3 6.7 

2.8 4.5 3.7
1.1 4.2 4.7 4.5 3.2 
__ 
6.5 5.4 4.1 4.8 1.9 5.8 5.0 5.4
3. ]8TpIMFOt

GOP per wadar 
ret" 	 Growth Pates In 
5.5 4.4 3.2 4.4IS. gIacultal pM i.ct 	 4.8 4.1 1.6 3.5 
10.7 14.7 12.5 12.6 12.3 17.2 .5.4 15.06. xnamtrial pzVd=t 
9.1 8.3 91 3.7 9.9 8.57. Service prouct 10.0 	 7.0 
1.8 3.2 2.5
Agriultur Product per wker 4.6 3.2 4.1 3.6 2.18. 	 4.8 5.7 [0.9 7.9 5.8 6.99. Idustriaproduc perworker 7.9 6.6 
5.2 4.8 5.0
10. Servie product r worker : 6.7 2.4 3.7 3.0 
sdectr Grwth of Podt Per Woker In 
9.9 	 3.9 0.8 3.5 2.221. Miniing i quarrying 	 -2.4 
2.6 4.1 3.8 4.012. Canstuctixr. 	 0.8 4.1 
and public utilities 	 8.3 14.9 11.7 12.2 11.2 1.713. 7tricity
14. Trmasprt, storge and csmmumcatcin 7.2 9.4 8.3 10.4 6.5 8.4 
15. 	 Mtufacturng 7.8 3.3 5.4 5.0 7.5 6.2 
ervices 
0.7 4.4. 2.7 2.1 , 1.5 1.9 
17. 	 Peringal and others - also includes 
qgenue nt service 4.3 3.1 3.6 3.9 1.9 2.9 
Is. ftpulatien 3.5 2.6 1.9 2.7 2.0 2.5 1.7 2.1 
Labce 
2.4 2.3 	 3.0 2.8 
20. ubl c isurpticin 	 6.0 4.5 5.4 5.3 3.0 5.5 8.3 5.6
 
7.6 5.8 7.0 7.5 6.8
21. Private consumption 	 7.8 8.3 6.8 

22. Gross dcestic inveamnt 13.7 16.2 8.2 12.7 - 23.6 13.4 18.5 
23. &rmrts (comtant) 	 9.3 23.7 9.3 14.1 7.1 34.1 23.0 21.4 
24. h,-rts (constant) 	 11.0 17.9 9.1 12.7 2.9 20.5 11.8 11.7 
of WoKrl~ lport 
and Ih World Tables 1980. Dlployment data used in coiputing lines , 4, 0rinly 
fzrmuiffeartE3E ofaor Statistics. In computing lines 11-17 various issues of official publication 
on national accounts are used. Lines 3, 4, 3-10 for 1950s calculated fron Shirley W.Y. Kuo, The Econoic 
Structure of Taiwan 1952-69 (for Talwan) and Wmtack llong, Trade Distortions and Eployvnt Crth n 
m, Seoul, HDI (for Republic of Korcal. 
Notes and Scurces Unless otherwise indicated, all data are taken from various issues MM D 
B. Statistics of Cbnparative Prerentpge and Absolute Changes,
 
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, 1950 to 1980
 
TAIWAN 	 REPUBLIC OF KOREA
 
1950s 1960s 1970s Change 1950s 1960s 1970s Change
 
Percentage of labor force in 
56 30 -46.4 	 66 34 -48.5
1. Agriculture 

2. Industry 	 11 41 272.7 9 29 222.2 
33 29 -12.1 	 25 37 48.03. Service 
GDP 	 Origina in 
-4.AgriuIture 32 28 10 -68.8 45 37 16 -64.4 
141.2
5. Industry 	 28 29 48 71.4 17 20 41
(a) Manufacturing 17 22 38 123.5 9 14 28 211.1 
42 5.0 38 43 43 13.2
6. Service 	 40 43 

Debt 	service as %of 
7. GNP 
8. Exports 
External public debts 
9. % of GNP 
as 
10.6 
2.0 
4.5 
13.1 23.6 20.9 
3.5 
15.0 
28.8 37.8 
1b. enrolled as % of age group in 
1.0. Primary schools 
U-. Secondary schools 
12..Righer education 
95 
33 
4 
103 
78 
13 
8.4 
136.4 
225.0 
94 
27. 
5 
il 
76 
12 
18.1 
181.5 
140.0 
1950 1960 1970 1980 Ave. 1950 1960 1970 1980 Ave. 
Absolute Magnitudes 
13. Population (millions) 
14. Per capita $ GNP 
7.98 
106 
11.21 
141 
14.60 
412 
17.64 
2150 
12.86 
702 
20.36 
60 
24.70 
80 
31.37 
242 
38.12 
1520 
28.64 
476. 
15. Life expectancy at 
birth (years) 64 68 72 68 54 59 65 59 
16. Energy constmption per 
capita, kg. of coal 
equivalent (1980 data 
is for 1979) 
17. Crude birth rate per 1000 
18. Crude death rate per 1000 
19. Total fertility rate 
20. Working age pop. (15 to 64 years) 
million persons 4.5 
512 
40 
7 
5.8 
5.6 
1960s 
1052 
27 
5 
4.0 
8.4 
1970s 
2431 
23 
5 
2.3 
11.3 
1365 
30 
6 
4.0 
7.5 
Ave. 
11.9 
208 
43 
13 
13.8 
1964 
, 
815 
30 
10 
17 1 
1970s 
1473 
24 
7 
3.0 
20.3 
832 
32 
10 
15.8 
Ave. 
21. Gini coefficient 
22. Number of tourists millions 
. .9 . 
(Shirley Kuo's estimates)
23.6 472.5 1393.3 629.8 
.367' .382 .375 
(Hakchung Choo's estimates) 
Notes and Sources: Data frcm IBRD World Development Reports, various issues except otherwise noted. In line 1,
 
force shares in 1960, 1970, and 1980 are as noted in the text for Taiwan and Japan. 
Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, 1950 to 1980 C. C..prative Financial, Fiscal and Other Data r 
TREPUBLIC OF KOREA 
Whole
Whole 

1950s 1960s 1970s Period
1950s 1960s 1970s Period 
I 
Savis as %ofIGNP, in averages 4.32.7 3.3 6.8
3.0 8.4 13.0 8.1
1. Personal saving 2.0
0.5 2.1 3.3
3.5 4.0 3.2
2. Corporate saving 2.2 6.1 4.9 4.6
 4.0 2.9 7.8 4.9 2.8 
3. Government saving 

4. Surplus on current account -4.3 -3.4
-0.3 -1.4 -4.4

-1.5 -1.0 1.6
(-deficits) 

Private Consuption Expenditures as
%of QW in aveages 77.3
71.2 62.0 52.1 61.8 83.0 78.5 70.5 
otion
5.Total 33.9
29.9 35.3 36.6
30.7 31.9
32.8 32.1
6. Non-food 

15.8 16.2 15.9
14.6 15.6 
7. Clothinq and household 15.7 15.1 13.0 

Central Government Revenue and
 
tures as % of GNP
 15.7 16.2 15.4
 
8. Tntal Current Revenue 24.5 22.8 24.6 24.0 14.3 
 13.1 10.2
 
9. Direct and Indirect taxes 15.4 16.3 19.5 17.1 7.0 
10.4 

1.4 0.6
0.4 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
10. Smosidies 
 0.9 -0.8 0.4.
 
U1. Net lending (-borrowing). 4.2 3.8 8.2 5.4 1.1 

Prices, rawth rates 22.5
17.0
14.3 2.9 12.1 9.8 36.5 13.9
12. Consumer prices 
 45.7 17.5 22.4 28.5
 13. Inplicit prices (GNP) 13.3 4.1 11.5 9.6 
 3.3 19.6

-0.4 4.7 38.5 17.1 
14. Foreign exchange. 14.5 0.1 

Mney supply, growth rates 
14.8 24.5 19.7 18.6 29.5 30.5 26.2
 15. Currency & demand deposits 
of China 1981 (for Taiwan) and The Bank of Korea
 Sources: Lines 1-Ui fran National Inca of the Republic 
National Inccme in Korea 1978 updated by Korea Statistical Yearbook 1980 (for the Republic of Korea); 
lines 12-14 frau IBRD World Tables 1980 and ADB Key Indicators (April 1982); line 15 fran various 
issues of Taiwan Statistical Data Book and Korean Statistical Yearbook. 
Statistics ofqznparative Growth Rates in Thailand and Philipphes 
Gz__h Rates In Oxitant Price, Goanetric ;ate Per Yer 1950- to 190 
Whole 'f Mole 
19502 1960s 1970s Period 19508 1960s 19708 Period 
Oerall wh htw In 
6.4 5.1 6.3 6.0 5.7 8.4 7.2 7.11. Gm irut prices 
3.6 2.2 3.4 3.1 2.e 4.7 5.1 4.22. O per Otqa 
3.9 3.7 4.2 3.9 3.6 4.0 3.2 3.7
3. O 
2.1 2.0 4.4/ 4.04. GD per 2.5 1.4 " 2.1 3.4 
Bee= Gnwth Fates In 
4.9 4.2 3.8 5.6 4.7 4.75. Jwnjraztlwm pOO=. 5.2 4.3 3.7 7.3 8.0 11.9 10.0 10.0z bdmtrw ixawt 7.2 6.0 
6.9 5.2 5.4 5.8 6.1 9.1 7.3 7.57. kevice euxt 
2.9 0.7 4.3 4.5 3.5I. Awiz1ts4 prouct per worer(44 2.6 1.5 3.3 3.20. 2.8 2.0 1.6Iadustral pem&ut per mrx, 1.0 1.5 3.0 5.14.4 3.310.9. Bava prdc per mocke 0.6 -1.9 -0.7 -0.7 
Odxwcter Graith of Prdct Per Utxker In 
1. miwlntg a qmutzyig -4.3 4.1 -0.3 -0.2 -9.3 4.9 10.7 2.1 
12. Qu=nt-uim -6.8 -2.7 13.6 1.9 -3.2 1.1 -0.7 -0.9 
13. lactfricty and WAS utilities -3.0 -0.2 4.3 0.4 4.3 17.6 6.2 9.4 
14. Tgsm 1, - and oamundcatte. 0.4 -0.7 3.7 1.1 6.7 1.4 2.9 3.6 
1.6 1.6 -3.7is. mmutabiring 1.5 1.8 -0.01 7.0 4.1 
Servce
 
1r. - - C -0.3 -0.8 -0.3 -0.5 5.8 6.6 -1.9 3.5 
17. Pormwladothers 4.3 -0.4 0.1 1.4 1.71.3 -3.7 -0.1 -0.91 -1.7 1.3 5.4 1. OMFUnmmt mevice 
ozs or/iinating V heta e in 3.3 0.9 1.8 -1.9 0.3wxy.1110 
1.9 6.6 2.9 -3.3 2.120. Haize21. Oboormt 0.3 
1.4 7.0 1.3 0.1 2.922. Sugarane 
-3.1 -2.5 -2.7 -2.8 
-0.2 -1.923. 
Cuavs 
24. Al othdr 4.7 -1.3 -1.1 
2.7 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 2.5 2.8
25. Population 9.2 8.326. Public amzum 4.5 S.0 7.2 5.6 6.0 9.7 
27. Private cimzpLtm 6.% 4.7 5.0 5.4 6.8 7.0 6.3 6.7 
28. Crws dawstc invebment 7.0 8.2 10.5 8.6 4.9 15.9 7.7 9.5 
29. Ext (miswn.t) 3.9 2.2 7.0 4.4 5.4 5.2 11.8 7.5 
30. Uirts ( }stanti 3.7 7.1 3.4 4.7 U1.3 , 11.2 5.4 9.3 
(1) In calculating product per worker of I Sector in 1950s for the PhiLippines, mplo5ment in 1950 is obtained as the 
average of tw estimations one based on the trend line of 1948 and 1960 censuses, and the other the trend line of 1960 and 
1970 c uses. it is done because of the extremely low level of I enployment in 1948. 
Sourss: kdless otherwise indicated, all data are taken fron various issues of World Devel2=t R and IBM World 
Tables 1980. Ewploynent data used in computing lines 3, 4, 8-10 and 11-18 mainly from iw Yearbook or 
Stattics. Peal in=m originated frou crops for Thailand obcained fran various issues of National im-um of 
~II7 rea harvested from various; issues of FAO Production Yearok and FMO~l ttsis Area, 
Yield 1948-64. Official nationaf-1FZW -pulicatis (NationalIncaleof Thailand and Y 
!'tlipp!e National ccunts) were used in cauputing lines U to 18. 
Mm am 
B. Statistics of Comprative Percentage and Absolute Changes,
 
Philippines and Thailand, 1950 to 1980
 
THAflANDPHILIPPINES 

1950S 1960s 1970s Change 1950s 1960s 1970s Change 
Percentage of labor force in 
1. Agriculture 
2. Industry 
3, Service 
GDP originatin in 
61 
15 
24 
46 
17 
37 
-24.6 
13.3 
54.2 
84 
4 
12 
76 
9 
15 
-9.5 
125.0 
25.0 
4. Agriculture 
5. Industry 
(a) Manufacturing 
6. Service 
26 
28 
20 
46 
23 
37 
Z.6 
40 
-11.5 
32.1 
30.0 
-13.0 
40 
19 
13 
41 
25 
29 
20 
46 
-37.5 
52.6 
53.8 
12.2 
External public debt as 
7. % of GP 9.0 18.2 102.2 5.0 12.4 
148.0 
No. of enrolled as %of age group in 
8. Primary schools 
9. Secondary schools 
10. Higher education 
95 
25 
13 
98 
63 
27 
3.2 
142.3 
107.7 
83 
13 
2 
82 
29 
7 
-1.2 
123.1 
250.0 
1950 1960 1970 1980 Ave. 1950 1960 1970 1980 Ave. 
Absolute Magnitudes 
11. Population (millions) 
12. Per capita $ GP 
13. Life expectancy at 
birth (years) 
14. Energy consumption per 
capita, kg. of coal 
equivalent (1980 figure 
is for 1979) 
15. Crude brith rate per 1000 
16. Crude death rate per 1000 
17. Total fertility rate 
18. Working age population 
(15 to 64 yrs.) million 
persons 
19. huber of tourists 
(millions) 
20.9 27.4 
53 
147 
46 
15 
0.05 
36.9 
280 
57 
301 
43 
11 
0.1 
, 
48.3 
690 
64 
329 
34 
7 
4.6 
22.4 
1.0 
33.4 
58 
259 
41 
11 
0.4 
20.0 26.4 
52 
60 
44 
17 
0.1 
35.7 
270 
57 
247! 
42 
12 
0.7 
47.0 
670 
63 
353 
30 
8 
4.0 
2.2 
32.3 
57 
220 
39 
12 
1.0 
Data from IBRD World Developnt Reports, various issues, except otherwise noted.
Sources and Notes: 

Thailand and the Philippines, 1950 to 1980 C. C pative Firncial, Fiscal and Other Data, 
PHILIPPINESTHAIIAND WholeWhole. 
1960s 1970s PeriodPeriod 1950s1950s 1960s 1970s 
Savings as %of GNP, in avrages	 11.4 8.3 8.8 7.9 8.3 10.6 12.1
1. Personal savings 	 2.3 3.6 2.41.9 1.3
1.7 2.0
2. Corporate saving 	 1.4 3.9 2.3
1.9 2.7 
3. Government saving 3.5 	
1.6 
-0.3 -3.1 -1.1
-1.1 -4.6 -1.9 -0.0 4. 	 Surplus on current acceunt 

(deficit)
 
Private Consumpton Expenditures asof 1W..P in averages6817. 76.0 68.1 75.1 74.2 70.0 67.5 70.6 81.3 5. Ttal con.metion 	 27.9 26.826.0 26.6
37.1 35.5
34.4 35.0
6. Non-food 

17.5 18.6 17.6 15.0 15.2 15.8 15.3 16.6
7. Clothing and hItmsehold 
8. Food as % of Private	 57.9
46.9 '59.0 58.2 56.3 

Consuzton Expenditure 49.0 47.5 44.3 
Central Government Revenue and 
Expieitures as %of GP ii.5 15.4 12.314.3 10.1
13.9 14.7
9. Total Current Revenue 	 9.3 10.1 13.6 11.013.3
12.9 13.6
10. Direct and Indirect taxes 	 0.4 0.4 .0.4
0.2 0.1 0.3
ii. Subsidies 	
-0.2 -0.2
-0.2 -0.1
3.5 1.9 2.7 
12. Net lending (borrowing) 

Prices, growth rates 5.1 15.0 6.9
3.7 2.2 10.5 5.5 0.7 13. Consumer prices 	 7.35.8 15.5
1.7 1.9 10.2 4.6 0.7 
14. Implicit prices (GNP) 	 4.7

-0.1 -0.1 -0.03 0.2 6.8 7.0 
15. Foreign exchange 0.1 
Mney supply, growth rates 9.6 4.3 9.7 16.7 10.25.3 13.8
16. Currency & demand deposits 
from 	various issues of National Income of Thailand and NEDA Philippine National Sources: Lines 1-12 computed 	 line 16fran IBRD World Tables and Key Indicators of DMs of -DB (April 1982);Accounts; lines 13-15 issues of Statistical Yearbook of 
computed from NEDA Philippine Statistical earbook 1982 and various 
Thailand.
 
___ 
__ 
roth Rates in Mlaysia and I sia, 
Groith Rates in Constant Price, Gecetri Rates per Year 1950 to 1990
Statistics of C v eGara 
_ __ 
__I1UYSA __ 
thle
Whole 

1970s Period1950s 1960s 1970s Period 1950s L960 
Oaral! Groh Rates in 7.6 5.24.0 3.93.6 6.5 7.8 6.01. GDP prices 5.7 3.31.9 2.31.0 3.3 5.3 3.22. GOP per capita 2.2 3.9 3.13.12.9 2.1 4.03. Ddloymet 3.7 2.71.70.7 4.4 3.8 3.04. G par acdIer 
Liactor Garth Mat" In 3.02.6 2.7 3.8
0.9 5.8 5.1 3.95. AriculturaL prom= 5.2 11.1 8.26.1 ­3.7 7.0 9.76. Ir z3t JA1 product 7.05.6 - 4.8 9.21.3 7.2 8.27. Servic Mo 1uct 2.4 2.20.8 6.1 4.1 3.7 a, Aviculbfal pmuct per worker 
1.9 
5.0 3.1 
* 0.8 A.9 3.1 2.9 1.2 9. lnZistrIal product per worker 0.60.3 0.8

-1.2 3.4 2.9 1.710. Service pxuoact per woter 
agg,=ts ruith of Prodt Per Worker in 
-8.21.10.2 1.1 2.0 
-6.0 9.2 0.3 1.211. mnng anl quarrying 6.1 12. Cbmtrition 4.96.913. Electricty and public ui33tie. 6.8.
 
14. amq 'oct,stage and oommicati 13.3 7.9 9.4 3.8 7.65.9
1.1 4.515. NHsufacuid 
2.7
1.7 
service
17. Personal and others ]5.68  Governnen 

2.0 2.3 2.12.5 2.9 2.4 2.C 2.1 19. pqxlatjim 12.9 4.57.5 9.9 8.7 -0.4 0.920. Publc orstion 5.7S.0 4.1 8.14.2 7.2 5.721. Private cumuoption 14.4 7.07.5 10.3 8.9 1.9 4.6 22. Gross doastic invesbient 5.95.8 7.4 6.6 4.9 4.0 8.7 23. Dqrts (contant) U.9 5.52.3 7.0 4.7 2.7 i.0 24. lsports (onstant) 
Notaas 1) For 1950s data on alaysiaV,. 1 frln Werd ablese 1980 and are not exactly misistent with ros 4, 9-10 which were calculated 
Bhanoji Pao, National Accounts of West Malaysia 1947-71. usiz product data fran V.V. 
Data for 1950s and 19609 refer to Peninsular Malaysia only.2) 
all data are taken fran various issues of L World Develgnt "r, and IJI Wbrd Souwrces iUless otherwise indicated, and 11-18-9inly from 1i Yearfrok of?ailes 1980. Diploynent datr used in caoit ng lines 3, 4, 9-10 in V.V. hanoji Pao, Nat.tonal Acouts of West Staust cs. Lines 11 and 17 are carpited using product data 
data for 1970s which are fran Ministry of Finance Ecnomic port.Pala'.ila 947-71 exc-, 
B. 	Statistics of Comparative Percentage and Absolute Changes, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, 1950 to 1980 
INDONESIAMALAYSIA 
Percentage of labor force in 
1. Agriculture 
2. Industry 
3. Service 
GDP originatin in 
1950s 1960s 
63 
12 
25 
1970s 
50 
16 
34 
Change 
-20.6 
33.3 
36.0 
1950s 1960s 
75 
8 
17 
1970s 
58 
12 
30 
Change 
-22.7 
50.0 
76.5 
4. Agriculture 
5. Industry 
(a) Manufacturing 
6. Service 
39 
14 
6 
47 
37 
18 
9 
45 
'24 
37 
23 
39 
-38.5 
164.3 
283.3 
-17.0 
54 
14 
8 
32 
26 
42 
9 
32 
-51.9 
200.0 
12.5 
0.0 
External public debt as 
7. %of GIP 
1970 
10 
1980 
13.7 37.0 27.1 22.5 
No. of enrolled as %of age T_ 
8. Primary schools 
9. Secondary schools 
10. Higher education 
up in 96 
19 
1 
93 
52 
3 
-3.1 
173.7 
200.0 
71 
6 
1 
94 
22 
3 
32.4 
266.7 
200.0 
Absoute anitdes 
II. Population (millions) 
12. Per capita $ GNP 
13. Life expectancy at birth 
14. Energy consumption per 
capita (kg. of coal 
equivalent) 
15. Crude birth rate per 1000 
16. Crude death rate per 1000 
17. Total fertility rate 
1950 
6.3 
1960 
8.0 
261 
53 
239 
45 
9.1 
1970 
10.7 
750 
59 
469 
38 
6.8 
1980 
13.6 
1620 
64 
713 
31 
6.0 
4.2 
Ave. 
9.7 
877 
59 
474 
38 
7.3 
1950 
76.7 
150 
1960 
94.7 
180 
41 
125 
46 
23 
1970 
117.6 
225 
46 
120.' 
40 
18 
1980 
147.5 
430 
53 
225 
35 
13 
4.5 
Ave.. 
109.1 
246 
47 
157 
40 
18 
Data for 1950s and 1960s refer to Peninsular Malaysia only.Note: 

Source: IBRD World Development Report 1982 & IBRD World Tables 1980.
 
Statistics of Cmparative Grth Pates in r K a4 r o 
Crowth Rates in Constant Prime Gcuttric ates per e1950 to 1980 
IG X= SDVAP0I 
IVZle 
1950s 1960s 1970s Perim 1950s 1960s 1970s Peri 
owra11 cath mes In 9.3 9.5 5.4(l) 0 8.5 0.1I. U P ii&Rket ==aL 9.2 10.0 
4.5 7.2 6.4 6.0 1.3(1) 6.7 7.7 6.22. GOP par capita 
3. BR)init 5.3 4.5 4.8 3.1 4.8 3.3 
4. GOP per w 4.7 5.8 4.7 5.7 3.7 4.8 
- ior Ctoh Pates In 1.9 -4.6 *-1.4 5.0 2.8 3.45. i r-a tural Fmo3h 
6. lndustrial pruc 7.9 8.2 0.1 12.5 0.8 10.7 
7.7 8.5 9.1
 
. icultural product per worker' 9.3 4.9 6.7 10.1 6.7 3.5

7. Servicm 11.5 9.8 10.7 
9. xndze prolcl per worker 2.8 3.0 2.9 5.3 4.3 4.9 
7.6 4.7 6.2 5.5 3.0 4.310. Servic pruct per vorker 
&h s r Grmth of Prmwt Per Worker in 
7.0 16.5 .11.811. Hfird quarrying O7

-10.3 5.0 -2.7 1.1 0.9 6.012. Cntrutio 
13. Eletricity and public utilities 21.0 6.9 14.0 8.0 8.9 8.5 
14. Tranqxwt, storage and ozuumlcatiui -2.2 2.3 0.1 3.7 9.7 6.7 
15. Mmfacturing 6.3 .3.0 4.7 5.q 2.2 3.6 
Services 7.0 0.5 3.8
 
4.5 8.5 6.517. Formal, ¢govemet,services 
and others 
2.6 2.5 3.2 4.8 2.4 1.5 2.919. PmlatI 4.5 

19. Working age population 2.8 3.9 3.4 3.3 2.6 3.0 
20. Public cosumption 8.6 9.4 9.0 12.6 6.4 9.5 
21. Private o izptian 8.8 8.6 9.5 9.0 5.4 6.8 6.1 
22. Gross doestic investment 6.9 12.7 9.8 20.5 6.7 13.6 
23. Dqtz (ocstant) 12.7 9.4 11.1 4.2 12.0 8.1 
24. 1nports (onstant) 9.2 11.7 10.5 5.9 9.9 7.9 
(1) 1956-60 
sorcess Unless otherwise indicated, all data are taken frzn various issues of M World Devel t rt and MM World 
Tables 1980. Eployent data from rLD Yearbook and Labor Statistics. Promict used in M l-es ME-um 
ZMEi pubIlication on national accounts. 
B. statistics of Onzmarative Percentage and Absolute Changes, 
Singapore 	and Hong Kong, 1950 to 1980 
HONG KONG SINGAPORE % 
percnaeo ~o force p .ta of l ore2. Aiculture 
2. Industry3. Service 
in-7. 
1950s 1960s 
852 
40 
1970s 
357 
40 
Change 
-62.5 
9.6 
0.0 
1950s 1960s 
8 
23 
69 
1970s 
2 
39 
59 
Change 
-75.0 
69.6 
-14.5 
GDP originatin44. Agriculture 
5. Industry(a) Manufacturing6. MService 
39 
3626. 
57 
1 
42 
228 
57 
-75.0 
7.7 
7.7712813. 
0.0 
418 
12 
78 
137 
28 
62 
75.0105.6 
133.3 
-20.5 
Debt service as %of 
7. GNP8. Exports 
0.6 
0.6 
2.5 
1.1 
316.7 
83.3 
External public debts 
9. % of GNP 
as 
0.1 1.9 -1800.0 7.9 12.8 62.0 
No. of enrolled as %of age roup in 
10. Primary schools 
11. Secondary schools 
12. Higher education 
1950 
Absolute Magnitudes 
13. Population (millions) 1.97 
14. Per capita $ NP 
15. Life expectancy at birth6 
(years) 
16. Energy oon per 
capita (kg. of coal 
equivalent) 
17. Crude birth rate per 1000 
18. Crude death rate perlO00 
19. Total fertility rate 
20. Working age pop. (15-64)nms. 
21. Number of tourists 
87 
20 
4 
1960 
3.1 
67 
450 
35 
8 
1.75 
109 
63 
11 
1970 
3.9 
69 
1017 
22 
5 
2.2 
2.30 
25.3 
215.3 
175.0 
1980 Ave. 
5.1 3.5 
4420 
74 70 
1481 983 
17 25 
5 6 
2.2 
3.37 2.47 
1950 
1.0 
111 
32 
6 
1960 
1.6 
64 
49 
38, 
8 
0.88 
107 
59 
9 
1970 
2.1 
68 
1402 
23 
5 
1.22 
630 
1980 
2.4 
4430 
72 
5784 
17 
5 
1.8 
1.58 
2562 
-3.6 
4.4 
50.0 
Ave. 
1.8 
68 
2561 
26 
6 
1.23 
1596 
Source: Same as Part A general sources. 
Stati tic of Omarative Gacwth Rates in Odm and 'dia, 
ith tat-sIn Cr.-ant lPric, GeutriLc Pates pr Year -- 50 to 1980 
Wtmole Whole 
Ped
Peri 	 1950s 19608 1970s 1950S 19608 1970s .3 63.
 
_mn uLll Gr t a tes In3 3.6
3.8 	 3.4 3.6 4.8(2) 6.0 6.0 	 1.2 1.6
-I-. G8.9(1) 	 5.013) 7.8(4) 4.1 5.4 1.9 2.2 2. GD cait 

6.1 -0.9 2.8 2.7
3.7 . 3.33.6(1) 	 2.912)
2. Mq p ttr 	 0.8 0.9
-2.3 4.3
2.3 2.7
5.3(1) 	 1.9(2)
4. GDP pr mod= 
1.9 2.3
3.2 	 1.9
3.3 2.8 

5e-t_" 12.2 5.7
4.9(1) 	
1.2(2) 5.2
 
___ 	 5.4 4.5 18.0(1) 	 12.2(2) 8.9 5.2 4.7
--t 	 4.3 4.6: , , , 	 3.3(2) 3.9 3.5 
o.1(1) 	 -0.16. 	 0.7 -3.6 2.9 0.4 2.6(1) -1.3(2) 2.5 xt Per uodcer 	 1.1 2.0Agritural W 	 -0.6 5.4S. 	 16.6(1) 6.7(2) 1.5 6.9 P. t per Ar 2.7(1) 1.6(2) 0.1 1.3 0.5 4.9 0.7 	 2.1,:InanialSrvice pcu1t per vmcker9. 
zwncGrowth of Product Worrker In 1.0 5.2 5.4 3.9 
-.- Mn ndquarryingh 
-2.1 5.9 -2.1 0.6 
12. Const dtioa 	 6.7 13.1 -3.8 5.3 
123. Zlecticty ad Pbj utilee 	 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.5 
14. Trnsprt, a e and COjmUcatio 	 -1.0 5.3 2.5 2.3 
1: Me- acturinn 
3.4 	 3.2 1.5 2.7.
.v 

]-0.7 6.2 -0.4 1.7 
17. Permnal ad others 
]A. ooeruut erviams 
2.1 2.5 2.3(4) 	 1.1(5) 2.6(6) 2.1 4.3 1.1 4.9w 	 hectare In 4.4 1.6 2.64.0 	 1.73.1(4) 	 2.2(5) 5.4(6) 1.720. t 	 -0.7 0.5 1.3(4) 	 0.6(5) 5.0(6) 3.0 5.3 5.921. Corn 2.6(6) 0.9
-0.7(4) 	 -1.2(5)22. Swyhmn 	 1.22.2(4) -2.0(5) 2.7(6)23. oUMs 	 1.6 2.8 2.2 2.2 4.1(4) 5.0(5) 1.1(6) 2.9 24. C 	 0.2 -0.8 1.3 0.7 
-4.6(4) 0.3(5) 1.9(6) 	 0.4 25. Peants 	 1.0 -0.1 0.5 0.0(4) -0.3(5) 1.0(6) 0.4 26. aLmrw 	 2.3 2.1 2.1 
27. Population 	 2.3 1.9 1.9 2.0 
1.9 
1.5 1.7 1.6 2.8(1) 2.5 2.7 2.7 29. 1 foare 
(4) 1952-57, (5) 1957-65, (6) 1965-79. (1) 	 1952-57t (2) 1957-70, (3) 1949-62, 
of usual definitincand powr. All other branches of I sector includes mining, mnufacturingtotest 	 For China, I Sector 

are included in S sector.
 
19B0 and various cmntry publications likeIM ) World TablesFe.In)rt1982 mpplm,,nted byZ)RD *brld Develcpnt 	 PPC. Yield per hiectare ofEourcesi 	 cipiled by the State Statistical jrneau,S;tatistical Yearbook of Cdin 1981 	 World Cropof F0 Prduction Yearook and FAO for India ,crzputed fran various issuesagricultural products 
Statistics, 1948-64. 
China & India, 1950 to 1980B. Statistics of CQoziarative Percentage and Absolute Changes, 
CHINA INDIA 
/ 1950s 1960s 1970s Change 1950s 1960s 1970s Change-
Percena of labor force in 
1.Agiculture
2. Industry 
3. Service 
84 
6 
10 
82 
6 
12 
74 
13 
13 
-11.9 
116.7 
30.0 
71 
13 
16 
74 
11 
15 
69 
13 
18 
-2.8 
0.0 
12.5 
GDiP ojEinatig in 
4. Ariculture 
5. Industry 
a) Manufacturing 
6. Service 
58 
28 
20 
15 
46 
44 
36 
9 
38 
54 
46 
8 
-34.5 
92.9 
130.0 
-46.7 
50 
21 
16 
29 
50 
20 
14 
30 
37 
26 
18 
37 
-26.0 
23.8 
12.5 
27.6 
Absolute Magntdes 1950 1960 1970 1980 Ave. 
1950 1960 1970 1980 Ave. 
7. Population (m) 
"8.Per capita $ GNP 
9. Life expectancy at 
. birth (yrs.) 
541.7(1) 
36 
646.5(2) 825.9 
57 
982.6 
290 
64 
749.2 
61(6) 
361.6 
, 
434.9 
43 
547.6 
48 
673.2 
240 
52 
504.3 
48(6) 
10. Energy oonsunption per 
capita, kg. of coal equiv. 
11. Crude birth rate per 1000 
12. Camde death rate per 1000 
13. Ttotal fertility rate 
14. Working age prop. 
37.0(3) 
17.0(3) 
560 
34.0(2) 
10.8(2) 
33.6 
7.6 
734(4) 647 
17.9(4) 30.6 
6.2(4) 10.4 
2.9 
628.9 
111 
44 
22 
242.2 
40 
17 
298.9 
194(4) 
36 
14 
4.9 
383.7 
153 
40 
18 
308.3 
(15-64 yrs.) 
15. Gini coefficient 
16. Nutzer of tourists (n.) 
.33(4) 
5.7 
.38(5) 
(1)1949, (2)1957, (3)1952, (4)1979, (5)1975/76, (6)Average of 1960 and 1980.
 
for China refer to those of Net Material Product. I sector inciudes industry (mining,Notes: Lines 4, 5, & 6 
mftg. & power) and transport and construction. S Sector includes corerce only.' 5(a) refer to share of 
industry (mining, mftg. and power) instead of manufacturing only. 
Source: Sane as Part A Table. 
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1/ 	 "Lewis' Dualistic Theory and Postwar Asian Growth" Malayan 
Econamic Review, October 1981; "Further Notes on the Limitations of 
Growth Theories", Philippine Review of Economics and Business, 
September/December 1980; "The Ranis-Fei Model of Development", 
American Economic Review, June 1963; "On the Theory of 
Underemployment", Journal of Political Economy, June 1958. 
2/ 	 See. V.D. Wickizer and M.K. Bennett, The Rice Economy of Monsoon 
Asia, Food Research Institute, Stanford: 1941, pp. 26-27. "Few 
agricultural alternatives present themselves. Neither wheat, 
barley, rye nor oats will thrive as summer crops under such 
conditions of moisture and heat. Millet, grain, sorghums, and 
maize do better but can equal rice only in areas of lower rainfall 
- and none can produce as much food per unit of land in the places 
where lowland rice thrives". (pp. 49-51) 
3/ 	The Pattern of Asia, ed. by N. Ginsburg, New Jersey: 1958, pp. 
5-15. "The seasonal heating and cooling of this, the world's 
largest land mass, makes for major seasonal variations in climate. 
In winter, when the interior regions are cold, a semi-permanent 
high pressure belt forms within the northern interior of the 
continent, and strong, cc-.d winds, outflowing as polar continental 
air masses fran the anti-cyclones within the belt bring winter to 
most of the continent. In summer, the rapid and continuous heating 
of the irterior results in lower pressures and in the inflow of 
tropical maritime air from the continent' s margin. Since the 
outflowing winds [from the continent] are land-originated and 
usually do not pass over large bodies of water, they are dry, and 
the winters also tend to be dry. Conversely, in the summer the 
generally weaker inflows of air from the eastern and southern seas 
are humid and carry with them the moisture that for much of Asia 
makes simmer the rainier season". (p. 7) 
4/ 	For details of, the data, see my. paper "Seasonality and 
Underemployment in Monsoon Asia", Philippine Economic Journal, Vol. 
X, No. 1, First Semester 1971, pp. 73-83. Another approach to the 
measurement of underemployment is the use of caloric consumption 
data from the food balance sheets. In Taiwan and Japan where the 
farm population was fully employed in the 1960s, caloric intake per 
day was around 2,500 per person compared to an average of around 
2,000 for other countries of monsoon Asia where underemployment was 
extensive.
 
5/ 	For further data see ibid., pp. 65-66.
 
6/ 	Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Tines to 1957, 
A Statistical Abstract Supplement, p. 281, Washington, D.C.: 1961­
7/ 	For more detailed discussion, Philippine Econcmic Journal, op.cit., 
pp. 65-70. 
8/ 	Even with the beginning of the rainy season, the peasant must wait 
for the heavier rains before the brick-hard earth could be plowed. 
-- 
9/ 

10/ 

l/ 

12/ 

13/ 

-
14/ 
121 
This called for timely and concentrated plowing, long hours of work time of 
on the seedling beds and transplantation at the optimal if
also harvesting must be at the appropriate timeseedling growth; 
are to be avoided. The 1plicationslosses due to over-ripe grains 
number of neighbors arefor need for cooperative work by large 
discussed below.
 
11, 112.
Wickizer and Bennett, op. cit., pp. 
Nutrition and Economic Development", -EconomicIn "Food Consumption, pp. 392-393, I arguedDevelopment and Cultural Change, July 1967, 
the intake per day of the averagethat about one-half of caloric 
costs aadult Asian is similar to the overhi. d of firm in that it 
k activity of the individual.
is fixed and not varying with tife w 

This fixed part is needed for the basic physiologi~cal functions of
 is sleeping orthe human body irrespective of whether the person 
highly active. The fixed part is determined largely by the size of 
This paper goes on to cite the figures of Wickizer

-he human body. 
that due to population increases, per capita
and Bennett, op. cit., to have fallen during theconsumption of rice by Asians appeared 
first half of the 20th century, pp. 391-397.
 
I argue that one of the reasons for the faster growth of East 
Asia
 
postwar decades is the prevalence of over Southeast Asia in the 
Confucian teaching in the former countries. See "Manpower Quality
 
in the Differentip-i Growth of East and Southeast Asia", Philippine
 
3, 1980.Economic Journal, Vol. 19, No. 
in Asia, especially chapter bySee John Wong, editor, Go rming 

Fdward Reed, Singapore University Press: 1979.
 
1962,Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental De!,otism, pp. 372-375, N.Y.: 
points out that Marx elaborated the views of Classical economists 
that the need to maintain(Jones, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill) 
a central authorit­large irrigation and water control systems by But
 gave rise to nat.onwide political stability and unity in Asia. 
(Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia,much of monsoon Asia 
Java) do not have large rivers, (Indus, Ganges, Irrawaldy, Mekong, 
get their water mainly from theYangtze, and Yellow rivers) which plateau and mountain rangesmelting snow and rains from the vast 
and north of India, Pakistan and Southeast Asia. west of China 
paddy farms even of India, China, Burma,Moreover, mst of the 
Indo-China, Bangladesh obtain their water directly from the monsoon 
rains falling in their own territory, from smaller rivers which in 
turn get their waters directly from the local monsoon rains. 
Japan's Growth", Economic DevelopmntIn "Reinterpreting Postwar 
I have argued that one of theand Cultural Chane, Octcber 1982, 
for the rapid growth has been the ability of various groupsreasons 
in Japan to work closely together. I have discussed the nature of 
the 20th century industrial technology requiring cooperation in the 
in the US the Significance of New
"Growth of Factor Productivity 
the Early Decades of the 20th Century", forthcomingTechnologies in 

in the Journal of Economic History.
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Confucian ethics may be said to be the philosophy of monsoon 
paddy agriculture, extolling and reinforcing the virtues of harmony 
as the key to social and political stability, and compromise, 
moderation, diligence, cooperation, and integrity as the means to 
achieve harmony. A.F. Wright, editor, Confucian Personalities, p. 
5, Stanford: 1962; "Confucians of all ages viewed the natural and 
human worlds as an organism made of multitudiness, interconnected 
parts. When any one of the parts fe 11 from its place or was 
disrupted in its functioning, the harmony of the whole was 
impaired". The modern industrial plant has become since the early 
decades of the 20th century increasingly an organism of 
interconnected parts where stoppage in one part means the whole 
plant must be closed dowon, unlike the factory in the 19i century, 
with 	non-serialized, individual achines. See on this the writings 
of Thorstein Veblen who lived at a time when the steam-driven 
technology of the First Industrial Revolution was being replaced by 
the Second Industrial Revulution of the electric-drive. 
15/ 	 "Monsoon Asia Falls Behind the West Since the 17th Century", School 
of Econcmics, University of the Philippines, (mimeo), April, 1982. 
16/ 	 Elsewhere I have defined underenployment as insufficient amount of 
work throughout the year. Underemployment cannot be adequately 
measured by hours or days of work per year in the slack seasons, 
the number of workers available for work are so large that a worker 
doing a full day's may not be'working intensively. For example, in 
the case of peddlers, stall-keepers, tricycle drivers, and so on, 
although on the job for full day, the amount of work done (or sales 
transacted) may actually take no more than a few hours. Or the 
peasants working on irrigation and other construction projects with 
plenty of time on hand, (or being paid poorly) may go about their 
work leisurely. Nor should availability for work be defined as 
those "looking for work" as in the usual labor force definition. 
In the dry seasons, villagers know quite well that work is not 
available and it will look ridiculous for them tr go around asking 
for work. It is 'the willingness to work at the going wage rates 
that is important, and the going rate being low, the intensity of 
work is also low since a higher intensity may raise the 
calorie-cost of the work he is doing above the food calories he can 
buy with the wages he receive. 
17/ 	 See Philippine Economic Journal cited in footnote 4 above, First 
Semester 1971. 
18/ 	 I have argued against the constant-.age assuption of the dualist 
theorists in the Malayan Economic Review, October 1981. 
19/ 	 Further notes on social obligations in Asian countries are found in 
the Philippine Review of Economics ad Business, December 1977. 
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manufactures can rise
20/ 	 The caTpetitiveness of labor-intensive 
-- rapidl, once Asian entrepreneurs and workers gain sane experience
 
becau.e, unlike in the 19th century and pre-World War II decades,
 
need not
small but efficient machines can be rep-ily imported and 

wait for innovation to take place.
 
in Asian Develop v -nt: Summary and Further21/ 	"Multiple-Cropping 
Research", Philippine Economic Journal, Special Issue in 
1 & 2, 1975.Multiple-Cropping in Asia, Nos. 
22/ Also as transport, ccmunication, utilities, finances, educational 
and health opportunities are made available increasingly in various 
parts of the rural hinterland, regional disparities start to 
S'_e "Trends in Growch and Distribution of Income indecline. 

Selected Asian Countries", Philippine Economic Journal, No. 3,
 Income",1976, and "Perspectives on T.ends in Asian Household 
Ekonami Dan Keuangan Indonesia, March 1982.
 
23/ 	Sin-on Kuznets, Share of the Upper Income Groups in Income and 
Savings, NBER, N.Y." 1953. 
to the
24/ 	 In this paragraph, the growth rate of family income is eal 

growth rate of family consumption multiplied by family's average
 
propensity to consume plus the growth rate of family saving 
ultiplied by the propensity to save.
 
the pattern of growth, see K.S. Kim and M.25/ 	For the similarities in 
Roemer, Growth and Structural Transformation, pp. 147-152, Harvard: 
1979.
 
26/ From Essays in Conteaprary Economic Problems: Demand Productivity 
by William Fellner, p. 129, Washington,and Population, edited 

D.C.: 1981.
 
27/ 	 See Toshiyuki Mizoguchi from sources cited in Table 1.
 
28/ 	 Pberto Repetto and Associates, Economic.. Development, Population 
Policy, and Demographic Transition in the Republic of Korea, p. 49, 
Harvard: 1981. 
Itural real incomes from the national accounts; the number of
29/ 	Agri 
farm households and per cent of nonfarm incomes from Taiwan for 	 RuralAr]cultural Statistics 1961-1975, Joint Cnmission 
(JCRR) Taipei: 1978. Japanese estimates based onReoistruction 
c.ca fron various issues of the Japan Statistical Yearbook, Tokyo. 
production data from Y.M. Ho, AgriculturalFor the earlier years, 
Developent of Taiwan, Vanderbilt: 1966, p. 19; also T.H. Lee in 
Place in the Strategy of Developirent: the TaiwanAgriculture's 
69, Taipei: 1974.
Experience, ed. by T.H. Shen, p. 
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30/ 	 Agricultural real inccribs fran National Income in Korea, Bank of 
Korea, and number of farm households fran Korean Statistical 
Yearbook. 
31/ 	 See discussion in Chapter 2 by Erik Thorbecke in Econanic Growth 
and Structural Change, ed. by W. Galenson, Cornel: 1979, and Rural 
Development by S.H. Ban, P.Y. Moon, and D.H. Perkins, Harvard: 
1980, especially Chapters 3 & 4. Also see Korea: Policy Issues for 
Tong-Term Developent by Parvez h,,sen and D.C. Rao, World Bank 
Country Report, Jobh Hopkins Press: 1979. For Japan, see my ECC 
paper, op. cit. Multiple-cropping ratio computed from One Hundred 
Years of Agricultural Statistics of Japan, Korean Statistical 
Yearbook, and Taiwan Agricultural Statistics, 1961-1975. 
32/ 	Data from ibid. See also Sloboda in note 45, p. 110. 
33/ 	Data frm =LO's Yearbook c2 Labor Statistics.
 
34/ 	 Data from sources in 31/ besides Agriculture's Place in the 
Strategy of Development, Taiwan's Experience, ed. by T.H. Shen, 
Taipei: 1974. 
35/ 	Japan and Korea data frcn FAO Production Yearbook 1980 and Taiwan 
data 	from Thorbecke, op. cit.
 
36/ 	EDCC, October 1982.
 
37/ 	See discussions in Rural Development, op. cit., especially chapters 
9 and 12.
 
38/ 	 T.H. Sheri in Agriculture's Place in the Strategy of Development, 
pp. 355-356, op. cit. Also pp. 143-149 on local government by S.C. 
Hsu, pp. 150-159 on irrigation associations by C.Y. Feng, pp. 
193-199 on extension services by Y.K. Yang and C.H. Huang on 
research , pp. 200-210. Carpare these pages with those of Chapter 
9 (by Vincent Brahdt) in Rural Development op. cit.; only in the 
1970's with the Saerraul Movement that some changes were made. 
39/ Papers by W.F. Hsu, Y.K. Mao, and Y.C. Hsu in Agriculture's Place 
... ibid. Also paper by Wangyong Kuo in Multiple-Cropping in Asian 
Development, Philippine Economic Journal, Nos. 1 & 2, 1975. 
40/ 	 Cainpare discussion by T.H. Lee, Intersectoral Capital Flows in the 
Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970, New Haven: 1978 and 
Chapter 2 on Rural Development, op. cit. On services rendered by 
local governments and farmers' association, see T.H. Shen, op. 
cit., pp. 354-364. Data on government expenditures fran The Six 
Year Plan for Economic Development of Taiwan, 1976-1981 and fram 
Statistical Yearbook of Korea. 
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op. 	 cit. On farm export.41/ ,On -apital transfers, see T.H. Lee, 
-- contribution, see K.S. Liang, "Agricultural Trade and Econaric 
Development in Taiwan", Philippine Econcmic Journal, Nos. 1 I 2, 
18 4 show that 54 per cent of inpor.t were1975 	op. cit., data on p. to 1965, andfinanced by farm exports during the crucial years 1953 beif it were caputed on value-added 	 basis the percentp4e may 
requirements of acriculturalsubstantially higher since imports 
exports were only one-third those of manufacturing ex>pzrts in 1969, 
p. 189. 
on farm -amily incore and42/ 	 Estirated on the basis of data 
noted in above sources, conve.c'-d to US dollar basisexpenditure as 

using IBRD currency conversion data.
 
S-'4tistical Yearbook of the43/ 	 Data for 1975 and 1981 from the 

Republic of China and Major Statistics of the Korean Econcmy.
 data on transplanting andJapan Statistical Yearbook, 1982 for 

reaping machines.
 
by T.H. Shen and Y.T. Wang on technology in44/ 	 See chapter 
of Development, ed. by T.H.Agriculture's Place in the Strategy 

Shen, op. cit.
 
Repetto45/ 	 See D.Y. Kin and J.E. Sloboda's chapter on migration in R. 
and Associates, Econamic Development, Population Policy, and Harvar4:Demnqraphic Transition Un the Republic of Korea, p. 61, 
1980. Net rural-urban migration was 2,300,000 in 1966-1970 and 
1,687,000 in 1970-1975. 
op. cit., pp. 14 & 15; Korea, Policy 	Issues for46/ 	Rural Development, 

Long-Term Development, p. 260.
 
47/ Data from Statistical Yearbook of the respective nations. A 
cursory glance at the topograhic maps of the Republic of Korea and 
on density since Taiwan appears toTaiwan w'ald bear out the data 

be even more mountainous than the Republic of Korea.
 
48/ See A. Krueger, The DeveLopret Pole of the Foreign Sector and AID, 
Harvard: 1979. Data on agriculture production and food imports 
. from Major Statistics of Korean Econcay.--.. . 
cited49/ 	 For Kim and SI-toda discussion, see the Repetto volume, 
above, pp. 109-113; for the Ranis discussion, see the Galenson 
vol-me, op. cit., pp. 222-228, No. 32, 1976, and my paper (jointly 
with W.H. Lai), "Labor Absorption in Taiwan" presented at the Asia,Conference on Manpoer Problems in East and Southeast 
the Philippine Ecnanic Journal,Singapore 1971, and reprinted in 
Special Issue on I.-bor Absorption, Nos. 1 & 2, 1976, pp. 139-182, 
Ranis shows that paved highways/railways per square kilcmeters of 
50 per cent greater in Taiwan in 1973/1974. For Bandt'sarea was 

discussion, see Rural Development, op. cit., pp. 157-158.
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50/ 	 In Mason and Associates, The Economic and Social. Modernization of 
the Republic of Korea, pp. 163-164, Harvard: 1980; it is said that 
the rise in the wage/rental ratio made necessary the export of 
heavy industrial products "to sustain the momentum of 
a pg-rt-oriented industrialization". But a large part of the rise 
was the outcome of a policy of export-oriented strategy. 
51/ 	 This section on heavy industries is a summary of my paper, 
"Problems of Heavy Industrialization in Asia", Philippine Review of 
Economics and Business, March 1983. 
52/ 	 For data on 1981 output of various industries and production 
capacities. see Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1982. 
53/ 	 Data from Major Statistics of Korean Economy and Statistical 
Yearbook of the Republic of China. 
54/ 	 On export value-added, see IBRD, Korea, op. cit., p. 233. 
55/ 	See C. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford: 1982, for 
discussion not only of MITI's role bu- of the over-all role of the 
Japanese State in development. On Korea, see P. Hassan, Korea, 
Problems and Issue in a Rapidly Growing Economy, IBRD, John Hopkins 
Press: 1976, *pp. 124-146 on the need for decentralized industrial 
planning. A less authoritarian central government in Taipei would 
have speeded up the nechanization of agriculture, and avoided the 
troubles Taiwan is having with its high cost petrochemical and 
aluminum production.
 
56/ 	 In my view, one secret of Japanese success in the postwar decades 
has been the high level of motivation reached by Japanese Manpower. 
See EDDC, April 1982. 
57/ 	 Because of these changes, .it is important to take a longer span of 
tire than a decade or even two decades when studying economic 
growth, as Kuznets has insisted. 
The data for Southeast Asian countries in general are imnch 
weaker than for East Asia, and their interpretations are nore 
difficult. The basic data for the national accounts are not as 
plentiful and more difficult to collect than in East Asia, while 
the limitation in the application of labor force and employnent 
concepts to Southeast Asian conditions are greater than in East 
Asia, as pointed out elsewhere. 
58/ 	 Asian data fram my paper "Sector Sources of Postwar Growth of the 
Philippines in Caparative Perspective", Philippine Economic 
Journal, forthccming; and S. Kuznets, Econamic Grath of Nations, 
TableIi, Harvard: 1971. 
59/ 	See for details, Asian Development Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1983. 
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60/ 	 See discussion in "Perspectives on Trends in Asian Household Income 
Distribution", Ekonami dan Keuangan Indonesia, March 1982. 
61/ 	 Malaysia, see various World Bank reports; on Thailand see among 
others, T.H. Silcock, eel., Thailand, Social and Econanic Studies, 
Chapters 1, 3 & 4, Australlan National University: 1967; also J. 
Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850-1970, Second Edition,. 
Stanford: 1971, Chapter 11. Also references to be cited below. 
62/ Rural family incomes data' fron Fourth Malaysia Plan, op. cit., 
onTable 3-9. Agricultural family incomes estimated fram 	FAO data 
agricultural population divided by average family size of Malay and 
Indian households fran ibid., real agricultural product from 
not include off-farm incomes. Thenational accounts which does 

latter may not have changed very much in the 1960s and were all,
 
about 10 per cent.
 
to get to harvest the palm oil trees, coconut63/ I am told that 
were not successful because ofcutters fram Hawaii were tried but 
the uneven terrain. 
64/ Estimated by using number uf household fran the censuses of 1947, 
- 1960, and 1970 and extending 1970 total to 1980 by the increase in 
the 1970 and 1980 censuses.agricultural employment as shown in 
Household income growth from national accounts. Product per worker 
data 	fram Appendix tables. 
65/ 	 FAO Production Yearbook, 1980. 
66/ 	 See ibid. 
67/ See data from FAO Yearbook discussed in Philippine Economic 
-- Journal, ibid., forthcming. 
68/ 	 Computed from agricultural censuses.
 
- 69/ Data from ibid.. 
70/ 	 See discussion in ibid. 
See basic data fran the national accounts of the two countries.71/ 
72/ 	 See Economic Development and Cultural Change, Octcber 1982. 
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